Witte's financial policy. Economic and financial policy S.Yu. Witte. What will we do with the received material?

29. Economic policy S.Yu. Witte and agrarian reform P.A. Stolypin.

The industrial boom in Russia is closely connected with the economic policy of the government and its head S. Yu. Witte (1849-1915). He contributed to the industrial development of the country, but viewed this factor not as a purely technical one, but as a path of its bourgeois progress, as an important transformative economic factor, as a social instrument for stabilizing the political situation in the country.

Witte's economic policy did not remain without the influence of the “master of the Russian land” Nicholas II (1894-1918). Nikolai did not show any inclination or desire to resolve the problems that had accumulated over the previous decades.

One of the components of economic policy at the turn of the century was the establishment of high customs duties on goods imported into Russia and at the same time the removal of obstacles to the penetration of foreign capital into the country. The introduction of the “gold standard”, i.e. the free exchange of the ruble for gold, contributed to the influx Money from abroad. The main investors were banks and joint stock companies of Great Britain, France, Germany and Belgium.

At Witte's initiative, a wine monopoly was introduced, i.e., the exclusive right of the state to sell alcoholic beverages. It provided the main revenues to the state budget.

In the same time economic policy tsarist government of the late 19th - early 20th centuries. remained controversial. Both Witte's program and the government's policy itself lacked a balance between the needs of industry and agriculture. This imbalance was one of the reasons for the economic crisis of 1900-1903, which completed the industrial boom of 1895-1899. However, the crisis was expressed only in a decrease in the growth rate of Russian industry, and not in stopping its progressive development.

In 1909-1913. Russia experienced a second industrial boom. But Russian industry could not successfully compete with the industry of Western countries, and certain successes were achieved more due to the regulatory role of the state.

A natural continuation of the government course at the beginning of the 20th century was the agrarian reform of P. A. Stolypin (1862-1911), who served as Chairman of the Council of Ministers in 1906-1911.

Purpose of the reform: maintaining landownership, accelerating bourgeois changes in agriculture, instilling in the peasant a sense of ownership, thereby relieving social tension in the countryside and creating a support for the government there - the rural bourgeoisie.

The essence of the reform:

Decree of November 9, 1906 allowed the peasant to leave the community, and the law of June 14, 1910. made exit mandatory.

a peasant could combine plots of land into a single plot or move to a separate farm

a fund was created from part of the state and imperial lands

To purchase land, the Peasant Bank provided cash loans

the government encouraged the resettlement of peasants beyond the Urals, because There was a “land famine” in the center of Russia.

An integral part of the agrarian reform was the resettlement policy. On the one hand, resettlement to Siberia and Kazakhstan made it possible to reduce social tension in European Russia, on the other hand, it contributed to the development of sparsely populated areas.

The reform contributed to the rise of the country's economy. Agriculture has become sustainable. The purchasing power of the population and foreign exchange earnings associated with the export of grain have increased.

In practice: 35% of peasants left the community; 10% started farms. 16% of the settlers returned to the central regions and joined the army of proletarians. 20% of peasants who took out a loan went bankrupt. The peasant's needs for land were not satisfied. The reform accelerated social stratification - the formation of the rural bourgeoisie and proletariat.

Economic and financial policy S.Yu.Witte. Ministry of Finance, in charge financial policy, for eleven years (from 1892 to 1903) was headed by S. Yu. Witte, the largest statesman in Russia at the turn of the 19th-20th centuries. Witte headed the financial department at a time of crisis for the state, when finances and the economy were seriously undermined by the unprecedented famine of 1891-1892. Once again, the country was faced with choosing a way out of the crisis.

One of these ways was to democratize the regime, in deep social structural changes, in providing personal freedom to the population and greater opportunities for the development of market relations and private entrepreneurship. But in this case, tsarism had to, if not break up completely, then significantly sacrifice its power, and this was unacceptable for it.

The opposition forces to tsarism that expressed such an alternative were at that time extremely weak and dispersed and could not have any influence on the nature of domestic politics. Tsarism used its traditional policy, which boiled down to further strengthening of state intervention in the economy, to the wider use of monetarist methods of its improvement, avoiding deep social transformations. Witte's significance as a financier, economist and statesman lay in the fact that, with the determination, assertiveness and scope inherent in his nature, he consistently implemented such a policy.

S. Yu. Witte paid main attention to strengthening finances, as well as the development of industry and railway transport. During Witte's tenure at the head of the financial department the state budget has more than doubled. In 1892 it was about one billion rubles, and in 1903 more than two billion.

The average annual budget growth was 10.5%, while in the previous decade it was 2.7%, and in the subsequent decade - 5%. Budget growth was ensured mainly due to increased revenues from state property, increased indirect taxes and the wider use of a progressive tax on corporate profits instead of the previous system of trade taxation in the form of fees for the right to trade and trade. The increase in direct taxes was insignificant and was reduced mainly to an increase in taxes on residential and urban real estate.

Moreover, some direct taxes were even reduced. So the land tax was reduced by half. Officially, this measure was explained by the agricultural crisis, but in reality it had primarily the goal of supporting the landed nobility. Annual redemption payments were partially reduced by lengthening total term buyout operation. The most profitable item in the budget was the wine monopoly introduced under Witte.

According to this measure, the production of raw alcohol remained a private matter; its purification, production of vodka and strong wines were also carried out in private factories, but only by order of the treasury and under the strict supervision of excise supervision. The sale of these drinks became a state monopoly, but it did not apply to the production and sale of beer, mash and grape wine. The introduction of the wine monopoly began in 1894 and by the end of Witte’s tenure as minister it was extended throughout the entire territory of the empire except for the remote outskirts.

With the help of the wine monopoly, the state was able to increase drinking revenues not only by spreading it to new areas and by increasing the sale of strong drinks, but also by increasing prices for these drinks. Treasury revenues from the wine monopoly were constantly growing and in 1913 were almost three times more than all direct taxes. In this regard, the state budget was called the “drunk budget” not without reason. Contrary to the assurances of the authorities and the press that served them, the introduction of a monopoly did not help reduce drunkenness and improve the morality of the people.

