Section 3
INDIRECT LOSSES AND DEMOGRAPHIC CONSEQUENCES
Large-scale wars, undoubtedly such as the Great Patriotic War, affect the population of the warring parties in many directions. One of them, discussed in previous sections, is direct human losses. During the war, the population dies from various types violence and extreme living conditions. Another impact is indirect losses. AND I. Kvasha, following B.Ts. Urlanis defines indirect military losses as unfulfilled opportunities or lost demographic benefits. He includes the difference between the actual and hypothetical population sizes at the dates of the beginning and end of the war. Under the hypothetical population what could have happened if the war had not happened is accepted. (32). Hypothetical, V in this case forecast, the population is calculated according to the life tables of the base period. Biometric the parameters of these tables are dated to two adjacent years of the last pre-war population census of 1939. Not to mention possible falsifications of the census itself and current statistics on vital statistics, their use means a transfer to the nexta period of constant indicators of age-specific mortality and the birth rate of the population, although it is obvious that neither one nor the other, most likely, may not exist. The size of the actual population, in turn, depends on the scale of direct losses, excess mortality, war-induced reduction in the birth rate, the results of migration movements and some other events.
According to another point of view, during the war years, in addition to direct casualties, the warring countries suffer enormous human losses, due to both increased mortality due to deteriorating living conditions and a decrease in the birth rate. (41). Here, indirect losses include, firstly, a decrease in the number of births, i.e. the difference between the number that could have been born without the war and its actual value and, secondly, an increase in natural mortality of the population. It is difficult to agree with the last statement. An increase in mortality not only from hunger, but also from other deprivations, regardless of where the population was located: in rear areas, in occupied territories, in forced labor in Germany, etc., should be classified as direct losses, because is the loss of living population caused by war. Only the decline in the birth rate during the war represents that possible, but failed reduction population size, which can be attributed to indirect demographic losses. This position is not new. In particular, E.Z. Volkov back in 1930 and A.Ya. Boyarsky in the early 70s was included in the total losses, both those killed and those who died from epidemics. True, the last author also included a reduction in the birth rate as a direct loss. (54.p. 16, 17).
To the third type of losses A.Ya. Kvasha refers to “secondary consequences of war.” In his opinion, they are predominantly socio-psychological in nature and difficult to quantify. It seems to us that secondary losses or consequences include: deformation of the age-sex structure of the population due to the death, first of all, of young men, and partly of women who were of reproductive age (conscripted, able-bodied, subject to deportation for forced labor); the formation of a demographic wave due to a sharp drop in the birth rate during the war, especially in 1943; deterioration in the health of the population, primarily that part of it that was born and formed during the war and early post-war years; territorial redistribution of the population caused by its evacuation from combat areas, etc. Some of these demographic consequences can be quantified, but with an even greater degree of conditionality than demographic losses, regardless of whether they are direct or indirect.Page 1
The population of Russia throughout the twentieth century. grew. In Fig. Figure 8 shows the population growth rate in the 20th century. If all was well, then the growth rate of Russia's population should have gradually decreased, in accordance with the red curve on the graph, because the birth rate should have decreased, as happened in other growths, in accordance with the decrease in mortality. The high growth rate of Russia's population at the beginning of the century indicated that mortality began to decline, but the birth rate remained very high.
Figure 8. Actual and hypothetical population growth rates in Russia, 1900-2000
But, unfortunately, there has been no smoothness in the dynamics of the growth rate of the Russian population over the course of a century. The country was shaken by social and military disasters, they caused a sharp drop in the growth rate of Russia's population; its population declined several times during the century - during the First World War, the Revolution and Civil War, the famine of the 30s, and the Second World War. All these perturbations reflect sharp fluctuations green curve in Fig. 8.
Absolute population
Russia changed as shown in Fig. 9. The upper red curves show how the population of Russia could have grown if all the social and military catastrophes of the 20th century had not occurred. But since they were, the population actually grew in accordance with the lower green curve. In fact, if there were no disasters, and the red rate curve that was presented on the previous slide was realized, then the current population of Russia could be twice as large as it actually is, i.e. it would be comparable to the US population. Yet, in general, despite all the difficulties and disasters, the population of Russia in the twentieth century. grew, although this growth was interrupted four times. The first three times this was due to periods of disasters that have already been named. The fourth population decline began in the 1990s, and it is very different from all the previous ones and has a completely different nature. Previous periods population declines ended along with disasters, then population growth resumed. The decline that began in the 1990s is deeply rooted in the demographic processes of previous decades; Russia has entered a stage of its demographic development (more or less characteristic of all developed countries, although in Russia it has its own specifics) when there are no great hopes that growth will ever resume.
Figure 9. Actual and hypothetical population of Russia, 1900-2000
There are different demographic forecasts for Russia for the next 50 years. They are made by the UN, Rosstat, various research centers, and the US Bureau of Census. Some of these forecasts are presented in Fig. 10. Although the specific trajectories of future population dynamics vary, all forecasts - both more optimistic and less optimistic - predict more or less rapid population decline until 2050.
Figure 10. Population of Russia until 2050 according to various forecasts, million people
The only exception is the forecast called “normative”. The Concept was recently approved demographic policy Russia until 2025, and some numbers were named there. In particular, it is said that by 2015 the population of Russia will reach 142 million people, and by 2025 - 145 million people. If you take these reference points and draw a curve through them (this is the top curve on the graph), you will get a “normative” forecast that predicts population growth. The only thing that can be said about this forecast is that it does not correspond to any of the available ones.
Since the population of Russia is decreasing, and the population of developing countries is growing rapidly, Russia’s place in the world demographic hierarchy is inevitably decreasing. In 1950, Russia within its current borders ranked fourth in population in the world after China, India and the United States. In 2007, it had already fallen back to ninth place, behind Indonesia, Brazil, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Nigeria. If you believe the UN forecast, Russia’s place will continue to decline, and by 2050 it will move to 15th place. By this time, Russia's share of the world population, which in the mid-twentieth century. exceeded 4%, and now is about 2%, will approach 1%. At the same time, Russia has 13% of the world's land mass.
