It seems more difficult to study this topic for some time periods than the study of the external debt of the Russian Empire. This is due to the fact that there is no open access Books of accounting and registration of external obligations of the USSR, payment (settlement) balances of the USSR were not published, and a number of other reasons that sometimes stimulate the emergence of various hypotheses that are usually attributed to conspiracy theories.

"Unconditionally and without exception, all foreign loans are canceled"

By the time the Bolsheviks took power, Russia's external debt amounted to 10 billion rubles, which was equal to about 5 billion US dollars. accumulated and huge external debt, which was expressed in the depreciation of the "kerenki" issued by the Provisional Government (the fact that the remaining "royal" money on the black market was more expensive is a sign of the degree of trust in the Provisional Government). Of the vast gold reserves of the Empire, more than a third was spent or deposited in foreign banks. Approximately 1,100 tons of gold remained in the country (worth $733 million). One external debt service required 500 million rubles. in year.

In this situation, the RSFSR actually declares a default (however, then this term did not exist yet). Decree of the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of January 21 (February 3) canceled all foreign loans. Debt obligations under them, owned or kept by citizens of the RSFSR, by savings and loan banks, and by banks, were subject to exchange for book debt obligations of the RSFSR.

The latter says the following:

1. Russian individuals and legal entities in possession there were many obligations of external loans, which I wrote about in part 1 of the article.

2. At that time, the vision of the authorities of the financial system of the Land of Soviets was far from the views of the times of war communism.

Thus, the external public debt was zeroed. However, the issue of its payment will be raised repeatedly. It is possible that, after all, the USSR at different times to some the right banks paid for their debentures Empire.

Finally, the issue of royal debts will be resolved only by the Russian Federation in 1994, when the Chernomyrdin government will pay France 400 million dollars as repayment of all French loans. The fact that even now about 350,000 French people are making some claims on these debts does not matter, because. these claims can now only be addressed to the French government.

Credit blockade and money for industrialization

During the civil war, there was no question of any foreign loans. After its completion, Soviet Russia (which later became the USSR) was subjected to a credit blockade due to the cancellation of tsarist loans.

Meanwhile, the ruined country was in dire need of foreign goods. In 1918-22. the negative balance of Russia's foreign trade balance amounted to 2,217 million rubles. This means that in order to repay it, it was necessary to official exchange rate(1.5 tons = 1 million dollars = 2 million rubles after the reform) more than 1,108 tons. Of the 1,100 tons of gold reserves transferred to Soviet power, 98 tons were sent to Germany as reparations, 505 tons were recaptured by Kolchak, only 323 tons were returned. Total 890 tons. In 1923, the gold reserve amounted to approximately 400 tons. 490 tons of it were used. The balance does not converge to 618 tons, which is equal to 824 million rubles. It was probably closed at the expense of valuables received as a result of requisitions and valuables from the State Depository. It is possible that the debt obligations of other states and the gold shares held by the State Bank and the Treasury in the amount of approximately 300 million rubles were sold. (It was very difficult to sell them, but you can at a huge discount).

It is often written that during these years, on the accounts of a number of leaders of the RCP (b) and the Comintern, opened in American and European banks hundreds of millions of dollars have been invested. However, in the well-known 1921 New York Times article cited, the figures are an order of magnitude or even two lower. It was simply impossible to accumulate, say, 800 million on Trotsky's account (and such an amount is called) due to the lack of such money.

After the Treaty of Rapallo with Germany, the credit blockade was partially broken. We're starting to get short-term loans for imports and for exports (in essence, the latter represent advance payments). Gradually, the term of these loans is lengthening, as is the country's circle of creditors. The USSR has an external public debt. At the end of 1926 it was 210 million rubles. (150 for import and 60 for export).

The balance of foreign trade turnover (i.e., the source of currency receipts) for 1923-1927. is minus 188 million rubles. It is also extinguished by the sale of gold, and the fact that A.A. Ignatiev gives the USSR 225 million francs, put in his name by the Empire.

The negative balance grows sharply in 1928 (industrialization begins) to 655.7 million rubles. At the end of this year, our debts reach 320 million dollars (640 million rubles), and the gold reserves are reduced to 150 tons. The main creditors are German (a 1926 loan from Deutsche Bank for 300 million marks) and American companies. At the same time, the USSR for the first time tried to place its bonds in the USA, but they did not find demand, because. The USA recognizes the USSR only in 1934. Looking ahead, I would like to note that even after that we managed to make a bonded loan for only 5 million dollars.