On the contrary, the secret sale of wine increased, and most importantly, a whole army of new officials appeared in charge of the monopoly, which corrupted not only themselves, but also those who had to turn to them, giving rise to such negative phenomena as tyranny, arbitrariness, corruption, sycophancy, theft etc. The wine monopoly was the most effective, but not the only measure for replenishing the treasury and indirectly taxing the people.

The increase in excise taxes was also significant, and therefore retail prices on goods of everyday mass consumption: matches, tobacco, kerosene, sugar, tea, etc. Excise taxes have been increased repeatedly on a number of such goods. Among the measures taken by Witte to strengthen financial system country, the monetary reform he implemented played a major role. Its essence boiled down to the introduction of the free exchange of paper money for gold currency. The need for such a reform was recognized by Witte’s predecessors in the Ministry-N. X. Bunge and I.A. Vyshnegradsky, they took some preparatory measures for its implementation, stabilizing finances and accumulating gold reserves.

Witte, with his characteristic determination and consistency, brought their work to the end. First of all, he took a number of measures to further stabilize the exchange rate of the credit ruble. Private credit banks, in order to avoid speculation on their part in the exchange rate of the ruble, they were strictly warned that such speculation and assistance in it would lead to the deprivation of their government support and even the right to carry out commercial transactions.

Supervision over these institutions was established, as well as controls and duties on exports from and imports into the country. Russian money. Currency reform was very important. She put Russia in financially on a par with developed European countries, most of which have end of the 19th century V. The system of gold monometallism dominated, and created more favorable conditions for the development of Russian capitalism and for the influx of foreign capital into the country.

In this matter, Witte achieved only partial success. In 1899, the “highest command” confirmed the admission of foreign capital and entrepreneurs to participate in the creation and development various industries domestic manufacturing industry, in order to “reduce the cost” of the products it produces. 2.1. Witte's activities in the field of industrial and trade policy Witte's policy in the field of industry and trade was outlined in the program of activity of the Ministry of Finance, approved by the head of the Ministry in the fall of 1893. It spoke, first of all, about ensuring favorable external conditions for the development of domestic industry, protecting it from competition with side of foreign goods on the domestic market.

To this end, it was envisaged to make more energetic use of such traditional measures as protective customs tariffs, trade agreements with other countries that were beneficial to the state, and reasonable railway tariffs.

The main idea of the program was to further strengthen the leadership role of the government in the development of industry and trade. To activate private entrepreneurship, it was recognized that it was urgently necessary to revise outdated, mostly pre-reform, industrial and trade legislation.

It was intended, in particular, to simplify the paperwork when establishing factories and factories, getting rid of all sorts of adjustments, approvals and delays on the part of not only local, but sometimes also central administrative bodies; modernize the laws defining the procedure for joint-stock foundation; replace the licensing system of this foundation with a private one, and reform stock exchange legislation. However, most of the bills developed by various commissions to implement these intentions were rejected or fiddled with by bureaucratic authorities, without any hope of their approval.

Things were more successful in strengthening the state's position in the economy. Witte’s desire to “subordinate to his jurisdiction an increasingly wider sphere of private economic activity” was clearly manifested in a significant increase in the apparatus and intensification of the activities of the Department of Trade and Manufactures of the Ministry of Finance.

Priorities in government industrial policy have changed. If previously the focus was on removing obstacles to industrial development, now it is being provided with direct support. The style of government itself is changing industrial policy, the interference of officials even in small private matters is significantly expanding entrepreneurial activity. The number of business representative organizations has increased significantly: exchange committees, industry congresses; New entrepreneurial organizations emerged - district societies of factory owners and factory owners.

The Ministry of Finance actively relied on these organizations in developing its policies, instructing them to create various draft decisions, attracting their representatives to participate in the various meetings it held on trade and industry issues. However, Witte preferred the creation of joint bureaucratic-entrepreneurial bodies in the center and locally - they had to take the initiative and develop preliminary decisions on important commercial and industrial issues.

Thus, the government, while stimulating the activity of commercial and industrial circles, did not go further than providing these circles with advisory functions in developing its trade and industrial policy. The state's lever of influence on private railways was also its monopolization of the right to set railway tariffs. With its tariff policy, the state had the opportunity to regulate trade flows and stimulate exports in order to replenish the treasury with the currency necessary to maintain the stability of the ruble exchange rate. Witte also did not limit himself to regulating commodity tariffs.

To increase the profitability of the railways and facilitate the mobility of the population, he lowered the passenger fare, especially over long distances. Thanks to this policy, the budget of the state-owned railway industry increased 4 times, but its profitability was insignificant. The main reason for this was the intensive construction of new railways, which was expensive and, as a rule, significantly exceeded estimated costs.

To a large extent, this was due to the fact that, pursuing a policy of encouraging domestic industry, the state paid for the railway products it produced more than its cost by international market. The development of railways also required large expenses. It was also reflected in the fact that they were often built taking into account, first of all, not financial, but general economic and strategic considerations.

Overpayments to the treasury when buying out private railways were significant. The policy of protectionism towards domestic industry under Witt was carried out traditional methods: high customs duties, placing government orders at domestic factories, generous financial support for industrial enterprises from the state treasury: they were provided with preferential loans and credits, but on a much larger scale than under his predecessors. One of the important aspects of Witte's commercial and industrial policy was the significant expansion of the network of commercial and technical education.

Before 1894, there were only eight commercial schools in Russia, but from 1896 to 1902, 147 such schools and three commercial institutes were opened - in St. Petersburg, Kyiv and Warsaw. Their programs and activities had to be strictly consistent “with the practical needs of the country.” Witte achieved that the management of these educational institutions was entrusted to the Ministry of Finance.

At the same time, significant rights to establish such institutions and manage them were granted to private entrepreneurs: in response to such trust, they willingly provided funds for the establishment and maintenance of these institutions. Attention was also paid to various shapes vocational and technical training of workers, as well as for the organization of industrial exhibitions in the country and for Russia’s participation in international exhibitions. Measures to expand and improve commercial and technical education were supposed to solve not only the problem of providing industry and trade with specialists, but also generally increase the “technical and moral” level of these sectors of the economy. 2.2. S.Yu. Witte and social politics autocracy in relation to the nobility The social policy of tsarism did not undergo any fundamental changes compared to the previous period.