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In 1897, at least 8% of the then population of the globe lived on the territory of the Russian Empire, and part of the Russian Empire corresponding to the territory of the present Russian Federation, accounted for various estimates from 5.2 to 5.6% of the planet's population. Currently, 2.4% of the world's population lives in Russia. Thus, over 100 years the specific gravity Russian population in relation to humanity as a whole has decreased by at least two times.
General characteristics of the period. A hundred years ago the population of that part of the territory Russian Empire, which now corresponds to the territory of the Russian Federation, was second only to China and British India. Currently, the Russian Federation ranks 7th in the world in terms of population, behind China (1285 million people), India (1025 million), USA (286 million), Indonesia (215 million), Brazil (173 million people) ) and Pakistan (146 million people).At the same time, Russia remains in the top ten largest countries in the world by population, ahead (for now) of Japan, Bangladesh and Nigeria. However, given that these three countries are increasing their populations at a rate of 3 percent or more per year, the predictions can be considered reasonable
about the almost inevitable elimination of Russia from the top ten largest countries in terms of population in the world by 2015.Over the past century, Russia has suffered large population losses during the Civil War, World War I and World War II, as well as the repressions of the 1930s and 1940s.
The losses of the entire Russian Empire in the First World War amounted to approximately 8 million people, of which the territories now part of the Russian Federation accounted for 46 million people.
Civil War
, according to various estimates, claimed from 8 to 13 million lives. If we add to this figure the number of emigrants provoked by military actions and repressions, then we can talk about losses of 1416 million people, of which the losses of the population living on the territory of the RSFSR formed in 1918 amounted to 35 million people.Collectivization, famine and mass repressions of the 1930s and 1940s in total claimed the lives of up to 10 million Russians.
Second World War According to official (and recognized by the scientific community) data, it cost the Soviet Union 27 million people (and according to unofficial data, much more. In particular, independent calculations by the famous Sovietologist M. Voslensky and writer A. Solzhenitsyn converge on a figure approaching 40 million. Human). According to official statistics, the population of the RSFSR accounted for 14 million people
(20 million people according to unofficial).Thus, only direct losses to Russia from the socio-historical cataclysms of the 20th century. range from 42 to 65 million lives. To these must also be added the indirect losses caused by a sharp decline in the birth rate during the years of adversity. Wars, having sharply disrupted the gender and age structure, weakened the health of the population. All this taken together had an adverse effect on fertility and mortality rates in the post-war years. The total indirect losses for the period after 1932 alone amount to
various estimates from 10 to 15 million people.According to hypothetical estimates, the population of Russia, in the absence of the above-mentioned cataclysms in its history, would currently range from 250 to 400-600 million people.
Despite the losses, the population of Russia increased until 1992, although before that there was a long-term (since 1965) slowdown in its growth.
From mid-1992, for the first time in the post-war history of Russia, the population began to decline: during the period from 1992 to 2002, the population decline amounted to 1.8 million people. Population decline continues to cover an increasing number of territories: from 4 regions in 1988 to 70 at the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries. The highest population decline is observed in the Tambov, Leningrad, Novgorod, Ryazan, Yaroslavl, Ivanovo, Tver, Tula and Pskov regions.
Currently, the demographic situation is complex and significantly differentiated among individual regions.
Dynamics total number population of the country determines it natural increase (i.e. the difference between the number of births and deaths) and migration increase(the difference between the number of people who entered the country and those who left it). Thus, the hundred-year period of the dynamics of the natural population movement in Russia can be divided into three stages:
1. 1897-1960: the dynamics of natural population growth is significantly higher than average compared to developed countries with a clear predominance of the Caucasian race;
2. 1960-1988: the dynamics of natural population growth are rapidly approaching the trends characteristic of these countries.
3. 19892002: in Russia the same dynamics of natural growth is established as in the developed countries of the world ( see also INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION OF POPULATION). External migration processes. An important component of changes in total population is migration. Russia has experienced several major emigration flows, which influenced the population decline. First of all, this is the so-called “Great Exodus” caused by the Civil War of 1918-1921. It has not yet been possible to estimate its scale with reliable accuracy: most likely, it ranges from a minimum of 4 million people to a maximum of 12 million people. The figures of 15 million or more cited in journalism are questioned by experts.The second emigration flow is the departure from the USSR for permanent residence in other countries, stretched over the entire period from 1970 to 1988, for ethnic and political reasons. There are two components in this flow: first the so-called Jewish emigration to the USA and Israel (approximately 200 thousand people); second dissidents who left the USSR at that time, their number is extremely small throughout the country and does not exceed 50 thousand people.
The third emigration flow mass emigration abroad after the liberalization of legislation in 1989. Contrary to the prevailing idea at that time about the level of potential emigrants at 1015 million people, the real number of Russians who left for permanent residence abroad is in the range of 800 thousand to 1.2 million people
In the period after the end of the Civil War and before the start of World War II, external immigration as a mass phenomenon was practically absent. Right after Second World War According to various estimates, about 3 million people were repatriated to the USSR (prisoners of German concentration camps, German prisoners of war, Italians, Japanese, etc.). Most of them—three quarters—were repatriated by force. About 60% of those repatriated remained in Russia.
The current situation in the field of external migration consists, on the one hand, of an intensive influx of migrants to Russia from the former republics of the USSR and a significantly smaller volume of departure from Russia for permanent residence in the CIS countries and developed countries (Germany, Israel, the USA, etc.) .