Industrialization, so necessary for the country, was very expensive. The vast majority of the necessary money was at the expense of internal resources, but the role of external loans in different types and from different countries(for example, a 1935 loan from Czechoslovakia of 250 million crowns). Basically, these were related loans (for example, the German one in 1931 in 300 million marks). They were provided in the overwhelming majority by private banks and companies under state guarantees.

At the beginning of 1932, the total amount of the USSR state debt was approximately 1,400 million rubles. (as can be understood from an interview with a New York Times correspondent in early 1934). True, foreign sources speak of $1,400 million, which is twice as much in rubles. In the same interview, our leader notes that in two years we managed to reduce the external debt by 1 billion rubles, i.е. up to 400 million rubles

There is some inconsistency here. It turns out that for 1932 and 1933. 1 billion rubles was paid. debt. But the balance of foreign trade over these years is only plus 77 million rubles. Little gold was sold then (in general, no more than 300 tons were sold abroad during the entire 1930s, there was an intensive accumulation of this metal in state reserves), its withdrawal the population was given only 30 tons, "Torgsin" was more effective and by 1935 he had collected up to 200 tons. Most likely, Stalin spoke about plans, and not about realities. Here in 1933-1937. the foreign trade balance was sharply positive - 2,402.8 million rubles. Perhaps it was then that debts were paid off and a reserve was made for subsequent years (in 1938 - early 1941 the balance was negative).

Another problem is also possible. All the data that I have cited is from the statistical collection "Foreign Trade of the USSR 1913-1937", ed. in 1938. Import/export data includes only goods, not services, and we imported a lot of services at that time. In particular, it is not clear how much the services of Albert Kahn's company, which carried out the design of almost most of the most significant enterprises of the industrialization period, cost, how much the wages of 20 thousand foreign specialists cost (they received most of it in foreign currency), etc.

I am not a supporter of conspiracy theories, but I think that in matters of financing industrialization, not everything is clear. But it is very clear that external loans pursued productive goals.

On the eve of the Great Patriotic War

In 1935, a 200 million German loan was received from Germany for 5 years for the supply of goods, which were to begin in 1940. The German loan of 1938 was received under the same conditions; his return began in 1944. The first loan was repaid by 25%, the repayment of the second did not take place for known reasons. The Czechoslovak loan was not paid in full in connection with the liquidation of Czechoslovakia in 1938. Nevertheless, formally, at the beginning of 1941, the USSR had an external debt of about 200 million rubles.

Great Patriotic War and the Lend-Lease debt problem. Reparations

In the years that followed the end of the 2nd Five-Year Plan, there was a constant decrease in the volume foreign trade THE USSR. If in 1930 our country accounted for 2% of all world trade, then in 1937 - 1.3%. According to the TSB, in 1940 the volume of our export-import amounted to only 0.5 billion rubles. An article of that time directly states: “ Soviet Union does not need foreign markets as a means of solving the problem of product sales” (“Customs in Russia”, D.A. Aleksandrov, S.S. Dmitriev).

But during the war years, the volume of imports was forced to grow. Raw materials, foodstuffs, military and civilian equipment, medicines, etc. are imported into the country. The foreign trade balance becomes sharply negative. It will be the largest in 1943: (million rubles) exports - 373, imports - 8,460, a negative balance - 8,097. Part of the imports goes as Lend-Lease supplies, but some is subject to short-term payment. Back in October 1941, a framework loan agreement was concluded with Great Britain, and more than 100 tons of gold were transferred to its banks as a deposit. Later, the same agreement is signed with the United States. Gold is shipped there as well. It is possible that up to 1,000 tons of gold were used to pay off wartime loans.

These disputes arose because of the different positions of the parties on what delivered equipment should be returned, in what quantity and at what price to take into account. In principle, the USSR recognized its debt, but disputed its size. Only in 1972 did the USA and the USSR come to an agreement, and our debt was determined at $722 million. It was fully repaid by the Russian Federation in 2006.

In the post-war period, the USSR received only two small loan from the USA (1945) and Sweden (1947). The entire post-war reconstruction came at the expense of internal resources and, to a much lesser extent, reparations.