It remained conservative in nature and was aimed at preserving and strengthening the social structure of society, which, in the opinion of the ruling elite, most contributed to stability and order.

This policy was based on the principle of class. For the tsar and his entourage, Russia was seen as a country mainly of two classes - the nobility and the peasantry. But capitalist development made its own adjustments to social structure society, generating heterogeneity in traditional layers and forming new ones - the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, forced the authorities to pay attention to some extent to these latter.

It left its mark on the government's social policy and the growing revolutionary movement in the country. In order to more successfully resist their political opponents in the struggle for the masses, the authorities sought to intensify and spread wider their traditional policy of patronage, to use it, in particular, in relation to workers and students who were increasingly dissatisfied. Such a policy boiled down mainly to minor economic concessions and partial satisfaction of the spiritual needs of these segments of the population, as well as their need for professional organization.

At the same time, it testified to the state’s desire to strengthen its role in regulating social relations. Witte's views were eclectic, contradictory and subject to opportunistic influences. Before his appointment as Minister of Finance, he shared the main provisions of the Slavophil theory about the special path of development of Russia.

Then his views underwent significant changes towards Westernism. Witte's attitude towards autocracy was peculiar. Being his supporter, he at the same time did not deify him, did not consider him the power given to Russia by God once and for all. He viewed autocracy as a historically transitory power that had to change with changing social conditions. He valued autocracy primarily as a system of strictly centralized power. Only such a government, in his opinion, was capable of solving the problems of modernizing the country and overcoming its backwardness.

Therefore, before the start of the first revolution, he opposed the slightest attempts to limit autocracy, and considered even the zemstvo incompatible with it. Witte tried to present autocracy as a supra-class power, putting the interests of the country above the interests of any one class or estate, including the nobility. Using this argument primarily, Witte initially convinced Nicholas II to abandon the idea of convening a Special Meeting on the needs of the nobility, but his attempt was not successful.

The nobility is a product of feudalism, which in Western Europe has already been replaced by capitalism, and this change is an immutable law of the world. Russia is also developing according to this law. In 50 years, the nobility, if it continues to associate itself with land ownership and service, will become completely impoverished and lose its privileges, unable to withstand competition with the new rich - bankers and industrialists. Witte saw the salvation of the nobility and the country not in reviving the former position of the nobility and “nobility” of the bourgeoisie, but in “bourgeoisizing” the nobility, reorienting its interests from land to industry and banking. However, Witte, in his understanding of the inevitability of a change from the traditional agrarian system to an industrial one, was alone at that time not only among the participants in the meeting, but also among the entire ruling bureaucracy.

Thus, the social policy of the autocracy in relation to the nobility was to a certain extent of a compromise nature, taking into account, on the one hand, the heterogeneity of interests and contradictions between various groups of the nobility, and on the other, the contradictions between national interests that required the country’s transition from a traditional, agrarian system to an industrial system for the sake of its preservation of economic and military power, the status of a world power, and the narrow-class interests of the local conservative nobility, who did not accept the new, dreaming of restoring the pre-reform order.

But such a compromise did not satisfy, but only increased the discontent of both the liberal and conservative nobility, thereby weakening the main social basis of tsarism. The weakening of the position of the local nobility under the influence of capitalism, the growth of contradictions in it, the growing discord between the ruling elite and their social support, disagreements in these elites on the issue of attitude towards the nobility - all this were signs of a crisis of power, one of the important evidence of the revolutionary revolution that was taking shape at that time. situations.

The government, as noted above, could no longer completely subordinate its socio-economic policy to the conservative one. 2.3. Influence of S.Yu. Witte on the solution of the peasant question in Russia Russia at the beginning of the 20th century remained an agrarian-peasant country.

Income from Agriculture accounted for 2/3 of national income. The vast majority of the country's population was employed in this sector of the national economy. The situation of the peasantry remained extremely difficult. It suffered from land shortages, tax burdens, redemption payments, agrarian overpopulation, and class inferiority.

Peasant farms were crushed by the landowners' latifundia. One of the main reasons for the backwardness of the countryside was the continued dominance of feudal forms of land ownership - landlord and peasant communal. They prevented the rational distribution of land and the organization of agricultural production on it, which met the requirements of developing market relations.

The catastrophic situation of the Russian countryside was most evidenced by the systematically repeated years of famine. The semi-miserable state of the village had a depressing effect on all spheres of social and state life countries. One evidence of this was the economic crisis of the early 900s. Further implementation of modernization required the expansion of the domestic market for industry and new funds. The state's need for money also increased in connection with foreign policy problems: the implementation of expansionist plans in the Far East and inclusion in the unfolding global arms race.

The main source of replenishment of the treasury remained direct and indirect taxes paid by peasants. The issue of increasing the solvency of this largest category of the population became a state issue. His decision was directly related to increasing the productivity of peasant farms and their level of profitability.

The state was interested in the rise of peasant farms also due to the fact that their products constituted one of the essential components of agricultural exports - the main item, foreign trade income of the state. The military department was also concerned about the miserable state of the village: the increasing number of recruits and horses supplied by the peasantry to the army did not meet the requirements for them. The factor also played a major role state security. Witte is one of the few in the ruling spheres who, in search of solutions to the peasant question, proceeded not from ideological considerations, but from the position of economic progress.

Before becoming Minister of Finance, S. Yu. Witte, gravitating toward the Slavophiles, shared their idea of the beneficial role of the peasant community. Subsequently, he began to argue that the rural community does not prevent the process of differentiation of the peasantry, does not protect it from proletarianization. Nor is it a protective rampart against revolution.

From an administrative and police point of view, it certainly provides certain conveniences, since “it is easier to shepherd a herd than to shepherd each member of the herd individually.” But this dignity of the community is diminished by aspects dangerous to the authorities: by not instilling in the peasants a respectful attitude towards other people’s rights and property, it thereby not only hinders the development of civil legal consciousness among the peasants, as the basis for healthy economic and cultural development, but also contributes to the spread of revolutionary and socialist ideas. Witte also saw negative consequences in solving the problem of peasant land shortage at the expense of landowners' lands.

He allowed such a decision only in exceptional cases. Thus, he recognized the political necessity of allocating land to the peasants in 1861, but at the same time emphasized that the reform on such conditions weakened the very principle of property, obliged the government to perform police and guardianship functions in relation to the peasantry, turning Special attention to regulate issues of land ownership and land use.