Since the mid-1970s, migration growth for Russia as a whole has become positive, and in the last decade of the 20th century. changed even more significantly in favor of Russia. It largely compensates for population losses from natural decline. Data from the 2002 census showed that Russia is now very popular and ranks third in the world in terms of the number of arrivals.
permanent residence. The most intensive processes of population movement are observed between the Russian Federation and the CIS and Baltic countries. Moreover, in contrast to the period of 1979-1988, in 1989-2002 there was a significant decrease in the flow of emigrants from Russia to these countries, and the number of those entering our country from neighboring countries, on the contrary, increased. From 1989 to 2002, 11 million people entered Russia and 5 million left, i.e. net migration increase amounted to 6 million people. More than half of the migrants from the former Soviet republics areto Russians by nationality.Internal migration. Internal migration processes were quite intense in the pre-revolutionary period. Their peak occurred during the Stolypin period of development of Siberia: then about 3 million people moved to Siberia, including about half from the territory of the present Russian Federation.IN Soviet period there was very strict administrative control over the movements of citizens. Significant flows of internal migration were associated, first of all, with the forced displacement of certain groups of the population during the years of collectivization and Stalinist repressions, and with evacuation and re-evacuation during the Great Patriotic War. Patriotic War.
And, nevertheless, the main flows of internal migration were determined by the processes of urbanization, industrialization and economic development of territories rich in mineral resources. They are associated, first of all, with the development of the Far North and Siberia, the construction of the Baikal-Amur Mainline, etc. Economic incentives generated intense migration to development zones, and difficult living conditions generated an almost equally intense return flow. Proposals for the economic development of these territories on a rotational basis, i.e. without permanent settlement, were never accepted, although the low efficiency of migration (poor survival rate of new settlers) and the high mortality rate in development zones proved the validity of such proposals.
Census data from 1979 and 1989 indicate that more than half of Russian residents (54% and 51%) changed their place of permanent residence at least once in their lives. One can agree with the opinion of the domestic demographer A. Volkov that high migration mobility in Russian conditions was largely the result of social experiments, repression and general social discomfort.
IN last years in Russia there was a change in the main direction of migration flows the population began to leave the regions of the North and East of the country, the richest in raw materials, which had previously attracted migrants from other parts of Russia and the republics for many decades former USSR. These territories suffered the most significant migration losses in 1992, when, due to the collapse of the USSR, many immigrants from Ukraine and Belarus who worked here left them. In total, from 1992 to 1999, the regions of the Far North and similar areas lost almost 7% of the population due to migration outflow. In general, the population decreased in 66 out of 89 constituent entities of the Russian Federation. The greatest decline in the regions of the Far North and Far East, for example, in Chukotka the population decreased threefold compared to 1989, in the Magadan region by half.
The migration influx to the developed areas of the North, Siberia and the Far East directly depended on the volume and structure of industrial investments and the system of regional benefits. In conditions of a sharp drop in industrial production, a reduction in production volumes natural resources, lack of investment, the need for labor resources has decreased, the standard of living of the population has fallen to a greater extent than in other regions of the country, and there are no factors left to compensate for unfavorable living conditions. The population that developed here during a period of extensive economic growth actually became excessive in the late 1990s. According to experts, the share of the surplus population was approximately 20% of the total population (1998 data). Among those leaving the mainmass people of working age. Their departure leads to a deterioration in the demographic structure and the destruction of the unique labor potential. This in the future creates a threat to the implementation of possible large investment projects, because Russia’s strategic interests in this region remain.In general, the migration movement in 1992–2002 contributed to the further redistribution of the population throughout the country, its predominant concentration in the southern and southwestern regions and the depopulation of the northern and eastern Russian outskirts. The population density of Russia is uneven: in the Asian part, which occupies 75% of the country's territory, only 22% of the population lives (2.5 people per 1 sq. km. with an average density of 8.7). This can be considered an already established trend.
At the same time, in Russia, as a reaction to the global social economic crisis, migration activity of the population has sharply decreased. The most active migration flows were in 1985-1986 and 1991-1992. The number of internal movements of Russians in the period from 1989 to 19
9 7 decreased by more than a third from 9.1 million to 5.7 million people. Lower levels of capital investment and a decline in industrial production have reduced the need for labor, while lower demand for labor and the threat of unemployment have reduced incentives to change residence. Uncertainty about the future forces families to refrain from moving. Data from sociological surveys from 1999 to 2002 show that stable socio-psychological stereotypes and values of “settled” living continue to dominate in the mass consciousness. Economic motivation largely determines the willingness to travel abroad, while internal movements of Russians are determined by other factors: security, family circumstances, etc.Sex structure of the population. IN normal conditions reproduction, the sexual structure of the population does not lead to the emergence of specific demographic problems. In cases where the balance between the sexes is disturbed, for example, as a result of wars, serious demographic and social problems. Some professions in our country have become essentially female. For example, more than 70% of primary and secondary school teachers are women; among doctors almost 70%. If we compare the gender structure of the employed in Russia with similar data for the United States, it turns out that the proportion of women among teachers in the United States is approximately the same high as in Russia, but among doctors it is almost 12 times lower, and in industry and trade in Russia the share of employed women is 2 times higher than in the USA.Since alignment demographic situation requires a long time, then it negative consequences may also affect the life of an entire generation. In 1897, the proportion of men and women was 49 and 51% of the population, respectively, which corresponds to the demographic norm.
However, later this relationship was violated. In 1926 (consequences of the First World War and the Civil War) these shares were 47 and 53%, respectively. The Russian population had an even more unfavorable structure in the period from 1959 to 1971: 45% men and 55% women (the result of World War II). But according to the 2002 census, the situation has not improved much: there are about 67.6 million men in Russia, that is, 46.6%.
The second important problem is the predominance of the female population: approximately 77.6 million (53.4%) in 2002. This means that for every 1000 men there are 1147 women (in 1989 1140). The predominance of the number of women over the number of men is observed starting from the age of 33.