The growth of debt obligations of the USSR

The active return of the USSR to the market of foreign borrowings begins in the 1960s. As a rule, loans are provided by private banks for the implementation of certain projects in our country with the help of Western companies.

So, in 1966, 7 loan agreements in the amount of 449 million rubles, which is equal to about 760 million dollars at the official rate. Basically, they went to the construction of the VAZ. In the 1970s, up to $11 billion was received under the gas-pipe deal. These loans have been repaid since 1984. There is a rather sharp increase in debt obligations, which continues until the collapse of the USSR: 1975 - 15.4; 1980 - 25.2; 1985 - 38.3; 1990 - 62.5; 1991 - 67.9 billion dollars (Popova G.V. State debt and credit. RGEU "RINH", Rostov-on-D). Since the 1960s, the USSR has also received loans from the CMEA member countries.

With the increase in the export of hydrocarbons, the dangerous dependence of the foreign trade balance of the USSR on world market prices begins to appear. In the mid 1970s. the price of a barrel of oil fluctuated around $30 (according to purchasing power this is above the recent 100), but then it went down. Already by 1986, the foreign exchange burden on servicing and paying off external obligations began to be felt. It was exacerbated by the independent entry into the external borrowing market of the subjects of the USSR and the RSFSR and the liberalization of foreign trade that followed after the start of "perestroika".

Since 1988 economic organizations The USSR began to carelessly service its external debts. This year, the USSR was forced to place its Eurobonds worth 1.9 billion dollars on the foreign market. Since 1985, the USSR has reduced its balance of payments with a deficit: 1985 - 2.4%, 1986 - 6.2%, 1987 - 8.4%, 1988 - 11% of GDP (documents of the Houston meeting in 1991), but in 1990 it decreased to 9%, according to the 1991 plan - to 8.3%.

Since 1989, a number of private banks began to lend to the USSR only under the guarantees of their own governments. In fact, this means that the USSR is credited by the latter. The share of such loans in the portfolio of external liabilities is growing. For 1990-1991 the dates of repayment of a number of short-term loans fell and the start of repayment of several short-term loans. In terms of the budget for 1991, 16 billion dollars were allocated for these purposes and for servicing the rest of the debt (GV Popova, op. cit.). It was hard, but not fatal.

According to the certificate of the last chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR V. Pavlov, at the time of his arrest in August 1991, according to the documents, our debts amounted to 31.1 billion dollars, but only in the central repository of the Gokhran there were 180 tons of gold and 30 billion dollars of diamonds and polished diamonds . But it seems that at that time the plans for the future of a number of leaders of the country were not connected with the preservation of the USSR.

In October, VEB announced its insolvency. Somehow, imperceptibly, in 4 months they managed to take out loans for another 36 (!) billion dollars (here, however, it must be taken into account that given figure was determined retrospectively).

Inheritance of the debts of the USSR. External debt Russian Federation

After the Belavezha Agreement, under pressure from external creditors, it was proposed to divide both external assets and liabilities between the new states - the former Soviet republics in proportion to GDP. Initially, 7 of them agreed with this, but subsequently, after long and difficult negotiations, all assets and liabilities by 1994 went to the Russian Federation. With fixing the volume of Soviet external debt not everything is clear.

On May 29, 2001, on the initiative of V. Nikitin and S. Glazyev, a draft law “On the state external debt and external assets of the former USSR” was submitted to the State Duma. IN explanatory note to it, the authors asked for clarification on a number of issues, in particular:

Why do different documents of the Ministry of Finance contain different figures for servicing the debt of the USSR?

Why is the Book of Accounting and Registration of External Obligations of the USSR kept by the German consulting firm Warburg Dilon Read, and not by the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation?

It was also noted that so far the Government of the Russian Federation has not explained to Parliament the reasons for the increase in the debt of the USSR by 19.6 billion dollars by 1994 from the date of termination of the legal responsibility of the Government of the USSR.

In 1994, Russia's entire external debt amounted to $119.9 billion, and the amount of overdue payments and interest payments on the debt exceeded $15 billion (here it should be noted that creditors in 1992-93 agreed to defer a number of payments).

