Mikhail Borisovich Denisenko, head of the department of demography at our university, will talk about how the point system works in foreign countries. We have a report. Will Russia withstand the demographic blow? Denisenko Mikhail Borisovich

An important indicator The marriage process is the age of marriage. It is calculated as the time elapsed between the date of birth and the date of marriage. The source of data on the age of marriage are population censuses, special socio-demographic surveys, and current records of demographic events.

If the census program contains a question about the date of marriage (and this is not always the case), then it is answered either by everyone who was married at the time of the census, or by those who have ever been married and survived until the time of the census. . This allows us to estimate the age at marriage for all living people and for all generations.

In the second case (i.e. during the current registration), the age of marriage is fixed, naturally, only for those who marry in given year. Thus, if we talk about the generation as a whole, current accounting provides information only about a part of each generation.

In demographic analysis, the age at marriage is a characteristic not of individual individuals, but either of the entire population during a certain period of time, or for a generation throughout its life. Therefore, when talking about the age at marriage, we always mean either the distribution for this indicator (for the entire population in a specific period of time or for a generation over the entire period of its existence), or about various measures of central tendency for this distribution: o middle age of marriage, as well as about median and modal age. These indicators can be calculated both for all marriages and for marriages of any order, most often, of course, for the first.

In this case, various methods are used to determine these indicators. In particular, average age of marriage can be determined using the following methods:

  • based on the age distribution of those getting married (including the first one) in this year, or (which is the same thing) based on the absolute numbers of people married at different ages;
  • according to census data on the distribution of the population by marital status (marital status at the time of the census);
  • according to marriage tables for real and hypothetical generations. Let's take a closer look at the first two methods. The general idea of ​​demographic tables and the calculation of averages based on them will be discussed below.

The distribution by age at marriage and measures of central tendency for the period are the best known characteristics of marriage rates. At the same time, the average age is most often calculated from the measures of central tendency. Since the age of marriage is known for almost every bride and groom, its average is calculated as the arithmetic mean of all these ages:

Here: MAM - average age at marriage; x is the age of each bride or groom; Their - number of people married in this age range. Half a year is added to the exact age due to the peculiarity of age as a statistical variable.

Typically, the average age at marriage is calculated based on the absolute numbers of people married at a given age, but the results of such calculations are influenced by structural factors. Under the influence of fluctuations in the birth rate in the past, either small or numerous generations of men and women enter the age of maximum intensity of marriage. In addition, the proportion of those who have never been married in each of these generations is also constantly changing, influenced by the dynamics of the marriage rate among it in the past.

Borisov V.A., Sinelnikov A.B. Marriage and birth rates in Russia:

demographic analysis. M., 1995. pp. 34-35.

Formula 5.6 can only be used if each individual age of the brides and grooms is known. Statistical authorities have such information and therefore use it. It is by this method that the data on the average age at marriage given in Table 1 were calculated. 5.8.

But statistical reference books usually publish data on the age of marriage only in a generalized form - by five-year age groups. Therefore, ordinary people, not statisticians, are forced to use various approximate formulas to calculate the average age of marriage. One of these approximate methods of calculation is the calculation of the arithmetic weighted average, where the number of people entering into marriage acts as weights:

MAM =

^(x + 0.5 p)x p I x

Here: MAM- average age at marriage; x - beginning of the age interval (x+n) years; P - its length; N- number of people married in this age range. Half the length of the age interval is added to the exact age of x years due to the nature of age as a statistical variable.

Another approximate method of calculation is to calculate the arithmetic weighted average, where the age coefficients of marriage (for all and for the first time) act as weights:

Average age of people getting married. Russia, 1960-1995 (years)

Average age of people getting married

Average age of first marriage

Source: Demographic Yearbook of Russia 1996. M., 1996. P. 133. *-repeated marriages. Calculation of indicators for 1997 and subsequent years is impossible due to the cessation of centralized development of data on age, incl. simultaneously by age and order of marriage.

^ midpnt(x + n) x n ASMR X

  • 1n*SMR x
  • (5.8)

Here: tShrSh(x + P)- middle of the age interval (X + P) years, i.e. the same as (x + 0.5l) in formula 5.7; p A8ML x - age-specific marriage rates (all and first).

Chart 5.2 shows data on the average age of marriage in Russia for 1979-1996, calculated using this method.

IN last years data on the age of marriage began to be published in an extremely general form (up to 18 years, 18-24 years, 24-34 years, 35 years and older), which absolutely does not allow calculating the average age of marriage. This, unfortunately, reflects the general trend of reduction in the volume of published demostatistical information, which began to manifest itself in the second half of the 1990s. (see below).

If the methods described above for calculating the average age at marriage characterize the marriage rate for a particular year, then the indicator that will be discussed below is the estimated average age at first marriage (SMAM from English. The Singulate Mean Age at Marriage), - characterizes it in relation to the entire time during which those who were married at least once during the census period got married. This indicator was proposed by the English demographer J. Hajnal in 1953.

The estimated average age at marriage is based on the proportion of never-married people in each age group. Although this indicator can be calculated for any age interval, it is most often calculated for the ages of 15-49 years, divided into five-year age groups, conventionally assuming that first marriage does not occur before the age of 15 and after 50 years. The estimated average age at marriage is calculated using the following formula:

  • 15-19
  • 5 U X x5 +15
  • (5^45 + 5^50) X 50
  • (5.9)

5^45 + 5^50 where 5 1/, 5 U 45, 5 (7 50 - respectively, the proportion of persons who have never been married in age groups ah (x + 5) years, (45-49) years and (50-54) years.


1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996

-?>? Men

Chart 5.2

Average age at first and second marriage for men and women, Russia, 1979-96. Source: Population of Russia 1998. Sixth annual demographic report. M., 1999. P. 29.

Calculation SMAM quite simple 1 and can be easily implemented, for example, using spreadsheets Excel. It includes 5 steps (if the distribution of the population aged 15 years and older by marital status is known, then the number of steps is reduced to 4):

Step 1. Calculation 5 U x- shares of never married people in each of the five-year age groups from 15-19 years to 50-54 years (x= 15, 20, ..., 50). This share is equal to the quotient of the number of never married people aged (X+ 5) years per population of a given sex in that age group. If these shares are known from statistics, then step 1 is skipped.

Step 2. Calculation RS 2- the number of person-years lived by the population before entering into their first marriage, from birth to age 50. This number is equal to:

RSj = RS + 15,

Where RS ( - the sum of the never-married shares in each of the five-year age groups multiplied by 5 (i.e., 5 x n U x).