This is caused by physiological characteristics. The female body has a higher adaptive potential; women are not susceptible to alcoholism and drug addiction to the same extent as men; there are fewer injuries among them. In addition, studies show that in the event of divorce, women can more easily endure difficult living conditions and
are characterized by greater psychological stability.Violation of adequate correspondence between the sexes has a very strong impact on marriage rates and, consequently, on fertility rates, thereby distorting the entire demographic structure of society. The consequence of this is a distortion of the structure work force with all the negative consequences of this phenomenon.
The tendency towards a predominance of the female population is also characteristic of developed countries. It is believed that the processes of further social and economic activation of the female population taking place in Russia will have the consequences of a certain analogue of the general feminization of the population, characteristic of developed countries. Only there feminization took place in an organized and systematic manner, but in Russia it has a more spontaneous, or, one might say, natural character of the gradual squeezing out of the male population from its traditional positions.
Age structure of society. At the end of the 19th century. The main features of the reproduction of the Russian population were high birth rates and high mortality, the latter primarily being characteristic of childhood, although, of course, its influence also affected groups of subsequent ages. Since, in general, the birth rate significantly exceeded the death rate, then characteristic feature agethe structure of society was a soft predominance of children and young people. This trend prevailed from 1897 to the end of the 1920s.In connection with the medical (sanitary) revolution, which occurred already under Soviet rule, there was a sharp reduction in infant mortality while the birth rate was still relatively high. Population groups of children and young people began to significantly predominate. There has been a “rejuvenation” of society. Subsequently, mortality (both child and general) continued to decline, but the birth rate fell to an even greater extent: aging problem population of Russia. This process began around 1970, when the proportion of people aged 65 years and older was 7.8%. (According to international criteria, a country's population is considered old if the proportion of people aged 65 years and older in the total population exceeds 7%). In 1999, already 12.5% of the Russian population (that is, every eighth Russian) was over 65 years of age.
The process of population aging has emerged since 1950 in all economically developed countries and it is global in nature. In 1999, for the first time in developed countries, the number of older people exceeded the number of children (19.1% and 18.8%, respectively). The oldest population is in Italy, where the number of children is 60% less than people aged 60 years and older.
The most important thing in changing the structure of the population is the increase in the proportion (and absolute number) of people of retirement age (women over 55 years old and men over 60 years old). The share of people of retirement age in the Russian population increased from 15.4% in 1970 to 26.8% in 2003. This creates problems with the payment of pensions.
Pension reform. World practice shows that as the birth rate declines and life expectancy increases, the living conditions of older people in countries with solidarity pension systems (i.e., with pensions paid from the current income of citizens, as opposed to a pre-paid pension in the funded system) are deteriorating: fewer and fewer adult workers have to support an increasing number of retirees. Even in Russia, where life expectancy has not become longer, since 1990 the ratio of able-bodied citizens to pensioners has decreased from 2.28 to 1.74 (13 years ago 75.3 million workers supported 32.9 million pensioners, and in 2002 by 66 million workers accounted for 38 million pensioners). According to forecasts World Bank By around 2040, the number of workers and pensioners will be equal, unless unpopular measures are taken to raise the retirement age (as in France).Like most European countries, Russia is characterized by an aging population. Today the average age of a Russian is 37.7 years. This increases the burden of maintaining pensioners on the working population.
Most elderly people live in the European part of Russia, where their share ranges from 24% in the Lipetsk region to 27.2% in the Tula region, and in rural areas from 30.2% in the Lipetsk region to 34.8% in the Ryazan region.
It is especially important to note that in 1999, for the first time in the demographic development of Russia in the country as a whole (previously, this phenomenon was observed only in certain regions), the number of people of retirement age exceeded the number of children and adolescents ( age group under 16 years old) by 110 thousand people or by 0.4%.
How to assess the fact of population aging: positive or negative? It is impossible to give a definite answer to this question.
Population aging is a natural process caused by a decrease in the birth rate and an increase in average duration life. But at the same time, this process requires great effort and great attention from society related to the content of everything larger numbers unproductive population. In this regard, society faces two problems. The first problem is the need for increased growth of social labor productivity, because the burden on each working person increases due to the increase in the non-working population. Without intensive growth of social labor productivity, society will not be able to develop further, not only to increase, but even to maintain the achieved level of per capita consumption. The second problem is the creation of conditions for the full participation of older people in the public life of the country. There are several possibilities here. Firstly, partial inclusion of pensioners directly in social production is possible. Russia is characterized by the phenomenon of working pensioners. Their share in the total number of pensioners decreased during the 1990s and in 2001 was about 20%.
Greater involvement of pensioners is only possible if special conditions labor conditions that differ from the working conditions of persons of working age; We are talking about relevant professions, work hours and other conditions. Secondly, society can provide for a more active involvement of older people in social activities at its most various forms so that a person who leaves a job does not feel a sudden change in the entire rhythm of life, which, as a rule, has a negative effect on the psyche. Some people at this age experience a loss of energy, which is natural, but can partly be caused by psychological factors. A thorough and serious system of measures to attract older people to activities in various public organizations(for example, public inspectors in the service or production sector, etc.) it is possible to keep in service tens of millions of people who have extensive experience and great knowledge, but can no longer actively work in the places where they worked before. It turns out that the main problems here are of a socio-economic and socio-psychological nature.
In socio-psychological terms, the problem, first of all, is that older people fit much worse into modern socio-economic realities, which causes an increased conflict-prone situation in society. In addition, this part of the population is, as a rule, in the worst economic situation and often does not have the opportunity, including physical, to significantly correct it.