New Russia is actively credited and refinanced in foreign markets. Lenders include international financial institutions: IMF, The World Bank and EBRD. The decline in GDP continues until 1997, when its slight growth is planned. According to the data of the Central Bank of Russia, as of January 1, 1998, the external public debt was 149.9 billion dollars.

The newly taken loans are used to service external debt, to maintain the exchange rate of the ruble, to pay off the budget deficit - goals that can hardly be classified as productive. In this way, the loans of the Russian Federation differ from the loans of the Empire and, moreover, the pre-Gorbachev USSR. The situation is complicated by a large internal debt and the GKO "pyramid", which fundamentally differed little from the "MMM". In August 1998, the government announced a technical default on its debt obligations.

The default eventually leads to the recovery of the economy as a whole (albeit at a heavy price) and finances in particular. But the most important, in my opinion, its result is the growth in the power of understanding that one cannot live one day. They start doing what they should have done before.

In the field of external debt, this concerns primarily the restructuring of the USSR's debt (some agreements on this issue were reached earlier, but it seems that the government signed them out of fear not to offend creditors with the ruble). Negotiations with the London Club (which informally unites private creditor banks) end with the signing in 2000 of an agreement that 36.5% of the principal debt and 33% of VEB bonds are written off, and the remaining amount is converted into Eurobonds. The Paris Club (an informal association of official creditors, i.e. states) agreed that for the period up to 2020, 45% of the total debt should be paid, and 55% are paid until 2115. Looking ahead, let's say that during the second During the presidency of V. Putin, all debts to the Paris Club were repaid ahead of schedule.

The peak of the external debt of the Russian Federation falls on January 1, 1999 and is equal to 158.4 billion dollars. Starting from this date, the debt decreases to a minimum on January 1, 2009 - 32.1 billion dollars (the Central Bank of Russia), after which it slightly increases. I note that if you use the data of the Ministry of Finance, you will get somewhat different figures, although they will show the same trends as the data of the Central Bank. This is due to the fact that these structures have different methods of calculating debts.

As of January 1, 2016, according to the Ministry of Finance, the external public debt was $50,002.3 million. Russia's GDP in 2015 amounted to 80,412.5 billion rubles. The relationship between the former and the latter is quite favorable. But if you use the data of the Central Bank, it will be different. According to his statistics, the external public debt as of January 1, 2015 (I have no later data) was 304,892 million dollars, and since January 1, 2012 it has grown by more than 83 billion. The fact is that since the last date, the Central Bank has changed its calculation method. Now they take external debt for external public debt public sector in the expanded definition, which includes external debt of governments, monetary authorities, and banks and non-banking corporations in which the government and monetary authorities directly or indirectly own 50 percent or more of the equity or otherwise control them way.

This concludes the story of the external debt of the Russian state in various forms of its existence. We leave the conclusions to the discerning reader.

Excellent and informative material, with figures describing all the "power" and "independence" from Western creditors of the economy of the Russian Empire, before the 17th year, which became the last for the empire and its economy with a light hand, mediocre anti-state bourgeoisie. Another "nail in the coffin" of the myth of a prosperous Russian empire. A link to the material on the state of the economy of the Russian Empire at the beginning of the First World War at the end of the material of the respected arctus
Original taken from arctus in Financial collapse of the Russian Empire

Continuing the theme of the economic power of the Russian Empire - which, according to the prevailing opinion, was "knocked out" on the rise - let's consider the financial and economic potential and state debt Russia at the beginning of the twentieth century.
Let's start with debt.
"The state debt of the Russian Empire by the beginning of 1917 amounted to 33 billion rubles, by the end - 60 billion. Every year it was required to pay more than 3 billion rubles in interest.
These figures are taken from the report of V. P. Milyutin. They are present in the report of the director of the Department of the State Treasury Dementiev, published 10 years later. It shows the dynamics of the Russian public debt “with attribution to public debts also short-term liabilities whose replacement with long-term loans is only a matter of time.”
The debt amounted (to 1st of January):
- 1914 - 8.8 billion rubles,
- 1915 - 10.5 billion,
- 1916 - 18.9.
- 1917 - 33.6,
- and by July 1, 1917, he had already reached 43,9 billion rubles
It was expected that by the beginning of 1918 it would rise to 60 billion rubles

Actually up to 60 billion debt did not last, because the creditors did not show an active desire to borrow. <...>
“It is necessary to find about 15 billion rubles to fully cover all expenses by the end of 1917.” wrote Dementiev. The same amount was found during the three years of the war. About the same - nervous telegrams of the Minister of Trade and Industry of the Provisional Government Tereshchenko dated August 18, 1917 to the Russian ambassadors in France, England and the USA.
<...>
The structure of the public debt of Russia at the end of 1917 G.