Since each of the terms 5U x 5, which appears under the summation sign in the above formula, is equal to the average number of person-years lived outside of marriage during a five-year age interval (X+ 5) years, then the value RS 1 is simply the number of person-years lived before marriage from age 15 to age 50. The number 15 is the number of person-years lived before first marriage from birth to age 15.

Step 3. Calculation R.M.- shares of those who have ever been married. This share is equal to:

R.M. = 1 - RN,

Where RN- the proportion of those who have never been married (or the proportion of those who are finally married)

celibacy), in turn equal to:

y^dg _ 5^45 + 5^50

Step 4. Calculation RS 3- the number of person-years lived outside of marriage by those who have not married by age 50. Because the RN- the proportion of people who have never been married at age 50, then the total number of person-years lived outside of marriage by those who have not married by age 50 is:

RS 3 = 50 x R.N.

See: Indirect Techniques for Demographic Estimation. Manual X. U.N.. N.Y., 1983. Annex I. P. 225.

Step 5. Calculation YAMAM- the average number of person-years lived outside of marriage by those who married by age 50.

BMAM = ~ .

Table 5.9 shows the technique for calculating 5М4Л/ using the 2002 Russian census data as an example. Moreover, we calculated this indicator not for the population under the age of 50, as in formula 5.9 and in the procedure described above, but for the population under the age of 70 , which is more consistent with modern reality, when people get married at ages much older than 50 years.

This procedure can be illustrated graphically for greater clarity (graph 5.3). As can be seen from Table 5.9 and Chart 5.3, the average estimated age at first marriage was 32.1 years for men and 28.1 years for women. This is significantly higher than it was in 1994 according to microcensus data - 25.2 and 21.3 years, respectively.

The main reason for such a sharp increase in the average estimated age of first marriage is the increase in the proportion of those who have never been married according to the 2002 census compared to the 1994 microcensus data in almost most ages over 19 years, especially at the ages of maximum marriage (these for clarity, the shares are shown in parentheses in Table 5.9). This may indicate a change in the marital behavior of the younger population (especially young men). On the one hand, there is a postponement of marriage until older ages, which is undoubtedly due to the radically changed socio-economic situation in the country, when the interests of a growing part of young people have shifted towards achieving goals of personal success (career, high income, etc. ) as a precondition for marriage, and an early age at marriage began to be seen as an obstacle to their achievement.

On the other hand, and perhaps even more so, the sharp increase in the value YAMAM in the intercensus period indicates an increase in extramarital cohabitation and other forms of free sexual unions. It is not without reason that, as will be shown below, during the period between the 1994 micro-census and the 2002 census, the share of officially unregistered marriages almost doubled.

It is interesting that the value YAMAM, calculated for the population under the age of 50, equals 31.2 years for men and 28.2 years for women (in 1994, 24.5 years and 22.1 years, respectively). This may indicate that in younger generations, men on average married at an earlier age, while women, on the contrary, did so at older ages. One of the reasons for this dynamics YAMAM may serve the participation of older men

Calculation of the average age at first marriage. 2002 Census

(population under 70 years of age)

Age (years)

Never married (per 1000 people of a given gender and age)

70 and older

Ya8 1- number of person-years lived before marriage from age 15 to age 70

Ya8 2- number of person-years lived outside of marriage by age 70 (I8 2 = I8 1 + 15)

YAL/ - the proportion of those who have not married by the age of 70 years

YAM- percentage of people who have ever been married (YAM= 1 - YAL/)

Ya8 3 - total number of person-years lived outside of marriage at age 70 (I8 3= 70 x YAL/)

8MAM = (I8 2- YaYa 3)/YAM

Step 1: Calculation of the proportion of people who have never been married (initial data in the columns Men and Women)

Step 2: Calculate the number of person-years lived outside of marriage by the age of 70 years (R5 2 = R1 1 + 15)

Step 3: Estimating the proportion ever married (RM=^ - YAL/, YAL/ - the share of those who have not married by the age of 70 years, equal to half the sum of the share of those who have never been married in the age groups 65-69 years and 70 years and older)

Step 4: Calculate the total number of person-years lived outside of marriage at age 70 (I WOULD 3 =70 x YAL/, YAL/ - the proportion of those who have not married by age 70)

Step 5: Calculate the average age at first marriage: 8MAM=(I8 2 - I8 3)/YAM

Source: Official website of the 2002 population census. Vol. 2. Age, sex composition and marital status. Table 3 (http://www.perepis2002.ru)

The area under the curve (up to the horizontal line I) is the total number of person-years lived outside of marriage by those who married by age 70. BMAM equal to this area divided by the number of those who were married by age 70. This number is equal to 1000 minus those remaining outside of marriage by age 70. Lines II and III show the technique for calculating the median age at first marriage (Me)


5-9 10-15 16-19 18-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64 65-69 70-74

Chart 5.3

Calculation of the average age at first marriage (AMAM)

Source: Table 5.9.

knees in the Great Patriotic War, as well as generally longer military service in those years and, consequently, the forced postponement of first marriage. In addition, as can be seen from Table 5.9, in 1994, among women over the age of 59, the proportion who had never been married was much higher than among younger women (in 2002, this excess moved to the age group of 70 years and older) . For men in 1994, this increase applies to ages 70 years and older. This age-related dynamics in the share of those who have never been married is a direct and immediate demographic result of the Great Patriotic War, which doomed many women to forced celibacy.

If we consider the dynamics of this indicator in the period between the censuses of 1979 and 1989. and between 1989 and 1994, the following trends can be stated. In 1979 the value ZMAM for men, submitted by V. A. Borisov and A. B. Sinelnikov, was 24.16 years, in 1989 - 24.20 years, which, in their opinion, is a barely noticeable increase. The growth of the same value ZMAM by 1994 to 24.5 they do not consider a “major demographic shift.” As for women, then, according to the same authors, in the intercensal period the value ZMAM practically did not change, and in the period 1989-94. increased from 21.7 years to 22.2 years, or by 0.5 years, which “in demographics is considered quite significant.” The authors explain the dynamics of women's ZMAM both the increase in final celibacy and the postponement of first marriages 1 .

  • Demographic Yearbook of Russia 2001. M., 2001. P. 132.
  • First published in: HajnalJ. Age at marriage and proportion marriage // Population Studies. Vol. VII. No. 2 (November 1953). P. 111 - 136. See also: Indirect Techniques for Demographic Estimation. Manual X. N.Y., United Nations. 1983. Annex I. P. 225-229; Population: Encyclopedic Dictionary. M., 1994. P. 51; Borisov V.A., Sinelnikov A.B. Decree. Op. P. 27.