And this, in turn, not only suppresses the economic initiative of the peasants and interferes with the growth of their civic consciousness, but also contributes to the development of aggressive, dependent sentiments among them. Assurances that property is sacred and inviolable do not find understanding among them. They are inclined to believe that everything depends only on the will of the tsar: Alexander II wanted and took the land from the landowners, gave it to the peasants; and Nicholas II does not want to follow the example of his grandfather; It turns out that he is a bad king, he does not care about his people.

As a result of such reasoning, Witte believed, peasants become susceptible to revolutionary propaganda. According to Witte, the key to solving the peasant problem could only be the equalization of rights of peasants with other classes. It is necessary, he argued, to make a “person” out of the “half-person” peasant. This would allow him to keep up with the times and develop traits that meet the requirements market economy: personal initiative and entrepreneurial spirit.

By equalizing the rights of peasants with other classes, Witte also meant replacing communal allotment property with private peasant property and giving peasants the right to leave the community at will and move freely around the country. Witte's version of the solution to the peasant question was the most radical among the many options that were born at that time in the ruling elite, but at its core it was a liberal-conservative utopia, suffering from inconsistency and limitations.

It was utopian in that it envisioned a solution to the peasant question within the framework of an autocratic police-bureaucratic political system and while preserving landownership. The inconsistency and limitations of this option were reflected primarily in the fact that it put a number of barriers to the involvement of peasant allotment land in market relations. Provision was made, in particular, for prohibitions on the purchase of peasant allotment land by persons of other classes and on the sale of this land for debts, as well as norms for the concentration of allotment land.

In its economic content, Witte’s version was similar to Stolypin’s agrarian reform, but the latter was more realistic because it was being decided under a significantly reformed political system. Witte's liberal-conservative position on the peasant question was sharply criticized by representatives of the reactionary-conservative bureaucracy, who approached the peasant question primarily from political and ideological points of view.

They were convinced that the traditional way of life formed among the peasants a special worldview, which was the key to their loyalty to the autocracy. Therefore, such forms of peasant life as the class isolation of peasants, the community, allotment peasant property and the patriarchal family must not only be protected, but also strengthened. They also advocated the continuation of the policy of guardianship over all peasants, believing that such a policy not only supported the monarchical idea among the peasantry, but was also the basis and justification for government supervision of the peasants.

The position of Witte and his supporters was assessed as extremely dangerous, encouraging revolution. The disagreements in the ruling elite on the issue of revising peasant policy were so significant that in 1902, two parallel centers were created almost simultaneously to deal with this issue: a Special Meeting on the needs of the agricultural industry, chaired by S. Yu. Witte and the Editorial Commission for the revision of legislation about the peasants of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, headed by Comrade Minister of Internal Affairs A.S. Tishinsky.

The initiator of the creation of this commission and its actual leader was V.K. Plehve, who became the Minister of Internal Affairs in the same 1902. Both the Editorial Commission and the Special Meeting worked for more than one year. The first completed its work on preparing a draft reform of peasant legislation in October 1903. The results of this work amounted to as many as six volumes, which were immediately published. At the beginning of 1904, the prepared project was transferred to provincial meetings, where its discussion dragged on and finally died out with the beginning of the revolution.

At the same time, at the end of March 1905, the activities of the Special Meeting were also terminated by royal decree. A significant part of the materials of this meeting, including 57 volumes of “works” and “collection of works” of its local committees, was also published.

What solution to the peasant question was proposed by the Editorial Commission and the Special Meeting? The draft of the Drafting Commission, in contrast to the agrarian policy of the era of counter-reforms, no longer considered the facts of stratification of the peasantry to be accidental, but recognized them as natural results of economic development: transition peasant farm from natural to monetary, the spread of waste crafts and other non-agricultural earnings.

Moreover, it was recognized as inappropriate to take measures to prevent the formation of a wealthy peasantry, and not only because this would mean going against the development economic life, but also because these peasants, contrary to popular opinion, which branded them as “kulaks” and “world-eaters,” are not the worst and most harmful element of the village. On the contrary, due to their interest in protecting the principle of property, such peasants are a reliable support for the existing order.

The project did not deny the advantages of peasant farmstead and cut-off land ownership over communal land ownership. It was even believed that these forms of land tenure would significantly improve the well-being of the peasants, increase the productivity of their labor and strengthen their respect for other people's property. But while recognizing new phenomena in the peasantry, the project at the same time emphasized that they had not yet become widespread and therefore could not serve as the basis for a radical change in agrarian-peasant policy.

At the same time, this policy did not completely ignore these phenomena. It was proposed, in particular, to make it easier for peasants who were “individually strong” and “mentally outgrown the communal system” to leave the community, to create conditions for them to gradually transition from communal land ownership to farmsteads and farms, but farms and farms were to be organized only on non-allotment land and on the condition that their owners renounce communal land.

The measures mentioned did not yet mean that the government was betting on the wealthy peasantry. They only made certain adjustments to traditional politics. With their help, V.K. Pleve’s idea of a wealthy peasant as a “devil” from whom the peasant community must be freed was realized. Thus, the old "trustee policy" remained in force, and it further emphasized the aspect of the state protecting the "weak elements" of the peasantry from oppression by the "strong" peasants.

The project also proclaimed the inviolability of the peasant allotment land ownership, established the limits of its concentration and fragmentation, the principle of its reserve. The reactionary-conservative orientation of the project was even more evident in its desire to extend the provisions on compulsory allotment land tenure to peasant non-allotment lands. According to the project, the peasant community was also supposed to remain inviolable. Although the advantages of farmstead land ownership were recognized, at the same time it was believed that the bulk of the peasantry had not yet grown up to it.

Various kinds of arguments were cited as proof, but first of all, that the peasants did not have sufficient funds to move to farmsteads and undergo proper mental and cultural development. Natural-geographical and soil-climatic features of most Russian agricultural provinces were also cited as obstacles to the development of farmsteads. It was argued, as before, that the community, contrary to popular belief, does not interfere with the use of more advanced management techniques and that its role is especially beneficial: after all, it cares about the peasants - “helps the weak and encourages the careless.” And although the draft stated that the issue of community should be left to the “natural course of things,” at the same time, measures were proposed to strengthen it. In particular, a maximum 12-year period for land redistribution and leasing of communal land was established.