Alienation between generations, reinforced by different perceptions of socio-economic processes, negatively affects the general psychological climate in society. A special and very acute problem here is the inability of older people to transmit their experience to the younger generation due to the fundamental changes in the political and socio-economic situation in society. This, in turn, increases the “uselessness syndrome” among the elderly population. Due to these circumstances, the problem of population aging in Russia is more painful than in developed countries with the same trend
. Fertility. In Russia, the process of reducing the birth rate began at the end of the last century. This is a reflection of the general trend characteristic of developed countries economically countries Although our birth rate was the highest, comparable only to Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, and clearly superior to the corresponding figure in Europe and the USA: in 1913 it was 47.8 per 1000 people (and in some provinces it reached 60) .The decline in fertility between 1915 and 1920 was very strong. True, by the mid-1920s the birth rate had almost restored the value it had in 1913: in 1913 4 million 236 thousand people were born, and in 1926 4 million 21 thousand people. However, from the late 1920s, the decline in birth rates resumed. It should be remembered that the main tool of birth control in the 1920s was abortion, which was legalized in 1920.
The decline in the birth rate in the 1930s was primarily caused by the famine of 1933, as well as the extremely unstable socio-political situation in society, associated primarily with collectivization, mass repressions and the mobilization of the mainly male population for the so-called construction sites of communism. In 1936, abortion was prohibited by law and severely prosecuted. However, the birth rate continued to decline, also due to the huge number of illegal abortions. The ban on abortion did not produce any effect expected by the authorities, especially long-term. The Second World War dealt a severe blow to the birth rate. True, in the period from 1945 to 1950 there was a certain so-called “compensatory” rise in the birth rate. But he did not restore it to its pre-war level and did not even return the situation to the end of the 1920s.
Since the late 1940s, a steady trend of declining birth rates has emerged, which has continued to this day. Short periods of stability and rise in the birth rate (1972, 1983, 1984 and 1987) do not change the overall picture.
Until the early 1970s, the dynamics of the total fertility rate reflected the phenomenon of the so-called demographic transition: society finally switched to the demographic model of development adopted in developed countries. Indeed, by this time, control over childbirth had become universal, and each family realized its right to determine both the number of children in the family and the time of their birth.
From the late 1960s to the early 1970s, the massive spread of childbirth control completed Russia's transition to a two-child family. It is this model that has proven to be optimal for the modern nuclear family. The number of families who would like to have more than two children has decreased significantly.
After the two-child family model began to prevail in Russian society from the late 1960s, the birth rate averaged about two births per woman, while its deviation under the influence of various types of market factors (social, political and economic) was never observed significant.
In the first half of the 1980s, there was a slight increase in the birth rate, although very insignificant. It is possible that it was associated with a large-scale campaign to stimulate the birth rate: the introduction of state benefits for mothers with children and paid (so-called maternity) leave until the child reaches 1 year.
It is more difficult to explain the significant rise in the birth rate in 1986-1987 (approximately 2.5 million people each). The maximum birth rate was recorded in 1987, when it rose to 2.19 for the first time since the mid-1960s, that is, to a level sufficient to replace generations. However, already in 1988 the trend towards a decrease in the birth rate was restored.
The decline in the birth rate, which began in 1991, goes beyond the normal fluctuations of this process and is unprecedented for peacetime Russia. So, if in 1991 1,794,626 people were born, then in 1992 only 1,587,644, and in 1993 - 1,378,983 people. True, in 1994 the birth rate rose again slightly and amounted to 1,408,159 people. However, in 1995 and subsequent years it only decreased.
What are the main factors behind the decline in the birth rate in Russia over 100 years?
The decline in the birth rate is directly dependent on marriage rate, although increased marriage rates do not always automatically indicate increased fertility.
Marriage. In Russia, the number of marriages increased immediately after World War II due to the fact that many weddings were postponed due to wartime and difficult socio-economic conditions. However, in the 1960s, the marriage rate decreased slightly compared to the post-war period and then stabilized.The largest number of marriages occurred at the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries. concluded by persons aged 20 to 29 years. Moreover, the group from 20 to 24 years old is in the lead, with those from 25 to 29 years old in second place. This trend is generally explained by the fact that many young people study in higher educational and secondary specialized institutions. Their marriages often take place after the end of their studies or close to the end. When starting a family, young people first of all try to solve their financial problems. These facts are also reflected in the decline in the birth rate.
As the number of marriages increases, so does the number
divorces, and such demographically unstable family relationships lead to a drop in the birth rate, since a short marriage is almost always accompanied by the birth of only one child.A large number of divorces occur in marriages of relatively short duration: two thirds of divorces occur in marriages that lasted less than 10 years. Thus, divorces primarily affect precisely those groups of the population that are most optimal from a reproductive point of view, that is, between the ages of 20 and 30. During this period, almost 90% of children are born - the first and often second children in the family. Divorce prevents the birth of subsequent children. In the socio-economic conditions of the transition period, divorce often puts an end to the ability to raise subsequent children. Moreover, there is a clear effect feedback: Low fertility, in turn, makes divorce easier.
Women and family. Women's participation in economic and social activities is the main reason behind the steady decline in the birth rate. At the same time, we are talking not only about the difficulties of combining women’s employment outside the home and the function of motherhood, but also about the complex of socio-cultural factors that determine the formation
views
for the required number of children in the family.As a rule, women's employment does not have a noticeable effect on the birth of their first child, although in most cases the birth is postponed until a later time. Because of this, the first child is born at a later age, which often practically excludes the birth of a second and subsequent children.
The post-war period in Russia was characterized by an intensive increase in women's employment, which was caused, firstly, by the large losses of men in the Second World War, secondly, by the increased demand for labor in connection with the process of industrialization and post-war reconstruction, and thirdly, by targeted policies government authorities to broadly involve women in the socio-economic life of the country.
Demographers note that the greatest employment of women is observed from 20 to 40 years, that is, precisely when the largest number of children can be born in a family.