In billion rubles			In % of the total amount
	long-term	short	Total	long-term	short	Total
External
Interior
TOTAL						This, of course, is the tip of the iceberg. Let's look below, look at the "underwater part". About financial and economic potential writes a magazine "Questions of History" No. 2 1993. Possessing great national wealth - 160 billion rubles. (or 8.6% of world wealth), a significant part of which (90 billion rubles) were various kinds Natural resources, the Russian Empire, nevertheless, was in third place, after the USA (400 billion rubles, 21.6%) and the British Empire (230 billion rubles, 12.4%), sharing it with the German Empire and not much surpassing the possessions of France (140 billion rubles, 7.5%). A qualitative indicator is the per capita distribution of national wealth in Russia(900 rubles) barely approaching the world average(1 thousand rubles), surpassing only Japanese by 1.5-1.8 times, but 3-5 times inferior to American, British, French and German, and 1.5-2 times Austrian and Italian. The same follows from the data characterizing the role financial capital and its place in the formation of national wealth. With a financial capital of 11.5 billion rubles. (4.6% of world financial capital), of which 7.5 billion rubles, or 2/3, were foreign investments, Russia by absolute indicators surpassed only the powers of the second magnitude:Austria-Hungary (8.9 billion rubles, 3.5%), Italy (5.1 billion rubles, 2%) and Japan (4.5 billion rubles, 1.8%),but several times inferior to the leading world powers:4.5 times the USA and the British Empire (52.5 billion rubles each, 21%), 4 times France (47 billion rubles, 18.8%) and 3 times Germany (35.1 billion rubles). rub., 14%).If we take only the Russian national financial capital proper, without taking into account foreign investment, then absolute and relative performance decrease by at least 3 times. Share of financial capital in the national wealth of Russia, which proportionately reflects the process of capitalization of the national economy, fluctuated in all its structures from imperial to central metropolitan, amounting to 7.1% - 11.6%, that is, it was, according to at least, half of all averages:the world average - 13.5%, the average imperial - 17%, the average metropolitan - 19% and the average central metropolitan - 23.4%. In all these important qualitative indicators, Russia was 2.5–4.5 times inferior not only to the leading, most developed French (33.5–43.7%), British (22.8–36.2%), German (23 - 24.5%) parameters, but also 1.5-2.5 times Austrian (15.3-37.8%), American (13.1-14.8%), Italian (12.1-17 .9%) and even the smallest - Japanese (12.5-15.5%). Ultimately, of all the leading world powers that embarked on the path of capitalization of the national economy, Russia occupied the last place in all imperial structures, and only Great Russia barely reached the world average. Although in terms of national income (16.4 billion rubles, 7.4% of the world's total), the Russian Empire ranked fourth after the United States, the German and British empires, its per capita indicators were in the penultimate place, ahead of only Japan, but not reaching the world average. . By gross industrial production(5.7 billion rubles, 3.8% of the world) The Russian Empire was inferior even to France, being in fifth place in the world. All Russian quality indicators(industrial production per person and annual output per worker)were only half the world average , surpassing only the Japanese and Italian imperial data, but significantly,5-10 times behind the USA, Germany and Great Britain. By volume of foreign trade turnover(2.9 billion rubles, 3.4% of the world) The Russian Empire surpassed the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Italy and Japan, but significantly, 7 times, lagged behind Great Britain, 4 times - from Germany, 3 times - from USA and France. In terms of per capita parameters, the contrast was even more striking.All Russian indicators. were 2-12 times less than those of other leading powers. Along the length of the railways(79 thousand km in single-track terms) The Russian Empire occupied the second place in the world, yielding, though 5 times, only to the United States. According to such qualitative indicators as the length of railways per 100 sq. km., Russian imperial indicators (0.3) approached only those of France (0.4) and the British Empire (0.1), but were 6 times less than those of the United States, 20-50 times less than the metropolitan structures of European states. In terms of the length of railways per 10 thousand inhabitants (4.2-5.2), the Russian Empire was ahead only of the traditional maritime powers - the Japanese and British empires, but compared to the United States, this figure was 8 times less. Only in Great Russia this figure (5.2) approached the world average (5.9). Although formally 2.5 million registered tons of cargo of the passenger fleet were under the Russian flag, in fact, she owned only a fifth of it, the rest were the property of French shipowners. That's whyin terms of tonnage, its merchant fleet was at the level of Austria-Hungary - traditionally a land power- and significantly (60 times) inferior to the British merchant fleet. This gap is due mainly to the cyxotravel character of the Russian Empire, as well as the relatively weak development of its navy as a whole. In terms of the number of registered tons per 1 thousand inhabitants (2.7–4.1), Russian indicators were the lowest and amounted to only 10–20% of the world average (24.3), 5–100 times less than that of other leading powers. Although in terms of volume indicators, Russia occupied an intermediate position between the leading industrial powers (the United States, the German and British empires), on the one hand, and the industrialized ones (Austria-Hungary, Italy and Japan), on the other, and had, on the whole, a potential close to the French , in terms of qualityshe shared last and penultimate places with Japan. In this regard, Russialagged behind the leading industrialized countries by 3-8 times, from Italy and Austria-Hungary - by 1.5-3 times. This gap can only be explained by the fact that if England embarked on the path of industrialization from the middle of the 17th century, the USA and France - from the end of the 18th century, Germany, Italy and Austria-Hungary - from 1805-1815, then Russia and Japan - only since the 1860s. That's whythe position of a catching-up power became characteristic of Russia in the second half of the 19th and 20thV. when the advantages of the new industrial society became apparent, especially in economic sphere. The gap between traditional (feudal) and industrial society acquired a qualitative character, which is especially noticeable when comparing average per capita indicators, which began to differ by an order of magnitude or more. Other posts