The age of entry into family relationships in the Russian Federation is limited only by a minimum indicator. This means that older people can register their marriage on a general basis. Late marriage has its advantages and disadvantages, as well as features inherent only to a union between mature spouses. In addition, the concept itself is relative, since there are no clear age criteria for determining early or late union.

Late marriage: how old is it?

There are no definitive age limits for dividing early or late marriage.

It all depends on the psychological readiness of individuals to enter into family relationships and many other factors.

Trends regarding the age to start a family periodically shift either down or up.

Usually there is good reasons, making marriage registration necessary as soon as possible.

Late marriage is a union concluded between persons over 40 years of age. There is no upper limit, since in practice there are always 60-year-old newlyweds and even more mature ones.

Advantages and disadvantages

Late marriage has a number of advantages that for some make it preferable:
  • psychological maturity of partners. If young spouses have not yet formed as individuals, then older ones already have a clear idea of ​​what kind of partner they want;
  • financial viability. Often, by adulthood, greater financial stability appears than in youth;
  • a clear understanding of the relationship;
  • experience in housekeeping and home improvement for women;
  • Often, by the age of 40, men have already passed a stage in life when gatherings with friends are a priority and they understand the value of marriage.

Among the main disadvantages of late entry into a family union are:

  • Difficulties having children. It is sometimes difficult for older parents to raise a small child.
  • An established way of life. If people are alone for a long time without a partner, a lot of habits develop in everyday life that are difficult to eradicate or change.
  • Misunderstanding on the part of society. Often, those who marry at an advanced age receive indignation from acquaintances, friends, neighbors, etc.

In general, one can only talk about advantages or disadvantages in a specific case, since for some newlyweds they play a big role, but for others they do not matter.

Features of registering a marriage for an elderly couple

The process of applying and registering a marriage for older persons may differ slightly from the standard. It is especially relevant to hold a celebration for those who, for health reasons, cannot independently appear at the registry office.

Submitting an application necessarily requires the presence of at least one of the future spouses and the presence of a notarized signature from the second. The procedure itself is possible without the obligatory presence in the registry office. If you have illnesses that prevent you from coming to the department on your own and are documented, registration will take place at home. In this case, it is necessary to notify the registry office of this need in advance.

The rest of the procedure is carried out in the standard manner.

If the future spouses are elderly, then they can be signed on the day of application or as soon as possible.

Reasons why older people start a new family

Among the main reasons why people marry late are the following:
  • . After a long period of living together, a couple often comes to the conclusion that it is necessary to formalize the union.
  • or .
  • Loneliness and the need to create a family, realized over time. Often young people do not put family at the forefront, but with age they understand the need to create one.

The reasons are subjective and may vary. Often, it is upon reaching a certain age that a couple realizes the need to formalize an already long-term relationship.

Interesting statistic: average age of marriage

It is interesting to trace the dependence of the number of newlyweds on the age of marriage. IN different countries Oh, it differs significantly, since in many states it is customary to enter into an alliance at a more mature age, and in some as early as possible. According to statistics, the more developed the state, the later they enter into a family union.

Expert opinion

Irina Vasilyeva

Civil law expert

In Russia, the majority of average marriages take place for the first time between the ages of 22 and 28. This is due to the completion of studies at universities and other educational institutions, the transition to a new stage of life, the acquisition of independence, etc.

However, there are some differences between the boundaries for men and women, since their views on marriage are very different.

At what age do men usually get married?

It is difficult to name the optimal age for a man to get married. Some young people enter into family relationships early, while others enter into family relationships quite late. Today's trends are such that most men get married for the first time at 25-28 years old. It is at this age, even if you receive higher education the young man already has a job, a stable salary and some achievements. The indicator is relative, since many men start families after 30 years.