In the demographic literature one of the most important reasons the spread of the type of family with one, maximum two children is called housing factor
. A paradoxical picture is often observed: living conditions on the scale of a particular region or city, and even the entire country, are improving, and the birth rate is decreasing. At the same time, on a scale separate family Improving housing conditions can seriously contribute to the birth of more children.It is generally accepted that improving housing conditions is one of the important demographic factors, associated primarily with the qualitative side of population reproduction. Normal living conditions have a great influence on the physiological and mental development of children, on their moral and cultural development, on family connections, that is, on the entire complex of factors that determine the qualitative side of population reproduction, first of all: the state of its health, cultural and educational level , communication skills, aspirations.
Along with housing conditions, the decline in the birth rate is influenced by the unprecedented drop in income the absolute majority of the population in the period starting from 19
91. Currently, in all developed countries (especially Western European ones), there is a desire for families to consciously regulate and plan (first of all, limit) the number of children. Russia is no exception. The trend towards creating a family with one or two children, while simultaneously increasing the number of childless families, began in the 1950s, strengthened in the 1960s, and has become dominant since the early 1970s. There are no facts yet that would indicate a possible change in this trend. It is noteworthy that researchshowed: in Russia as a whole, husbands want to have more children than their wives. This is explained by the fact that the change in the position of women in society through active involvement in production and social activities has radically changed the scope of her interests. However, women still shoulder most of the housework and are more involved in raising children than men. All this creates serious overloads for an economically active woman, reduces her satisfaction with marriage and, ultimately, determines her refusal to have a third, and sometimes a second child.Thus, general development family models in Russia over the past hundred years clearly comes down to a decrease in the number of children in it. Nowadays, in almost all developed countries, families with one or two children have become typical.
Decrease in number large families(with five or more children) in a developed society is understandable, but the absence of a second and third child in a family from the point of view of expanded population reproduction can lead to adverse consequences.
The structure of the modern Russian family (nuclear) generally corresponds to the situation in developed countries. A large family (that is, with 3 or more children) has long ceased to be typical for the country. Not only is the absolute number of large families declining, but also their share in the family structure. Large families currently account for about 20% of the total number of children under the age of 18. In the city, every seventh child grows up in a large family, in rural areas every third. IN major cities The share of large families is less than 2%, and approximately every thirteenth child lives in them.
A distinctive feature of the modern Russian family is its instability. In recent years, the indicator that characterizes the ratio of the number of registered divorces to the number of registered marriages has increased sharply. In 1990 it was 424 divorces per 1000 marriages, and in the second half of 1998 it was 789 divorces per 1000 marriages. In a number of regions, the number of divorces exceeds the number of marriages. If, according to the All-Union Sample Survey in Russia in 1990, 55.7% of respondents considered their family strong, then in 1998 only 38.5% of Russians considered their family strong.
Urbanization. In Russia, the process of increasing the share of the urban population had a certain impact on the birth rate. Almost a fifth of the country’s population lives in 13 million-plus cities: Moscow, St. Petersburg, Novosibirsk, Nizhny Novgorod, Yekaterinburg, Samara, Omsk, Kazan, Chelyabinsk, Rostov-on-Don, Ufa, Volgograd, Perm. At the same time, as in most developed countries of the world, the process of urbanization has stopped according to the 2002 census, the ratio of urban and rural residents remained at the 1989 level.If in 1867 the share of the urban population was 15% (which is much less than it was then in the USA and in all large European countries), then in 2002 it was 73%. Social mobility of the population and industrialization in the 20th century. led to a reduction in the share of the population employed in agriculture, and consequently to an increase in the urban population. The reasons for the faster rate of decline in the birth rate in cities appear to lie in the very way of life of the urban population, which influences the formation of opinions about the need to limit the number of children (which is gradually beginning to take shape among the rural population).In Russia in 1913, the difference between the birth rate in the city and in the countryside was sharply expressed, and this difference remained until the period of industrialization and collectivization. But in subsequent years, these indicators gradually ceased to be significant. In cities, childless and one-child families make up more than half of the total, although in rural areas the share of families with a large number of children is much higher. And yet, the general trend towards a decrease in the birth rate is also evident in rural areas, albeit not as strongly as in cities. The difficult conditions of the transition period of the last decade neutralize this difference, although they do not completely destroy it.
Mortality. Increased mortality in Russia at the beginning of the 20th century. was a direct result of the general economic and cultural backwardness of the country. The mortality rate was significantly higher than in developed countries of the world. Inadequate nutrition, poor living conditions, hard exhausting work, lack of basic sanitation and hygiene infrastructure, poor development medical care All these factors contributed to the increased mortality. Infant mortality was especially high: per 1,000 births under the age of 1 year, 269 children died. This means that more than one in four children died, before reaching 1 year of age. On average, almost half of the children born in a family died before reaching adulthood.War and revolution disrupted the natural course of Russia's demographic development. Over the entire subsequent period, there were only two short periods of intense decline in mortality: the NEP period (from 1923 to 1928) and the interval from 1948 to 1964.
The rapid decline in mortality rates in the post-war years was due to the very widespread use of sulfonamides and antibiotics, which, as in many Third World countries, was largely the result of the import of medical goods and technology. In addition, after 1953, an important factor in reducing mortality was the cessation of large-scale political repression and significant social transformations of the period
Khrushchev's Thaw (massive housing construction in cities, thanks to which tens of millions of people moved out of basements, dilapidated housing and overcrowded communal apartments in albeit small-sized and uncomfortable, but separate dwellings).If the trends characterizing changes in the birth rate in Russia and developed countries are similar or identical, then the same cannot be said about mortality. The period since the early 1960s in the West has been marked by a significant decline in mortality rates. In Russia the same as
in other CIS republics, as well as countries of Eastern Europe, the mortality rate fluctuated slightly, without showing a steady downward trend.The process, albeit not always pronounced, but a steady decline in mortality (adjusted for military losses, repression and famine), continued in Russia from the early 1920s to the early 1960s. In particular, infant mortality has decreased from 88 to 25 children per 1000 births since 1950 alone.