Increased attention was paid to the stability of the peasant patriarchal family as one of the most important strongholds of conservatism.

It was envisaged to strengthen peasant family land ownership. The replacement of this traditional property with personal, individual property was seen as an unacceptable disruption of the entire land and property system of the peasants. Measures were tightened against unauthorized divisions of peasant families. In order to protect the peasant family from “turmoil and disorder” on the part of its younger members, the power of the householder was strengthened by law.

Without his consent, family members were not issued passports necessary to go to work, and minor (under 25 years old) family members could not leave the courtyard. S. Yu. Witte constructively criticized the activities of the Editorial Commission. In 1904, his “Note on the Peasant Question” was published, summing up the preliminary results of the work of the Special Meeting he headed on the needs of the agricultural industry and proposing a solution to the peasant question on a fundamentally different basis compared to the draft of the Editorial Commission.

Witte proposed freeing the peasants from the tutelage of the community, equalizing their rights with other classes and giving them the right to freely transition from communal to private personal land ownership. Witte's version of the peasant reform was part of his liberal-conservative plan for the modernization of the country, which envisaged the preservation and strengthening of autocracy in in this case by expanding its social base at the expense of the conservative small landowners whom the reform was supposed to create.

The reform proposed by Witte predetermined the Stolypin agrarian reform. She already had many supporters, both in the lower classes and in the ruling elite. However, the latter needed a revolutionary shake-up in order to make the ideas of such a reform guiding in agrarian and peasant policy. 2.4. Results of economic and financial policy S.Yu. Witte Results of economic policy S.Yu. Witte were controversial.

This policy, which largely boiled down to the accelerated development of industry through the mobilization of domestic resources, attracting foreign capital, customs protection of domestic industry from Western competitors and encouraging the export of goods from Russia, contributed greatly to the rapid industrial boom of the 90s, when industrial production increased by on average 2-3 times. Russia has approached industrial developed countries, however, Witte’s goal - to become equal to these countries - was not achieved. The price of Witte's industrialization was also great.

Witte's economic policy was the last opportunity that the autocracy used to modernize the economy without changing its essence and without making deep structural changes. The economic crisis that broke out in the early 900s indicated that this opportunity had already been largely exhausted.

Further modernization of not only industry, but also the entire society could occur only if significant political and socio-economic transformations were carried out. Particularly acute was the question of reforming the Russian countryside, which was in an extremely difficult situation, where developing capitalist relations were suppressed by the remnants of serfdom, patriarchalism, the basis for which was the landlord and peasant allotment forms of land ownership.

It is no coincidence that in the early 900s the government's economic policy shifted its emphasis from industry to agriculture. The needs of the village are also becoming the focus of Russian socio-economic thought and political movement. It is necessary to keep this aspect in mind. The positive results of the economic policy of tsarism gave certain grounds to evaluate them as evidence of the viability of the autocracy.

Thanks to them, the issue of political transformation, which had become aggravated in the early 90s, was muted for a whole decade. And only in the early 900s, when it became clear that the ongoing policy of economic modernization had exhausted its resources, this issue again acquired particular relevance in society. Guided by the principle that “great tasks require great sacrifices,” Witte, to implement his economic policy, abused so-called “unpopular” measures that affected the interests of the overwhelming majority of the population, which not only aggravated the social contradictions that existed in the country, but also expanded the basis for dissatisfaction with the existing regime.

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Development of the Russian economy in the post-reform period

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At the beginning of 1889 S.Yu. Witte was offered the post of director of the Department of Railway Affairs of the Ministry of Finance. In February 1892 S.Yu. Witte became Minister of Railways, and in August he took one of the key posts in the highest administration, heading the Ministry of Finance, whose competence included all issues of trade, industry, credit, and taxation. They obeyed him National Bank, Noble Land Bank. Peasant Land Bank, Mint. In this influential position, S.Yu. Witte remained continuously for eleven years, until August 1903. The implementation of a number of important economic transformations is associated with his name.

S.Yu. Witte was a supporter of Slavophile views. The Slavophil orientation also explains the great interest he showed in the teachings of the German economist of the first half of the 19th century V. Friedrich List, who developed, in contrast to “cosmopolitan political economy,” the theory of “national economy.” F. List's views on the role of the national economy and its state regulation formed the basis of the program of the Russian Minister of Finance. S.Yu. Witte believed that the most important task of the state is to encourage the development of domestic industry, with the weak development of which the overall economic progress of the country is impossible. The concept was based on the idea that in order to economically modernize the country it is necessary to achieve a balance of exports and imports through customs protection, strong credit system and sustainable money circulation. These measures were supposed to create conditions for the development of the domestic market and financial independence from foreign raw materials and financial sources.

With the close participation of S.Yu. Witte carried out major economic transformations in the empire, strengthening state finances and accelerating the industrial development of Russia. Among them: the introduction of a state-owned wine monopoly (1894), the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway, the conclusion of customs agreements with Germany (1894 and 1904). The nodal point of the Witte economic program was the implementation of a monetary reform in the mid-90s, which stabilized the Russian ruble and stimulated large investments from abroad in leading industries.

At the end of the 19th century. There was an obvious and confident rise in the productive forces, especially in industry. During the ministry of S.Yu. Witte invested about 3 billion rubles in Russia from abroad. foreign loans, a significant part of which went to productive needs. Similar practice made it possible not only to ensure the current stability of the financial system, but also contributed to the development of the most important elements of industrial infrastructure.

In n. 20th century - changes in the global economic environment led first to a recession business activity, and from 1900 - to a crisis in industries that developed intensively in the 90s: metallurgy, mechanical engineering, oil and coal mining, and the electrical industry. Economic crisis of the beginning of the 20th century. demonstrated that state paternalism and interventionist expansion of the economy have their logical limits. State power, even with the best intentions, cannot build an organic capitalist system.

End of the 19th century was characterized in Russia by the implementation of a major financial reform, which qualitatively changed the position of the Russian monetary unit. The ruble has become one of the most stable currencies in the world. Transformations 1895-1897 were part of a broad program of economic innovations in the 1990s. They accelerated the industrial modernization of Russia. The reform contributed to Russia's integration into the world market system.