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Of all modern processes, according to the famous French demographer Alfred Sauvy, the most easily measurable, the most consistent in its development, the most suitable for forecasting and the most severe in its consequences is the process of demographic aging. Difficult because, like human aging, it will be followed by changes in “appearance and internal organization» society. We can now only guess about some upcoming social changes, but we can talk about the content of others with a great degree of certainty. In this article, we propose to look, firstly, at how differences in the rate of aging are changing the demographic map of the world, and secondly, at what is behind the disruption in the ratios of age groups, which have actually been constant for many centuries. But first, let’s define the concept of “old population,” the content of which also turns out to be changeable.
Old age
Everyone knowing their calendar age is a conquest industrial society. Legislative consolidation of numerous age standards associated with admission to school and the transition of schoolchildren to high school, conscription into the army, elections, etc., forced the population to increase their chronological literacy. But even 150 years ago, even in enlightened France, as one French statistician noted, it was almost impossible to establish the age of people with any acceptable accuracy, because some did not know it, while others hid it. And today the question is “How old are you?” puts a lot of people in difficult situations developed countries.
In the past, people, with the exception of the most educated, did not know their calendar age. But they knew their social age, which was associated with a certain stage life cycle and was expressed in belonging to a certain stratum or group. The division of human life into stages such as childhood, adulthood and old age arose much earlier than the concept of age. Old age was everywhere associated with certain changes in appearance, the decline of a person’s physical strength and illness, disability and the need for care. These signs, and not the exact age, predetermined the transition to the old group. A person could be considered an old man at 40 or 50 years old. A similar attitude towards age is still observed in many tribes in Africa, Asia and Latin America who have preserved their traditional way of life.
The duration of old age as a stage of the human life cycle has changed little over long periods of history. Dramatic changes occurred during the era of demographic revolutions, the consequence of which was, in particular, an increase in life expectancy at older ages. For hunter-gatherers, old age did not last long. They worked virtually until the end of their lives, and the period of senile disability was very short. In an agrarian society, old age has become longer and, probably, the age group of old people has increased, and the role of older people in public life has increased. This was greatly facilitated by the increase in the volume of resources available to a particular human community (family, community, etc.), and the emergence of ownership of land, livestock, and housing, which was controlled by elders. People worked as long as their strength allowed, and as they became exhausted, they moved on from their occupation agriculture, craft, trade to other, easier activities in his family. By raising their grandchildren and running the household, the old people thereby allowed their children to spend more time working in the field or workshop. As long as a person was fit for basic activities, he, regardless of chronological age, was not considered an old man among his fellow tribesmen.
The common belief that old people were a highly revered group in ancient societies appears to be a myth. As studies show, the elderly themselves, as a functionally weak part of the population, and old age as the final stage of the life cycle in ancient times were revered no more than in our days. Let us note that the elders did not belong to the age group of old people. For example, Edward Evans-Pritchards noted that among the Nuer of Kenya, elders are members of middle age groups, since members of the oldest age groups take almost no part in public life. Among the Australian Aborigines, age in itself is not a criterion for classifying a person as an elder. If this were so, then the elders would be the oldest men, but usually decrepit old men were by no means considered elders. Among the Caucasian peoples, members of the council of elders should not be younger than 40 years old. Departure from its composition occurred naturally: due to age, health, and religious reasons.
With the onset of industrialization, the position of old people in society began to change rapidly. the main problem was that the maintenance of the elderly could not be provided entirely in the traditional family form. The separation of children from the parental family, the migration of children to cities and other countries, the high level of unemployment among older industrial workers and at the same time the extension of human life raised the question of material support for the elderly, especially in an urban environment. To ensure their existence at the end of their years, people tried to work as long as their health and strength allowed them. For example, the average age of retirement in the United States in 1910 was 74 years. But what about those who lost their ability to work earlier and had no savings? Among workers in capitalist countries, the idea of ​​a secure old age at the expense of the state began to gain strength. An example of the implementation of this idea was officers and officials who were provided with pensions upon retirement. As a result, in a number of European countries, by the end of the 19th century, pension systems were introduced, and the onset of old age began to be associated not with the physical and mental state of a person, but with the legally established retirement age.
For several decades now, older people in international comparisons have been defined as those aged 60 or 65 years and older. Accordingly, demographers call societies old or young depending on what proportion of people at these ages make up the total number population. The lower limits of old age correspond to the most common retirement ages adopted in different countries of the world. At the same time, a significant increase in life expectancy in the countries of Western Europe, Japan and North America has led to the fact that, on average, residents of these countries spend almost a quarter of their lives in retirement.
As history shows, retirement ages were set not so much according to physiological or demographic criteria, but depending on the outcome of the struggle between employers, the state and trade unions. So, when registering the first pension systems late XIX- at the beginning of the 20th century, the financial interests of the state took over. Therefore, the age of retirement due to old age was high (for example, 70 years in Germany and the UK, 65 years in the USA and France) and exceeded the corresponding duration indicators. future life at birth. Subsequently, under pressure from trade unions and private companies, the retirement age was lowered. In addition, economic crises pushed. Thus, one of the contemporaries of the Great Depression noted: “Recent times of severe unemployment have contributed to the development of the theory that older workers should be forced to leave paid work to make room for younger unemployed workers. In some countries there have been demands to lower the retirement age (usually from 65 to 60) and thereby force or induce more old people to give way to the young." In the private sector, early retirement has always been used as a way to reduce staff and save on pensions.
IN modern society older people, as a rule, are united into one age layer, which is often called the “third age” or “third age population.” In relation to representatives of the third age, various kinds of prejudices are common among young people, the roots of which go back to the distant past. Probably, in the initial period of industrialization in Western society, especially among the young population of the United States, where new migrants were separated from their parents by the ocean, negative attitudes towards old age and elderly people intensified. Many studies of older people in developed countries have unwittingly focused on their negative characteristics. In modern society, stereotypes are still widespread that attribute dependency, physical and mental weakness, cultural backwardness, inability to assimilate new ideas, and unfriendly attitude towards young people to older people.
Over time, the concept of the “third age” has undergone a revision, initiated by gerontologists and demographers. Their research showed that older people in countries with high life expectancy are divided into two groups that differ greatly in their social, economic, psychological and physical characteristics age groups. In the early 1970s, American gerontologists Bernice Neugarten and Ethel Shanas first started talking about the Young Old and the Old Old. In the 1990s, English demographer Peter Laslett proposed dividing the life cycle modern man into four stages. The last two stages - "third instar" and "fourth instar" - correspond to "the Young Old" and "the Old Old". At the same time, demographic studies and forecasts since the late 1980s have specifically identified a rapidly increasing group of “oldest”—those over 80 years old—and since the 1990s, a group of centenarians.
“Young old people,” which most often include older people under the age of 75, differ from their peers half a century ago in good health and relatively high life expectancy, high educational status, relatively high level well-being based on receiving a sustainable income in the form of pensions and wealth accumulated over a lifetime. Their children grew up and most of them left their parents' home. “Young old people” are energetic and active. Having received free time as a gift from society, many spend it on social activities or travel. Their numbers in countries with high life expectancy are constantly growing. The lifestyle of these people does not correspond to the stereotypical roles assigned to old people. Formal age limits limit their capabilities. Many of them would like and are able to continue working after retirement age, and research shows that the quality of this work will be no lower than that of representatives of younger generations. The traditional image of a “frail old man” corresponds to a group of “old old people”, most of whom, due to health problems, constantly need functional support and retire from public affairs. In Peter Laslett's interpretation, the "third age" represents a new phenomenon in history, which is the product of successful economic and demographic development, generous social policy. The identification of the “third age” means the emergence of another stage in the human life cycle in addition to the classic triad of “childhood—adulthood—old age.” Consequently, old age in this scheme is assigned the “fourth age”.
The age stratum of “young old people” in most developed countries began to form in the 1940-1960s. We can talk about the presence of a third age stratum in a country only if two demographic conditions are met: firstly, the probability of men surviving from 25 to 70 years exceeds 0.5; secondly, the age group of 60 years and older constitutes at least 25% of the total population of 25 years and older. In Russia and other countries of Eastern Europe and even more so in developing countries with a short life expectancy, a layer of people of the “third age” or “young old people” with all the ensuing consequences for policy in the field social security and the increase in the retirement age has not yet been formed. Thus, the probability of surviving from 25 to 70 years for Russian men in beginning of XXI century is about 0.35. A similar value was observed among men in Northern and Western Europe already in the second half of the 19th century.
Thus, in modern society, the lower limit of old age is formally determined by the legally established retirement age. However, as a result of a significant increase in life expectancy and improvement in health in developed countries, many older people, or the so-called “young old people,” do not fit into the existing framework of stereotypes of perception of old people and are hostages of the age roles assigned to them. Existing prejudices and legislative acts often do not allow older people to engage in attractive work or social activities and thereby prevent them from achieving a higher quality of life. The need to revise the age limits of old age in modern world dictated not only economic reasons.
Global aging
In modern society, there is a widespread belief that in the historical past very few people lived to be 60 years old, and their share in the population was extremely insignificant. Let us present some data that corrects this point of view. In the population of England in the 16th-18th centuries, the proportion of people aged 60 years and older averaged 8-9%, in France in the mid-18th century - 7%, in Japan in the 17th-18th centuries - 7-9%, in Denmark in the mid-17th century - XVIII century - 7-8%, in the Kiev province Russian Empire at the beginning of the 18th century - about 6%. In general, over the centuries for which statistical estimates can be obtained, the proportion of people over the age of 60 did not change significantly and fluctuated between 5 and 9%, and the age structure looked approximately the same as the world population in 1950 year (see figure). The aging process, which is observed throughout the world today, began at the turn of the 18th and 19th centuries in France, which then differed from other countries in its low birth rate.
In evolution age structure During the demographic transition, three phases can be distinguished. In the first phase, the population rejuvenates: as a result of a decrease in infant and child mortality, as well as an increase in fertility as a result of improved women's health, the share of children in the total population is growing, while the share of old people may even decrease, as, for example, in Great Britain in the mid-19th century century. It is at this phase the average size families at the expense of surviving children reaches its maximum. Most countries in the developing world have undergone a phase of “rejuvenation” relatively recently.
In the second phase, the proportion of old people in the population increases mainly due to a decrease in the birth rate and, consequently, a decrease in the proportion of children. The age structure ends up looking like a pyramid for developed countries in 1950 and for the whole world in 2005 (see figure). The sharper the birth rate falls, the faster the aging process develops. For example, for the share of people aged 60 years and older to increase from 8% to 16%, it took France 159 years (1788-1947), Sweden - 96 years (1860-1956), Great Britain - 45 years ( 1910-1952), in Japan, where fertility declined rapidly after World War II, 34 years (1954-1987). Developing countries are extremely heterogeneous in the level and pace of aging, primarily due to differences in fertility decline. Thus, according to available UN estimates, to double the share of older people from 8% to 16%, “Latin American Europe” - Argentina and Uruguay - will need about 70 years (1958-2018), China - 32 years (1985-2017), India - 37 years (2010-2047). The highest rates of aging are expected in South Korea, where it will take only 18 years (1992-2010) to double the share of people aged 60 years and older. In this republic, the birth rate decreased at an extremely high rate: from 4.3 births per woman in 1970 to 1.6 births in 1985. In countries with high birth rates, especially in Africa, the population remains very young (the share of children is 41.4%, the share of old people is 5.2%).
The third phase of aging is associated mainly with a noticeable decrease in mortality and an increase in life expectancy in people who have reached older ages, although the birth rate still continues to decline. Thanks to significant advances in medicine since the 1960s in Western countries, mortality among older people has begun to decline at a faster rate than in younger age groups. As a result, during the last third of the 20th century, in countries with high life expectancy, the proportion of people over the age of 80 more than doubled, and the probable number of years of life for those who lived to 60 years exceeded 20 years. Population aging due to the rapid increase in the number of elderly people compared to young people is called “aging from above” by demographers. This phenomenon is reflected in the form of age pyramids of 2005 and 2050 for developed countries (see figure).
At the same time, the countries of Eastern Europe have not yet passed this aging phase. In contrast, in Japan and South Korea, the rapid decline in fertility and the relatively rapid increase in life expectancy for the elderly practically coincided in time. According to a similar pattern, the population of a number of other countries in the world, for example China, is aging. Many third world countries, especially in Africa, still remain in the early phases of the evolution of the age structure due to the lack of adequate progress in reducing mortality not only in older but also in younger ages. As a result, there remains a colossal difference in life expectancy in the world. Thus, if the existing age-specific mortality rates do not change in the future, then a newborn in Japan will live on average almost 82 years, in Russia - 65 years, and in Zimbabwe - 39 years.
As forecasts show, the process of demographic aging is irreversible and global in nature (see figure). Moreover, in the first half of the 21st century, its pace will increase, and the increase in elderly people will significantly exceed the increase in the number of children and the working-age population (Table 1). The guarantee of this irreversibility is that, firstly, according to estimates from various experts, in all countries of the world the average number of births per woman will sooner or later be in the range of one to two children, and secondly, life expectancy will increase . Thus, in Western countries, including Japan, life expectancy from birth, according to various estimates, will increase by 4-11 years in 2000-2050, mainly due to older age groups. Globally, the number of people over the age of 60 will increase from 673 million in 2005 to 2 billion in 2050, and their share of the total population will more than double: from 10% to 22%. On the contrary, the number of children will remain virtually unchanged (1.82 billion people), and their share of the world population will decrease from 28% to 20%.
Developed countries will retain the lead in terms of aging rates in the coming decades. By 2050, every third person in the developed world will be over 60 years old, up from every fifth in 2005. In Italy, Japan, and South Korea, according to forecasts, older people will make up over 40% of the population in 2050 (Table 2). A very high level of aging (35-40%) is expected in the countries of Southern (Spain, Greece) and Eastern Europe (Poland, Ukraine). The influx of numerous migrants and the high birth rate among them is holding back the aging process in the United States and Australia. Important feature Demographic aging in Europe and Japan is that it takes place in conditions of population decline (depopulation). Over the period 2005-2050, the population in Old Europe is expected to decline by 75 million people, or 10.3%, and in Japan by about 16 million people, or 12.4%.