In the postwar years, the Soviet Union was an exemplary borrower, timely and in full fulfilling their debt obligations. However, the amounts of loans were not an example of modern. Until 1983, the external debt of the USSR did not exceed $ 5 billion (1-1.5% of the country's GNP).

Festive demonstration at the hotel Moscow 1964, photo from LIFE magazine

The situation changed dramatically after the death in November 1982 of the head of the Soviet state, L.I. Brezhnev. In 1984 there was a sharp jump in debt. More than $15 billion was borrowed on the foreign market. External debt amounted to 5% of GNP. In 1986, the amount of external loans exceeded $30 billion, and in 1989 the external debt reached $50 billion (8% of GNP). Another $30 billion of debt was accumulated by the Union in 1988-1991, when the West provided the USSR with a number of multibillion-dollar loans. On October 28, 1991, after the August events, when the State Emergency Committee tried to stop the collapse of the USSR, ten republics that declared themselves successors to the USSR signed a memorandum of understanding confirming joint and several responsibility for the external debt of the Soviet Union.

Queues to shops: USSR 80s

On December 4, 1991, an agreement was signed between the republics on the succession of the external economic debt and assets of the USSR, for which the RSFSR got 61.34% of the external debt of the Union, i.e. approximately $57 billion (10% of GNP). However, on April 2, 1993, the Russian government announced that it would assume all obligations of the former Soviet republics to repay the external debt of the USSR, in exchange for their refusal to share in foreign assets of the USSR (the so-called zero option). So Russia got the entire external debt in the amount of $ 96.6 billion.

In 1997, Russia joined the Paris Club, a non-institutionalized association of creditor countries created in 1956 to discuss and resolve debt problems of sovereign states*. When joining the club, Russia had about $ 150 billion in assets, which owed it, as the successor of the USSR, developing countries, primarily Ethiopia, Mozambique, Yemen, Vietnam, Algeria, as well as other countries in Africa and Asia. At the same time, obeying the charter of the Paris Club, Russia was forced to write off a large amount of debts for the supply of weapons to its debtors. War debts accounted for about 80% of the total Russian assets, With. 253.

In addition, Russia has become obligated to write off debts to countries belonging to the category of "poor" and "developing". Not taken into account were only the debts of India, Iraq, Libya and Cuba - countries objectionable to the West. As a result, after joining the Paris Club, it turned out that Russia could claim less than $ 8 billion, which is slightly more than 5% of the total accounts receivable THE USSR.