The current stage in the evolution of mortality in Russia began somewhere in the mid-1960s. Firstly, then there was a sharp trend towards an increase in the mortality rate, primarily caused by diseases of the circulatory system at young ages. Secondly, a significant increase in mortality from accidents, poisonings and injuries began to be observed, while mortality from infectious diseases and respiratory diseases in childhood stabilized at a fairly high level (by the standards of developed countries).
The increase in mortality from the above causes began much earlier (at the very end of the 1930s and the beginning of the 1940s), but it was compensated by a strong trend towards a decrease in mortality caused by infectious diseases, acute diseases of the respiratory system (tuberculosis, etc.), acute diseases of the digestive system (cholera, typhoid fever, dysentery), as well as a decrease in the level infant mortality at all.
The demographic literature names three main groups of reasons for the increase in mortality in Russia in the period from 1965 to 1985:
1) deterioration of the environmental situation in the broadest sense: widespread and increasing pollution environment, neglect at all levels of safety rules, complete disregard for environmental factors in economic activity.
2) deterioration of the adaptive potential of the population and, as a consequence, poor adaptation of the population to changing living conditions (including urbanization, technicalization of the environment, chemicalization of the environment, mass migrations to areas with severe climatic conditions).
It should be noted here that the action of similar causes in the 1960s in the developed countries of the world caused a slowdown in the decline in the mortality rate and even its increase. However, these alarming changes in mortality trends caused an adequate public reaction there; demands increased to tighten environmental protection, strengthen individual disease prevention and
, especially propaganda healthy image life. Already in the mid-1970s, relevant activities there had a positive effect.In the USSR, these negative changes in living conditions, due to the peculiarities of the political system, did not cause a massive public reaction and were not compensated by an adequate increase in living standards and, even more so, by improving the functioning of the health care system.
3) Specific psychological conflicts inherent in the social life of the era of so-called “developed socialism”: the contradiction of real life to the dogmas of official propaganda, numerous and unfounded, often completely absurd administrative prohibitions, limited opportunities for personal self-realization. It is interesting that the beginning of a steady increase in mortality coincided in time precisely with the moment when the expected onset of a bright communist future was postponed from 1980 to a more distant and indefinite period.
In 1985–1986, there was a phenomenon of a short-term decrease in the mortality rate, primarily due to a decrease in the mortality rate from accidents and diseases of the circulatory system. If the decrease in mortality from injuries was most likely the effect of the anti-alcohol campaign, then the decrease in mortality caused by diseases of the circulatory system can be explained by the fact that during these years Russia avoided significant influenza epidemics, which usually significantly increase the mortality rate from diseases of the circulatory system. There is also an exotic explanation: the decrease in mortality between 1985 and 1986 is a psychosomatic phenomenon - the result of social euphoria in the first years of Perestroika.
However, starting in 1988, the increase in the mortality rate resumed, and after 1992 it even accelerated. It should be noted that such an increase in the mortality rate has never before been observed in Russia in peacetime. According to the State Statistics Committee of the Russian Federation, the number of deaths in Russia in 2003 exceeded the number of births by 1.6 times, despite the increase in the number of newborns compared to 2002.
As in all previous years, the number one cause of mortality was the increase in accidents; diseases of the circulatory system took second place. However, over the past decade there has been a significant increase in mortality from chronic diseases, the share of which in total mortality was usually insignificant
. In recent years, the increase in mortality has primarily affected adults and older people. During the 1990s, a slight decrease in the infant mortality rate was achieved (1993 19.9 people per 1000 children, in 2000 15.3 people), but in Russia this figure is still several times higher than in developed countries of the world . From a geographical point of view, the mortality rate in rural areas is always higher than in the city.There are opinions that the decline in production in the 1990s sharply reduced harmful industrial emissions, but the impact of previously accumulated negative changes in the environmental sphere, including the consequences Chernobyl accident, is saved.
Changes (for the worse for the vast majority of the population) in the sphere of consumption, primarily food, have sharply aggravated the problem of population adaptation. Significant deterioration in working conditions, poor organization of the state health care system, high cost of private medical services and, especially, drugs, have greatly reduced the effectiveness of medical care. First of all, this was manifested in an increase in the mortality rate of people with chronic diseases, whose viability directly depends on the timeliness of medical care, the provision of medicines and a normal lifestyle in general. The increase in violent mortality was caused by general social tension and the weakening of all forms of life discipline. And the stresses of social upheaval in 1991, 1992, 1993 and 1998 provoked surges in mortality from cardiovascular diseases.
Changes in mortality from individual causes and the general dynamics of cumulative characteristics suggest that Russia is again returning to the mortality trend that characterizes the trends of the period 1965–1980. Statistics do not yet provide grounds for optimism. According to forecasts, until 2010 Russia will experience a slow increase in the mortality rate, or, at best, its stabilization.
Healthcare. The situation in the field of public health is recognized by experts as one of the most unfavorable. In the 1960s, the growth of life expectancy in Russia stopped. Successes in the fight against infectious diseases, primarily associated with the widespread use of antibiotics and related technologies and, perhaps more importantly, the widespread practice of social and hygienic prevention,have reached their limit, losing first place among causes of death to cardiovascular diseases and cancer. Unfavorable socio-economic changes have led to an increase in causes of death such as alcoholism, smoking, road accidents and violence.There is a general significant deterioration in the epidemiological situation. This is especially true for tuberculosis. The lowest incidence of tuberculosis in Russia over the past quarter century was in 1990 and 1991. But since 1992, this figure began to rise sharply and reached 48.3 per 100,000 population in 1994, which dramatically affects the disability of the working population. Moreover, the highest incidence of tuberculosis was among people aged 25-40 years.