However, despite high rates of aging in developed countries, almost 70% of old people now live in developing countries, more precisely in Asia (55%). Over the next 45 years, this number will increase to 63%. The main culprits in this situation are the most populous countries in the world, China and India. A sharp drop in the birth rate as a result of the government's strict demographic policies stopped the excessive population growth of the People's Republic of China. At the same time, in the future, China will have to solve the problem not of overpopulation, but of social security for a huge army of elderly people. In the middle of this century, the country will be among the oldest countries, ahead of the USA, Sweden, and Great Britain. Moreover, starting around 2030, the population in China will begin to decline, and the Celestial Empire will cede the palm of demographic primacy to India.
In the last two decades of the 20th century, a number of successfully developing countries in Asia, Latin America and North Africa showed a tendency towards an accelerated decline in the birth rate and an extension of human life. This will be followed in the 21st century by an accelerated increase in the proportion of older people and overcoming the threshold after which the population becomes very old (the proportion of people aged 60 years and older exceeds 18%, those aged 65 years and older - 7%). So, in 2005 median age over 40 years was observed only in 11 countries, and all of them were developed. In 2050, the median age of over 40 years will be observed in 90 countries, of which 46 are classified as developing countries according to the modern classification (Indonesia, Iran, Thailand, Sri Lanka, China, Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, Tunisia, etc.). At the same time, in China the median age of the population will be higher than in Russia: 44.8 years versus 43.5. Currently Russian population older than the Chinese by almost 4 years (37.3 versus 32.6 years). In 15 developed countries, the median age of the population will exceed 50 years (the highest is in the Republic of Korea - 53.9 years).
In least developed countries, the transition from high to low fertility levels occurs slowly. At the beginning of the 21st century, in many of them the total fertility rate exceeded six births per woman. Therefore, the share of older people in 2005-2050 on average will increase slightly: from 5.1% to 9.9%, and in some African countries and Afghanistan will not exceed the demographic youth limit of 8%. The share of children will decrease more noticeably (from 41.5% to 29%) in favor of the working-age population. Overall, the world's least developed countries will experience the fastest population growth across all age groups over the next half century (see Table 1). As a result, by the middle of this century, 21% of the world's population will live in Africa alone, including 30% of children from 0 to 14 years old, and 9.8% of people aged 60 years and older. Similar figures for Europe - 7.1%, 5.4% and 11.5% - are discouraging to Europeans. Developed countries are gradually losing weight in all age groups (see figure). At the same time, thanks to “young” Africa, the age structure of developing countries in 2050 will be the same as that observed in developed countries around the end of the 20th century.
A significant improvement in health parameters and life expectancy leads to the fact that the old population is also aging: the number of “old old people”, or those over 80 years old, is increasing at an extremely rapid pace (Tables 1 and 2). In 2005, there were 87 million such people in the world, and in 2050, 394 million are predicted. Accordingly, 80-year-olds will be increasingly common among the entire elderly population. Thus, in developed countries, virtually every third old person will be over 80 years old. Centenarians, whose numbers are growing exponentially, are of particular interest in society. According to experts from the UN Population Division, in 1950 there were only 22 thousand people worldwide, in 2005 there were already 265 thousand people. It is expected that in 2050 there will be 3.7 million centenarians living on the globe, 40% of them in developed countries, whose share of the world population by then will fall to 13.6%.
General characteristics population of different countries of the world is the predominance of women in older ages. This is a result of the higher mortality rate among men. As you know, for every 100 girls, approximately 105 boys are born. In developed countries, there are more men than women up to 40 years old, in developing countries - up to 55 years old. But at older ages, as a result of the laws of mortality, the sex ratio changes. Thus, at the age of 60 years and older in developed countries there are 72 men per 100 women, and in developing countries - 88, at the age of 80 years and older - 46 and 66, respectively. Over time, thanks to progress in the field of life extension, a reduction in gender imbalance is expected at older ages, as well as between groups of countries. But nonetheless, social problems older people have been and in many ways will remain the problems of older women.
The main result of demographic aging is a radical change in the ratio between the numbers of individual age groups, and therefore generations. Thus, in the mid-twentieth century, there were 5.2 able-bodied people per elderly person aged 60 years and older in Italy, 7.0 in Japan, and 7.9 in China. A hundred years from now, in these and other countries with high aging rates, there will be fewer than two older people aged 15 to 59 per older person. As a result of the decline in the birth rate, the ratio between children (from 0 to 15 years old) and adults (from 15 to 59 years old) is not in favor of the former. Thus, in developed countries over the period 1950-2005, the number of adults per child increased from 2.3 to 3.7, and in developing countries over the period from 2005 to 2050 it will increase from 2.0 to 2.8 . The ratio between the number of elderly people and children, or the aging index, will also change noticeably. Thus, in 1950, for every child aged 0 to 14 years, there were 0.4 people aged 60 years and older in Italy, and 0.2 in Japan and China. In a hundred years, the value of the aging index will change dramatically, and in the “oldest” countries its value will exceed 3 (see Table 2). If in 2005 only 35 countries had more old people than children, then in 2050 there will be 116 such countries.
Changes in the age structure of the entire population are accompanied by similar processes in the family or kinship group. In a traditional society, the circle of close relatives of spouses aged 40 included numerous children, as well as siblings with their children and, possibly, one of the elderly parents. In the past, three-generation families occurred but did not last long due to the low life expectancy of the elderly. As a result of the decline in the birth rate among the population of developed countries, the circle of close relatives has noticeably decreased. At the same time, thanks to a significant increase in life expectancy, the time of coexistence of representatives of three and even four generations has increased. Thus, in Italy or Japan, one fifteen-year-old child is simultaneously cared for by both parents and four grandparents (grandparents). In addition, from time to time he visits one or two of his living great-grandparents (great-grandparents).
Thus, if even half a century ago older people in the circle of close relatives constituted a minority, now in Western countries this minority is children. At the same time, trends towards increasing life expectancy and increasing the age of parents at the birth of children lead to the fact that middle generations, primarily women, find themselves in a position where they need to simultaneously take care of both their children and their parents, and often about parents’ parents. Thus, the process of demographic aging is expressed in a violation of the balance that has developed over centuries between the numbers of individual generations or age groups, which will inevitably cause a revision of the economic principles of resource distribution between generations. Differences in the growth rate of the entire population, the elderly and children in particular, are one of the main factors complicating the geopolitical situation in the world. By mid-2050, the small and rich “old” North will be confronted by the populous and poor young Africa. At the same time, demographic aging will pose to developing countries the same problems of reforming society that developed countries face today, but with only one difference: as experts note, developed countries first became rich, and then old, and developing countries become old while remaining poor.
Aging and generations
As if in confirmation of the well-known law of dialectics, changes in quantitative relationships between generations turn into changes in the quality of relations between them. Intergenerational relationships are carried out directly within the family, informal family and friendly environment, as well as through public institutions. The system of such relations is often called a social contract, which is understood as a set of written and unwritten norms, expectations and obligations that govern relations between generations and between age groups. The economic side of the contract is aimed at creating mechanisms for the distribution and redistribution of private and public resources that are fair from the point of view of each generation. At the family level, the existence of a contract is manifested, in particular, in the rules of transfer of inheritance and dowry, in obligations to raise children and material support for the elderly; at the level of public institutions - primarily in the form existing systems social security and public education. In the course of fundamental socio-economic transformations, intergenerational contracts are being renegotiated.
In traditional society, the features of which are preserved in many countries of the world today, the center of intergenerational interactions was the family in the broad sense of the word, or a kinship group. Children were raised and provided for by their parents. Most elderly people, as historical data and modern statistics from third world countries show, lived until the end of their days, as a rule, in the family of their son, and in extreme cases, with other relatives. However, housing for older people could take different forms. Thus, in Northern, Western and Central Europe, elderly peasants could occupy a separate room in a peasant yard (a room in a house, etc.), or children would give them a small house on the allotment. In modern India, the father controls his sons until they are very old by the threat of depriving them of their inheritance (land). Low life expectancy was one of the factors for the cheapness of maintaining the elderly, as well as the early transfer of inheritance to children.
During the period of industrialization, the separation of families and the migration of young people to cities against the backdrop of gradually increasing life expectancy led to a revision of the previous “family” intergenerational contract. In the city, a person was deprived of such traditional sources of support in old age as a wide circle of relatives and land, and his experience was clearly not enough to prepare children for working life. As a result, the state intervened in relations between generations, taking over some of the functions of raising and educating children, as well as providing financial support for the elderly. The core of this system was state pension programs, which were introduced in young societies by demographic standards. However, according to a number of scientists, the introduction of a distribution pension system based on the principle of intergenerational solidarity had two negative side effects for the economy and demography. First, the population's propensity to save for a rainy day has decreased, especially in those countries where the replacement rate was high. Secondly, pensions have weakened the motivation to have children, since they are no longer seen as the main support in old age.
At first, most government spending was aimed at educating and preserving the health of the large children's age group. But gradually, as demographic aging progressed, resource flows changed their direction to older members of society. This was facilitated current laws, adopted at a time when older people were a poor and small group of the population, as well as the political system of developed countries. Elderly people make up a significant and most active part of the electorate, whose interests are forced to take into account various political parties. As a result, the economic situation of older people in aging countries has changed dramatically. Thus, in 1966 in the United States, 28% of people over the age of 65 and 17.5% of children under the age of 18 were below the poverty line; in 1989, the poor among the elderly was 12.7%, and among children - 21.2%. . If social expenditures on children under 14 years of age are taken as a unit, then in the late 1980s - early 1990s, expenditures on persons aged 65 years and older in Germany were 3.2 times higher, in Italy - 3.8 times, in Sweden - 2.3 times, in the UK - 2.13 times. In 2000, 46% of all social security expenditures were spent on the elderly population in the European Union, which accounted for 27% of the GDP of these countries. At the same time, only 8.2% of social spending was directed to supporting families with children.
Changing the ratio between the working-age population and people of retirement age undermines the foundations of the distributive pension system, which, according to the American researcher A. Walker, is “the heart of the welfare state.” Numerous studies have shown that, in the context of demographic aging, maintaining pension payments at a constant level by increasing pension contributions the working population will reduce incentives to work, the propensity to save, and thereby jeopardize the development of the economy in general and the well-being of current and future generations in particular. Other reserves, such as raising the retirement age, reducing early retirement programs, and increasing employment among older people, are also unable to provide economic efficiency distribution pension system. High tempo only economic growth(more than 3% annually), according to some demographers and economists, can preserve the distribution system. In this case, it becomes no more expensive than the funded pension system.