The very idea of strengthening the ruble by switching to gold parity met primarily the interests of industry: the reliability of the currency stimulated capital investment. To carry out the accelerated industrial development of the country, it was necessary to solve the following problems: increase capital investment, create a reliable credit system and provide guarantees to foreign investors. In the industrialization of Russia, Witte attached great importance to foreign financial centers, since internal sources seemed insufficient. However, it was impossible to achieve any favorable results until the Russian monetary unit was reliably secured and stable. The credit ruble, which became the basis of monetary circulation since the middle of the 19th century, served as the object of speculative manipulations abroad. In 1891, the ruble exchange rate fell to 59.3%. The position of paper money was not strong within the country either. In the 70-80s, the average rate was 64.3 kopecks in gold.

To eliminate the instability of the financial system, it was necessary to find a reliable metal equivalent, which was silver. But, starting from the 70s, the price of the “second noble metal” has been steadily falling. The state tried with all its might to support the ruble and for this purpose artificially limited the issue of paper money. However, decisive action was needed to change the situation.

Initially S.Yu. was a supporter of strengthening the credit ruble through administrative control: tightening supervision over the circulation of money and increasing responsibility will strengthen the ruble. At the beginning of 1893, customs duties were established (1 kopeck for 100 rubles), transactions based on exchange rate differences in the ruble were prohibited, control over exchange transactions in Russia was strengthened, and a ban on production was introduced exchange transactions foreign brokers. Exchange rate fluctuations began to decrease, but these measures were ineffective; a qualitative restructuring of the entire financial system is necessary.

There was a choice of the basis for the reform: based on monometallism (gold) or bimetallism (silver and gold). The second option was supported by both the tradition of Russian monetary circulation and the huge reserves of silver. But pegging the ruble to its bimetallic equivalent could increase its instability. S.Yu. Witte was a supporter of monometallism. The introduction of the monometallic ruble parity and stable convertibility were facilitated by the general political conditions in the country and the world and the relatively favorable economic situation. Russia had a positive trade balance, and impressive gold reserves were formed.

A step towards gold circulation was the law approved by Nicholas II on May 8, 1895. It has two main provisions: all written transactions can be concluded for Russian gold coins; in such transactions, payment can be made either in gold coin or in credit notes at the gold rate on the day of payment. The government has taken a number of other measures aimed at establishing the gold equivalent. Among them: permission for offices and branches of the State Bank to buy gold coins at a certain rate, and for those in the capital to sell and make payments at the same rate; then rules were introduced for the State Bank to accept gold coins into a current account. Soon the same operation will be introduced in private commercial banks.

Despite these measures, the gold coin was very slowly established as a priority means of payment. The State Bank announced on September 27, 1895 that it would buy and accept gold coins at a price not lower than 7 rubles. 40 kopecks for a half-imperial, and in 1896 the purchase rate was set at 7 rubles. 50 kopecks These decisions led to the stabilization of the ratio between the gold and credit rubles in the ratio 1:1.5. To stabilize the ruble, the Ministry of Finance recognized it necessary to devalue the credit monetary unit based on monometallism. Parity between the paper ruble and the credit ruble in accordance with the real exchange rate; according to the ministerial program, the introduction of the gold equivalent of the ruble did not imply the establishment of the identity of paper and metal money. The reform was based on the principle of significant devaluation. Submitted to the State Council in March 1896. bill “On correction of monetary circulation” S.Yu. Witte defined the conditions and goals of the reform as follows: “To consolidate the achieved successes in the field of financial economy by laying a solid foundation for metallic monetary circulation under them.” Introduction of the exchange of the ruble for a precious metal was established based on the actually established and stable exchange rate ratio: credit ruble - 66 2/3 kopecks in gold. In 1896, the need arose to begin producing a new type of gold coin. It was decided to mint a new coin with the inscription “15 rubles” on the imperial and “7 rubles 50 kopecks” on the semi-imperial.

The decisive stage of the monetary circulation reform came in 1897, when the most important elements of the new financial system were legislated through a series of personal imperial decrees. January - decree on the release into circulation of a gold imperial coin of 15 rubles. and semi-imperial at 7 rubles. 50 kopecks; August - on establishing a firm basis for the issue of banknotes. The State Bank was obliged to issue banknotes in accordance with the needs of monetary circulation, but certainly backed by gold. Credit notes must be backed ruble for ruble (one imperial is equal to fifteen credit rubles).

Conversion monetary system on the basis of gold monometallism demanded a change in the coin regulations, the new edition of which was approved by Nicholas II on June 7, 1899: state monetary unit Russia had a ruble containing 17,424 shares of pure gold, a gold coin could be minted both from gold belonging to the treasury and from metal provided by private individuals, a full-fledged gold coin was required to be accepted in all payments for an unlimited amount. Silver and copper coins were made only from treasury metal and were auxiliary in circulation. Coins of the previous mintage circulated. Gold quickly established itself as the main means of payment, which helped stop exchange rate fluctuations.

The results of the monetary reform became noticeable very quickly. The coin unit was the ruble, which contained 0.7742 g (17.424 shares) of pure gold. The main coin was gold, the issue of which was not limited, and the owner of a gold bar could freely submit it for coinage. The law required that all payments be made using a gold coin and a unit of account (the ruble) and established the mandatory acceptance of full-weight gold coins in all payments for an unlimited amount. Coinage in the empire was under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Finance, and the coin itself was minted at the Mint in St. Petersburg. State credit banknotes were issued by the State Bank backed by gold. The State Bank exchanged credit notes for gold coins without limiting the amount. On January 1, 1900, gold coins already accounted for 46.2% of all monetary circulation. The introduction of a gold currency strengthened government finances and stimulated economic development. At the end of the 19th century. In terms of industrial production growth rates, Russia was ahead of all European countries. This was greatly facilitated by the wide influx foreign investment into the country's industry. At the end of the 19th - beginning of the 20th centuries. the gold unit dominated Russian monetary circulation and by 1904 it accounted for almost two-thirds of the money supply.