Assortment of products in Soviet stores - USSR 80s

At the same time, no one began to write off the external debts of the former USSR. The only thing that the Western countries did was to restructure the external debt of the USSR - the termination of debt obligations that make up the state debt, with the replacement of these obligations with other debt obligations that provide for other conditions for servicing and repaying Russia's external debt. If after the collapse of the Union, the debtors of the former USSR owed Russia about the same amount as Russia owed its creditor (including the debt of the former USSR), then after Russia joined the Paris Club, the approximate proportion of 1 to 1 turned into a proportion of 1 to 0.053, to Unfortunately, not in favor of Russia.

A completely legitimate question arises: why were no offsets carried out? Having written off the lion's share of the debt to the debtors of the USSR, and having lost a strong foreign policy card, Russia has been trying for more than a year to settle its obligations on the external debt of the USSR, issuing new obligations and exchanging them for the old obligations of the USSR. Russia - a fragment of a world power named the USSR, whose name alone inspired panic in the countries of the West, turned out to be indebted to everyone around and around. Even the former socialist countries, as of January 1, 2002, Russia's debt amounted to $ 11.5 billion.

In June 2000, the Government of the Russian Federation approved the terms of issue and circulation of Russia's external bonded loans with final maturity dates in 2010 and 2030. These external bond issues are intended to settle the debt of the former USSR to foreign commercial banks and financial institutions organized into the London Club of Creditors. The London Club is a non-institutionalized association of commercial creditor banks, created for negotiations with official borrowers (in the case of Russia, the club unites over 600 banks, whose activities are coordinated by the Banking Advisory Committee headed by Deutsche Bank).

Empty shelves in Soviet stores in the late 80s of the 20th century

In June 2002, the Government of Russia adopted a resolution concerning the settlement of part of the external debt of the former USSR to international bank Economic Cooperation (IBEC) and the International investment bank(IIB), by exchanging these obligations for the obligations of the IBEC and the IIB to foreign creditors. At the same time, the obligations of IBEC and IIB to foreign creditors were simultaneously exchanged for bonds of external bonded loans of the Russian Federation.

At the end of 2003, the Russian government adopted another resolution "On the final settlement of the obligations of the Russian Federation for the external debt of the former USSR to the International Investment Bank", which stipulated that the remaining obligations of the former USSR would be settled by exchanging Russia's external bonded loans for bonds.

In February 2004, the order of the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation "On the additional issue of external bond loans of the Russian Federation" was issued, which provides for an additional issue of bonds, in accordance with the General Conditions for the Issue and Circulation of Bonds of External Bond Loans of the Russian Federation, with final maturity dates in 2010 and 2030. These bonds are intended to settle the debt of the former USSR to foreign commercial banks and financial institutions united in the London Club of Creditors. The issue of these bonds was approved by the Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation dated June 23, 2000 No. 478. This order of the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation provides for the issuance valuable papers for an amount not exceeding $ 700 million.

Line for vodka, USSR, 80s

As of October 1, 2004, the external debt of the former USSR amounted to $52.4 billion. Russia's payments on the external debt of the former USSR severely hamper the development of the Russian economy. Russia needs to write off at least 75% of the external debt of the USSR. Similar write-off precedents have already taken place in recent history.

Thus, in 1992, Western creditors wrote off 50% of the external debt to Poland and Egypt. As a result, Poland's external debt was reduced from $30 to $15 billion, and Egypt's - from $25 to $12.5 billion. Unfortunately, we have to admit that the West applies double standards in relation to Russia. Poland's external debt was reduced by 50% because Poland was the first country in the socialist camp, where market reforms began, and Egypt was given a similar favor for its peace with Israel. Therefore, until Russia shows its political will, it is obvious that the countries of the West will not agree to write off the debts of the former USSR.

* Paris Club member countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Great Britain, Germany, Denmark, Ireland, Spain, Italy, Canada, Netherlands, Norway, Russia, USA, Finland, France, Switzerland, Sweden, Japan.

Borrowing money on the side in Rus' began even before the formation of the Empire, from the time of the Great Troubles. The first Russian Emperor Peter I refused to borrow from foreign powers on principle, which he was proud of. But then, starting from the reign of Catherine II and ending with the reign of Nicholas II, Russia was constantly in need of external loans.