The question naturally arises about revising the social contract between generations in its main part - in pension provision. When developing a new contract, which means a full or partial transition from a distribution to a funded pension system, two points attract attention. First, both pension systems solve the same problem: how to most effectively divide national income between employed and pensioners. But none of these systems has decisive advantages. To the disadvantages distribution system should be attributed to its high dependence on demographic factors. The main disadvantage of funded pension systems is that they increase the level of economic inequality among pensioners. Thus, in one case we are talking about a possible economic inequality between generations, and in another about inequality within generations. It is obvious that the new pension system should be mixed and contain the best features of both systems. Secondly, the introduction of funded pension systems may become a factor in a further decline in the birth rate, since the birth of a child reduces the level of savings and the volume of probable contributions to pension funds. If the elderly are supported by their family, then the motivation for high birth rates is maintained. If people provide for themselves, then, as he said French economist 19th century Jean-Baptiste Say, “it is better to save than to have children.” If such a hypothesis is confirmed, then one of the results of the new social contract will be an intensification of the process of demographic aging.
However, the assessment of intergenerational interactions, as well as the rationale for the need for pension reform in developed countries, will be far from complete if we ignore the flows of resources that are redistributed within families and kinship groups. Available estimates of the flow of benefits from parents to children are very approximate due to the obvious lack of necessary information. But they also indicate that the volumes of intergenerational flows of benefits are enormous. Thus, according to estimates by American scientists Gale and Scholz, the annual transfer of wealth in the form of inheritance in the United States amounts to about $104 billion, i.e. 2.6% of GDP. In addition, children receive about $30 billion from their parents in the form of various kinds of gifts. Together, these flows almost cover government spending on pensions, which amounted to 4.4% of US GDP in 2000. About 13% of seniors in the United States pay an average of $9,000 a year for the education of their children and grandchildren. Thus, social programs the distribution of resources between generations is significantly adjusted within families and kinship groups. If public institutions redistribute resources in favor of older ages, then in the family, on the contrary, the younger generations benefit. Moreover, in Western society, transfer flows from children to parents, although they increase with the age of the children, are still generally inferior in volume to the lifetime parental flow of goods and services.
Contrary to popular belief, older people in Western countries are under the care of their loved ones. As in Russia, if necessary, most of them turn for help first of all to their children, then to other relatives, then to neighbors and friends, and go to bureaucratic institutions last. In developed countries, the main source of support for the elderly is their daughters (not counting their spouses). Sons provide parents with significant, and often even more significant, financial assistance than daughters. But when it comes to helping with housekeeping, including purchasing essential goods and caring for people during illness, there is an obvious female advantage. Moreover, middle-aged women are sometimes called the “Sandwich generation”: those in their 30s and 40s support their families and also help their aging parents and grandparents, while those in their 50s and 60s , they care not only for their elderly parents, but also help their children and grandchildren. One American survey showed that, on average, women spend 17 years of their lives helping their adult children and 18 years helping their aging spouse.