The industrial boom in Russia is closely connected with the economic policy of the government and its head S. Yu. Witte (1849-1915). He contributed to the industrial development of the country, but considered this factor not as a purely technical one, but as a path of its bourgeois progress, as an important transformative economic factor, as a social instrument for stabilizing the political situation in the country.

One of the components of economic policy at the turn of the century was the establishment of high customs duties on goods imported into Russia and at the same time the removal of obstacles to the penetration of foreign capital into the country. The introduction of the “gold standard”, i.e. the free exchange of the ruble for gold, contributed to the influx of funds from abroad. The main investors were banks and joint stock companies of Great Britain, France, Germany and Belgium.

At Witte's initiative, a wine monopoly was introduced, i.e., the exclusive right of the state to sell alcoholic beverages. It provided the main revenues to the state budget.

At the same time, the economic policy of the tsarist government at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries. remained controversial. Both Witte's program and the government's policy itself lacked a balance between the needs of industry and agriculture. This imbalance was one of the reasons economic crisis 1900-1903, which completed the industrial boom of 1895-1899. However, the crisis was expressed only in a decrease in the growth rate of Russian industry, and not in stopping its progressive development.

Witte's financial reform, carried out in 1897, allowed the free exchange of rubles for gold - the gold standard was introduced. The monetary reform of S. Yu. Witte led to an increased influx of foreign capital into the country. After all, thanks to the reform financial sector It became possible to export gold from the country. But, despite the fact that the attractiveness of Russia in the eyes of foreign companies grew, the domestic manufacturer was quite reliably protected from competition thanks to the customs tariff. Witte's consistent policy led to the transformation of the ruble into one of the most stable currencies that period.

Political situation 1894-1904 power and opposition

Nicholas II, who ascended the throne in 1894, followed the reactionary course of his father. The socio-economic and political crisis that struck Russia at the beginning of the 20th century complicated the problems facing the tsarist government. But the new tsar inevitably pursued a dual policy of making concessions to the “spirit of the times.” Defense of the “foundations” Nicholas sought to defend the autocratic system. Declaring that any hopes for the introduction of a constitution in Russia are “meaningless dreams,” Nicholas II led a decisive struggle against opponents of the autocracy. While fighting against professional revolutionaries and suppressing mass uprisings of workers and peasants, the tsarist government also persecuted liberals who tried to form a strong legal opposition to the ruling regime. Nicholas II supported the local nobility, in which he saw the only support for the autocracy. This support was most clearly manifested in the expanding activities Noble Bank: by the beginning of the 20th century. the amount of loans issued by him to landowners for preferential terms, exceeded 1 billion rubles. The same goal was pursued by other financial measures: a significant reduction in interest rates on loans to debtor landowners, the establishment of mutual aid funds for the nobility.

Autocracy and the bourgeoisie. The autocracy fought uncompromisingly against any claims of this class to state power; in the economic sphere found a common language with him. Government loans And tax benefits, a protective customs policy and the desire to seize new sources of raw materials and sales markets - the reign of Nicholas II fully met the interests of the Russian bourgeoisie. S.Yu. Witte remained the Minister of Finance under Nicholas for a long time, having taken this post under his father. He took a number of measures that contributed to the development of capitalist relations in Russia. The main one was the monetary reform: in 1897, a gold currency was introduced into circulation, which stabilized the ruble exchange rate and ensured sustainable profits for entrepreneurs. Witte was one of the main organizers of the construction of the Trans-Siberian railway, which contributed to the intensification of Russian policy in the Far East. On his initiative, Russia began economic penetration into Northern China.

Peasant question. The name Witte is also associated with new approach to the peasant question. In his opinion, the Russian village needed a strong, enterprising owner. To do this, it was necessary to equalize the rights of the peasants with representatives of other segments of the population, and destroy the community: allow the peasants to leave it according to at will, securing their plots as private property. But this idea had opponents - the circle of the Minister of Internal Affairs V.K. Plehve. In their opinion, such transformations were harmful. This group expressed the interests of the landowners of the old, serfdom, who benefited from the inert, impoverished existence of the Russian countryside; in the person of peasant owners, such landowners were afraid to meet dangerous competitors. Plehve and his supporters intended to solve the peasant issue using traditional methods: maintaining the class isolation of the peasants, artificially maintaining the community, and at the same time, in every possible way strengthening administrative and police supervision over the village. By 1903, Plehve’s group won. “Zubatovshchina”, the labor issue again became the focus of attention of the tsarist government. It was clear to the most far-sighted representatives of power that the labor movement was turning into a revolutionary force. At this time, the head of the Moscow security department, S.V. Zubatov, received some support from the top. From his point of view, strikes aimed at increasing wages, reduction of working hours, etc., are quite natural: they are generated by the natural desire of workers to improve their difficult situation. Zubatov saw the main task as keeping the labor movement within the framework of this economic struggle, depriving it of a political orientation, and neutralizing the influence that the revolutionary intellectuals had on the proletariat. And for this, government officials needed to take control of the labor movement. In 1901-1903 societies for “mutual benefit of workers” began to emerge in Moscow; teahouses opened - a kind of workers' clubs; In the Historical Museum, lectures were given to workers about the legal organizations of the Western European proletariat - mutual aid funds, cooperatives, trade unions, etc. The most important thing is that the Zubatov “societies” began to intervene in conflicts between workers and entrepreneurs.

The Ministry of Finance, which was in charge of financial policy, was headed for eleven years (from 1892 to 1903) by S. Yu. Witte, the largest statesman in Russia at the turn of the 19th-20th centuries.

Witte headed the financial department at a time of crisis for the state, when finances and the economy were seriously undermined by the unprecedented famine of 1891-1892. Once again, the country was faced with choosing a way out of the crisis.

One of these paths was to democratize the regime, to make profound social structural changes, to provide personal freedom to the population and greater opportunities for the development of market relations and private enterprise. But in this case, tsarism had to, if not break up completely, then significantly sacrifice its power, and this was unacceptable for it. The opposition forces to tsarism that expressed such an alternative were at that time extremely weak and dispersed and could not have any influence on the nature of domestic politics. Tsarism used its traditional policy, which boiled down to further strengthening of state intervention in the economy, to the wider use of monetarist methods of its improvement, avoiding deep social transformations.