"God forbid from war with Holland!"

The first loans in the Russian Empire were associated with the financing of various kinds of wars in which the state was drawn. Subsequent ones were also largely due to military spending.

In the second half of the 18th century, Russia entered the war with the Turks. We needed ships to hit the enemy from the Mediterranean, and money to acquire this flotilla in Europe in Russian treasury did not have. The loan had to be made in Amsterdam, at that time the financial center of Europe. The Dutch merchant de Smet received bonds from Russia for 7.5 million guilders, for which he issued banknotes, subsequently certified by the Russian ambassador. The banknotes were sold by the banker market price which has always been below par.

Part of the income de Smet kept for himself as a commission, the rest of the funds were sent to the places indicated Russian government. The loan was guaranteed by customs duties on goods imported into Russia.

The son and eldest grandson of Catherine also repeatedly borrowed money for military needs in Holland, and Paul I swore that in any case the debt must be returned, even in the event of a war with Holland, "... God save it."

Beginners are not always lucky

The Russian Empire was just beginning to accumulate its external debt, therefore credit policy in relation to the state was not too sparing - for a bond with a par value of 1000 guilders, we were given 750 guilders real money, and the interest had to be paid on the entire thousand.

By the end of the reign of Catherine II, Russia had an external debt exceeding 41 million silver rubles, including interest - 55 million, while the empire's revenues exceeded 62 million rubles. The subsequent war with France, unleashed by Pavel Alekseevich, increased the amount of external debt to more than 60 million, the son of Paul I Alexander, who continued to fight with the French, added another 10 million to this amount. By 1824, the external debt of the Russian Empire exceeded 100 million silver rubles.

During the reign of Nikolai Pavlovich, the debts of the Russian Empire to other states grew to 340 million rubles (including the debt of Poland) - the industrial revolution was taking place in the country during these years - railways, plants and factories. The borrowed funds were spent mainly for these purposes.

Private traders "plus" to the debt

Alexander II liberalized to a certain extent Russian economy which increased the external debt of the Russian Empire. Private enterprise, having received some freedom, began to take loans in foreign banks(in domestic it was unprofitable to do this). However, Western bankers agreed to issue loans only under state guarantees. And it gave them, especially when it came to financing projects for the construction of railway lines. Accordingly, the debts of private traders were added to the total amount of the empire's debt.

The amount of the external debt of the Russian Empire was also increased by the Crimean campaign, as a result of which, at the beginning of the 80s of the XIX century, the state already owed the West more than 2 billion rubles.

Financial consequences of the war with the Japanese

The governments of Alexander III and Nicholas II (before the start of the Russian-Japanese campaign) somewhat stabilized the upward trend in the external debt of the state - until the beginning of the twentieth century it amounted to "only" 2.4 billion rubles, at the same time, the state's revenues grew faster.

The war with Japan turned out to be the strongest financial blow to the country's economy - in less than three years, from 1904 to 1906, the Russian Empire placed various kinds of loans in Germany and France on total amount exceeding 1.8 billion rubles! Most of the funds were borrowed on unfavorable terms for the state.

Loans strengthen the system, but do not save from the revolution

Foreign analysts on the eve of the outbreak of the First World War argued that by 1910 loans had strengthened the financial system of the Russian Empire, by that time it was quite stable. At the beginning of 1914, the external debt of the state, taking into account the guaranteed obligations of private companies, amounted to 6.3 billion rubles (budget revenue - 3.4 billion rubles, 5.5% of it went to service external debt).

Relatively stable financial system shattered with the beginning of the Russian-German war and the subsequent February revolution - the socio-economic situation that had developed by that time led to an escalation of revolutionary sentiments in society, resulting in a coup d'état.

Bolsheviks: "Shish you, not debts"

When the Bolsheviks seized power in Russia, the country had a ten billion foreign debt (in gold). Lenin acted simply: he nullified it, announcing by a special Decree of the Plenum of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee on the annulment of all foreign loans.

... During the existence of the USSR, the problem of repayment of debts by the heads of foreign states was repeatedly raised before the Soviet government. Whether the Soviet Union paid the tsarist debts is unknown. It is only known that in 1994 the government of V. S. Chernomyrdin alone paid France 400 million dollars to repay French loans.