For a long time, living together has been one of the main forms of interaction between generations and a source of their joint well-being. However, over the past half century, the proportion of older people living alone has increased markedly, as has the number of households consisting of elderly spouses. Thus, in Great Britain, from 1951 to 2003, the proportion of single men over the age of 65 increased from 7% to 21.9%, women - from 17% to 46.5%. In China, between 1980 and 2000 alone, the proportion of households consisting of older married couples increased from 17% to 30%. These trends are based on both demographic and socio-economic reasons. The increase in the number of families with few children (one or two children) and childless people creates the necessary conditions for an increase in the number of elderly people living alone. Improved health as well as financial situation, allows older people, especially “young old people,” to live independently of their children. In turn, older people with a high educational status, of whom there are more and more, prefer to live separately from their children. Increasing life expectancy in men prolongs the existence of marital unions in older people. The institutional older population, recorded at a given point in time, is relatively small (see Table 3) and is more common in the rich countries of Northern and Western Europe. The most common are residential single-person facilities for people in need of constant care or suffering from various chronic illnesses. Therefore, among the members of such households in Western countries, persons over 80 years of age predominate (70-85%).
But, despite living separately, people in the modern world, as a rule, strive to maintain close contacts with their few close relatives (parents, children, grandchildren), as well as friends and neighbors. Thus, in Italy, children meet with separated parents (aged 65 years and older) at least once a week (Table 4). The frequency of contacts is slightly lower in France and Finland. In addition, in order to maintain close communication, children live close to their parents. Thus, according to the results of a survey in three cities of Russia, more than 70% of separated children lived in the same settlements as their parents.