Witte's significance as a financier, economist and statesman lay in the fact that, with the determination, assertiveness and scope inherent in his nature, he consistently implemented such a policy. S. Yu. Witte paid main attention to strengthening finances, as well as the development of industry and railway transport. During Witte's tenure at the head of the financial department, the state budget more than doubled. In 1892 it was about one billion rubles, and in 1903 - more than two billion. The average annual budget growth was 10.5%, while in the previous decade it was 2.7%, and in the subsequent decade - 5%. Budget growth was achieved mainly through increased revenues from state property, an increase in indirect taxes and the wider use of a progressive tax on enterprise profits instead of the previous system of trade taxation in the form of fees for the right to trade and trade. The increase in direct taxes was insignificant and was reduced mainly to an increase in taxes on residential and urban real estate. Moreover, some direct taxes were even reduced. So the land tax was reduced by half. Officially, this measure was explained by the agricultural crisis, but in reality it had primarily the goal of supporting the landed nobility. The annual redemption payments were partially reduced by lengthening the overall period of the redemption operation.

The most profitable item in the budget was the wine monopoly introduced under Witte. According to this measure, the production of raw alcohol remained a private matter; its purification, production of vodka and strong wines were also carried out in private factories, but only by order of the treasury and under the strict supervision of excise supervision. The sale of these drinks became a state monopoly, but it did not apply to the production and sale of beer, mash and grape wine.

The introduction of the wine monopoly began in 1894 and by the end of Witte’s tenure as minister it was extended throughout the entire territory of the empire except for the remote outskirts. With the help of the wine monopoly, the state was able to increase drinking revenues not only by spreading it to new areas and by increasing the sale of strong drinks, but also by increasing prices for these drinks. Treasury revenues from the wine monopoly were constantly growing and in 1913 were almost three times more than all direct taxes. In this regard, the state budget was called the “drunk budget” not without reason. Contrary to the assurances of the authorities and the press that served them, the introduction of a monopoly did not help reduce drunkenness and improve the morality of the people. On the contrary, the secret sale of wine increased, and most importantly, a whole army of new officials appeared in charge of the monopoly, which corrupted not only themselves, but also those who had to turn to them, giving rise to such negative phenomena as tyranny, arbitrariness, corruption, sycophancy, theft and so on.

The wine monopoly was the most effective, but not the only measure for replenishing the treasury and indirectly taxing the people. The increase in excise taxes, and therefore the retail prices on everyday consumer goods: matches, tobacco, kerosene, sugar, tea, etc. was also significant. Excise taxes were increased repeatedly on a number of such goods.

Among the measures taken by Witte to strengthen the country's financial system, the monetary reform he carried out played a major role. Its essence boiled down to the introduction of the free exchange of paper money for gold currency. The need for such a reform was recognized by Witte’s predecessors in the Ministry-N. X. Bunge and I.A. Vyshnegradsky, they took some preparatory measures for its implementation, stabilizing finances and accumulating gold reserves. Witte, with his characteristic determination and consistency, brought their work to the end. First of all, he took a number of measures to further stabilize the exchange rate of the credit ruble. Private credit banks, in order to avoid speculation on their part in the exchange rate of the ruble, were strictly warned that such speculation and assistance in it would lead to the deprivation of their government support and even the right to carry out commercial transactions. Supervision over these institutions was established, as well as controls and duties on the export of Russian money from the country and the import into it. Agents of foreign banks were removed from the Russian stock exchange. So that the reform would not be shocking to society, it was allowed to make financial operations using gold circulation at the rate of 5 gold rubles for 7.5 credit rubles.

Only after such preparatory measures did Witte in 1896 officially raise the question of monetary reform in higher authorities.

The reform, which involved a devaluation of 1/3 of the credit ruble, affected the interests of broad sections of the population, but primarily the interests of farmers who exported grain. She was sharply criticized by the right-wing press and the State Council. The author of the reform was accused of a malicious intent to bring the state to the brink of financial bankruptcy. The possibility of reform was allowed by Witte's critics only if the credit ruble was exchanged for gold in a one-to-one ratio. Concerns were also expressed that as a result of the reform, gold would end up in the population's pockets or, worse, end up abroad.

The monetary reform, like a number of other Witte “unpopular” measures to improve finances and industry, which placed additional pressure on the population, was carried out by decree of the tsar, which was issued in 1897 in a certain emergency way, without observing the then legislative order, bypassing the State Council. The reform reduced the gold content of the ruble by 1/3. The credit ruble was equal to 66 2/3 kopecks. gold. The weight of the gold ruble decreased by 1/3. The 10-ruble gold coins that existed before the reform were transformed into 15-ruble imperials, and the 5-ruble gold coins into 7.5-ruble half-imperials. Subsequently, 10-ruble and 5-ruble gold coins were again released into circulation, but with a correspondingly reduced weight. Since the devaluation carried out by the reform was hidden, the reform itself was implemented relatively painlessly, without causing the usual significant change in commodity prices after devaluation.

Currency reform was very important. It put Russia financially on a par with developed European countries, most of which by the end of the 19th century. The system of gold monometallism dominated, and created more favorable conditions for the development of Russian capitalism and for the influx of foreign capital into the country.

Due to the stabilization of the ruble exchange rate and the introduction of gold circulation, foreign investment in Russian industry began to grow noticeably. This was opposed by some Russian entrepreneurs, the national-patriotic press, and in the ruling elite such influential conservative-protective figures as Chairman of the Committee of Ministers I. P. Durnovo, Comrade Minister of Internal Affairs V. K. Pleve and State Comptroller P. L. Lobko .

S. Yu. Witte, who by that time had practically exhausted all possible means of mobilizing domestic capital and knew like no one else that “our fatherland is not rich in them,” convinced the tsar that “the necessary growth of our extremely backward industry can be accomplished in no other way.” , as with the direct assistance of foreign capital." He proposed removing the restrictions that existed in Russian legislation for foreign capital, in particular, prohibitions on foreigners owning land in a number of regions of the country, engaging in such industries as mining, oil, gold mining, etc., or at least not establishing new ones. In this matter, Witte achieved only partial success. In 1899, the “highest command” confirmed the admission of foreign capital and entrepreneurs to participate in the creation and development of various branches of the domestic manufacturing industry, with the aim of “reducing the cost” of the products produced by it.