Behind the high frequency of contacts between parents and children, as numerous studies show, there is a wide range of human relationships, which include not only material, but also moral, psychological, and emotional forms of mutual assistance. In turn, intergenerational transfers in families perform extremely important economic functions: they help relatives overcome difficult periods caused both by the characteristics of the life cycle (study, birth of children, old age, etc.) and external reasons (illness, disability, unemployment, economic crisis and etc.). In conditions of demographic aging, huge resources are redistributed within kinship groups, which thereby correct shortcomings in the functioning mechanisms of the market or state. But to accurately answer the question: “What place will be given to the family, what to the state, and what to the market when concluding a new generational contract?” — is not yet possible.
* * *
The immediate result of demographic aging is the increasing discrepancy between the “aging” age structure and the existing socio-economic system formed in the conditions of a young population. Such an imbalance threatens, in particular, an increase in social security expenditures for the elderly (pensions, social services, healthcare) at the expense of other age groups, an increase in the tax burden, a decrease in savings, a reduction in work force and a slowdown in economic growth. Bringing demographic and social systems into line will require a long series of profound political, social and economic changes throughout the world. UN Secretary General Kofi Annan called the process of population aging a “quiet revolution.”

Sovi A. General theory population. M., 1977. T. 2. P. 70.

Moreau de Jonnes A., Elements de Statistique, Paris, 1856, P. 69.

For more details, see: Kon I. S. Child and Society. M., 1999. P. 66.

The first demographic revolution was an integral part of the Neolithic revolution, which marked the transition from a society with an appropriating economy to an agrarian society. The second demographic revolution is associated with the transition from an agrarian society to an industrial one. For more details, see: Vishnevsky A. G. Reproduction of the population and society. M., 1982. The concept of “demographic revolution” is identical to the concept of “demographic transition”.

Chodzko-Zajko W. J., The root of agism in contemporary society: a historical and scientific perspective. Gerontologist. 1995, No. 35.

Evans-Pritchard E. E. Nuers. M., 1985. P. 158.

Rose F. Aborigines of Australia. Traditional society. M., 1989. P. 135.

Kaziev Sh. M., Karpeev V. K. Everyday life mountaineers of the Caucasus in the 19th century. M., 2003. pp. 136-137.

Burtless G., Quinn J., Is working longer the answer for an aging workforce? Center for Retirement Research, Boston College, 2002, No. 11. In 1996, the average retirement age in the United States was 61.5 years.

Accordingly, these two ages will be used as the boundaries of old age in this article. Note that the age of 65 years is more often used as a boundary for old age in developed countries. In countries with lower life expectancy and relatively low aging rates, 60 years is used as the cutoff for old age. The same age is often used in their work by specialists from international organizations, such as the UN.

However, in underdeveloped countries, where is the process social modernization It is still just unfolding, life expectancy is low, and there are no pension systems; functional age, not chronological, still remains the main criterion of old age.

Pension reform in Russia: reasons, content, prospects / Ed. M. E. Dmitrieva and D. Ya. Travina. M., 1998. P. 85.

Another example of ignoring the demographic factor is, as a rule, a later retirement age for men compared to women. Although everyone knows that in the modern world women live longer than men.

Mikhail Borisovich Denisenko is 50 years old

Biographical touches

January 2, 2011 to Mikhail Borisovich Denisenko, candidate economic sciences, Head of the Department of Demography at the Institute of Demography of the State University-Higher School of Economics, turned 50 years old.

Mikhail Borisovich Denisenko was born on January 2, 1961 in Dessau, Germany, in the family of a military man.

“The first years of my life passed there,” recalls Mikhail Borisovich. “Since then I have loved red tiled roofs, the smell in cozy cafes and pastry shops and German speech.

You always want to go back to childhood, when your parents were young, when everyone loved and spoiled you. I was the youngest in a large Moscow family with grandmothers, uncles and aunts, and cousins. In the 1960s there were still many such families in Moscow.

We learned to read early. Every year we traveled a lot by train. This is probably why my interest in geography arose. He became interested in politics early. Largely thanks to geographical location places of residence. Since we lived on Leninsky Prospekt, I had the good fortune to regularly greet personally the first cosmonauts, Fidel Castro and other leaders of “progressive humanity.” The “Khrushchev Thaw” affected me: I had critical judgments about Stalin and Khrushchev already in 1966.

He graduated from school No. 176, in Belyaevo. The guys in the class were interesting, the teachers were knowledgeable and demanding. We are still friends with our classmates. Some of them are notable personalities: Volodya Sedov is an art critic, the country's leading architectural historian, Kolya Alexandrov is a famous literary critic and popular journalist (Echo of Moscow, Culture), Borya Eremeev is familiar to those who are interested in cosmetology.

I didn’t imagine myself as anything other than a scientist. Since childhood, I dreamed of working only at Moscow State University. M.V. Lomonosov. My favorite subjects at school were geography, mathematics, history. I entered Moscow State University for the first time in the 8th grade - to the school of young geographers at the Faculty of Geography. The brightest memories. Ideal study. All subjects were my favorite, and I left each lecture with a huge “bag” of knowledge. During practical expeditions, professional skills and life experience accumulated very quickly. There were also archaeological expeditions on the Pskov land."

After graduating from high school, Mikhail Borisovich entered the Faculty of Economics of Moscow State University. M.V. Lomonosov, who graduated in 1983. Then he continued his education, first at the Faculty of Computational Mathematics and Cybernetics, specializing in applied mathematics, which he graduated in 1987. In the same year, he entered graduate school at the Faculty of Economics of Moscow State University and in 1992 successfully defended his thesis on the topic “Demographic development of Russia and the USSR in the first half of the twentieth century,” specializing in demography and population economics.

He began his career, as he dreamed, at Moscow State University. From March 1989 to January 2003 - senior lecturer, then associate professor at the Faculty of Economics of Moscow State University. In 1998-2000 - employee of the UN Demographics Division (New York). From February 2003 to April 2007 - Head of the sector of regional demography and human ecology of the Center for the Study of Population Problems, Faculty of Economics, Moscow State University.

Trained in foreign centers several times: January-June 1996 - Yale University (USA); 1997 - Department of Demography, La Sapienza University (Rome, Italy); August-September 2000 - Business School of the University of Navarra (Barcelona, ​​Spain; May-June 2002 - Department of Demography, Sapienza University (Rome, Italy).

From April 2007 to the present - Deputy Director of the Institute of Demography of the State University Higher School of Economics, Head of the Department of Demography of the Higher School of Economics.

The staff of the Institute of Demography and the editors of Demoscope Weekly cordially congratulate Mikhail Borisovich on his anniversary, wish him good health, success in creative and teaching activities and new achievements for the benefit of demographic science.

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