The main cause of early disability and mortality among the Russian population is vascular complications of diabetes mellitus; the number of people suffering from this disease exceeds 8 million people.
The incidence of malignant neoplasms has a clear upward trend; the number of people with such a primary diagnosis increased by 30% over the period from 1980 to 1999 and exceeds half a million people.
Over 8 years (1991-1999), the number of drug addicts increased almost 4 times.
The environmental situation in the country is not conducive to public health. Up to 60 million people live under conditions of 5-fold excess of MPC, and from 40 to 50 million people live under conditions of 10-fold excess. In other words, three quarters of Russians live in a poisoned environment.
Among the direct causes of mortality, cardiovascular diseases hold first place; compared with 1970, the adult mortality rate from these diseases in Russia has increased, while in all developed countries it has more than halved.
The second place is occupied by cancer. The gap in mortality from them between Russia and Western countries is increasing, as there is an increase in mortality from lung cancer in Russia (against the background of a decrease in the West), as well as low in Western countries and high in Russia mortality from stomach cancer.
Compared to 1991, mortality from alcohol consumption has increased 2.5 times.
AIDS is a particular problem. According to official data from the Ministry of Health, at the beginning of 2003, 235 thousand cases of HIV were registered in the Russian Federation. However, Western experts talk about much higher figures: ranging from 700 thousand to 1.5 million
. Among those infected, people under the age of 35 predominate.The most favorable situation from the point of view of public health is in Moscow, Irkutsk, Leningrad, Moscow, Murmansk, Perm, Sakhalin regions, the republics of Karelia and Ingushetia. The least favorable for the health of the population are Novgorod, Pskov, Tver and Tula region, as well as the Chukotka Autonomous Okrug.
Demographic forecast. Most experts agree that in the coming years the birth rate in the Russian Federation will increase, since it is during this period that the number of women in the most active procreative age (20–25 years) will increase. Then a new decline in the birth rate will begin, associated with the cyclical dynamics of the number of female generations, set by the “echo” of the Second World War. Even with the improvement of the socio-economic situation in the country, a return to more high levels the birth rate of the 1980s will not happen because reproductive behavior The population is focused on having only one (less often two) children.According to UN calculations in Russia, in the future the population will continue to decline and will amount to 138.1 million people in 2015 (according to the average option) (compared to 146,397 thousand people in 1999), the annual population decline will be from 600 to 800 thousand. people During this period, positive migration growth with the CIS countries will continue, although it will tend to decrease.
Speaking about the total population in Russia (taking into account its structure and qualitative characteristics), specialists and experts usually pay attention to the following points: is the population of Russia sufficient for its economic growth and what should it be in the future, i.e. what is its demographic optimum?
The relationship between the characteristics of the population and the socio-economic development of the country.
When they talk about a “demographic catastrophe” in modern Russia, then first of all imply depopulation (decrease in size) of the population. Methodologically, this is incorrect, if only because an excess population can create equally, if not greater, problems. Difficulties faced developing countries First of all, hunger, lack of jobs and desperate attempts to reduce the birth rate can be seen in the examples of India and China. And in Russia, many social cataclysms of the early 20th century. were partly due to the presence of a huge mass of people who did not fit into social structure society. Simply put, they had nowhere to go. Therefore, it is more competent to talk about the correspondence between the socio-economic structure of society and its demographic structure. Here, however, it is necessary to distinguish between quantitative and qualitative aspects.
The main quantitative problem is, on the one hand, the correspondence of the socio-economic and technological needs of society, and on the other hand, the structure of the labor force, which is not independent and is derived from the demographic structure of society.
The aging of the population and the decline in the birth rate will put Russia in the face of a shortage of people of working age. A number of experts believe that we can talk about a positive factor in this phenomenon, since unemployment will automatically decrease. This point of view is partially confirmed by the experience of developed countries that have already faced such a problem. However, these countries have experienced steady growth in productivity since the 1960s. This was not observed in Russia. Therefore, such a demographic effect could lead to an even greater decrease Country's GDP and, consequently, a decrease in its share in world markets and role in the world community. Such negative consequences can be neutralized by massive import of labor from abroad. For example, from China. But this could have negative geopolitical and socio-ethnic consequences for the country.
Another important issue for Russia in the near future will be, again due to the aging population, an increase in the burden on the economically active population due to the fact that it will be forced to support a larger population of retirement age.
The process of demographic aging will continue: the share of people in the total population over working age will increase from 20.7% in 2001 to 25.1% in 2016. (Accordingly, the share of people under working age will decrease from 19.3% to 15.9% ). This is due to the fact that from 2000 more post-war generations will begin to enter retirement age.
Population aging is also of considerable importance from the point of view of the qualitative structure of all those employed in social production workers, in particular, level of education. The more numerous the young generation, the higher the proportion of a highly educated population prepared for the requirements of modern production, and, consequently, the higher the scientific, production, and cultural potential of society. People, despite the ever-increasing progress of technology, remain and will always remain the most important element in the system of socio-economic values that society has.
The level of alcoholism and drug addiction of the population has an extremely negative impact on the socio-economic development of the country ( see also ADDICTION).
Both the stabilization of the birth rate at a certain level and the further reduction of mortality are directly related to the development of a modern civilized way of life, strengthening the family, and improving the health of the population. In turn, the listed components are determined by major socio-economic events,
which include housing construction, improvement of infrastructure in general, working conditions, further development healthcare, etc.The 2002 All-Russian Population Census showed that Russia belongs to the category of developed countries of the world. The demographic processes taking place in the leading countries of Europe, Asia and the USA are also characteristic of our country: natural population decline, a sharp increase in immigration and the aging of the nation. These characteristic features of states with developed economy only the PRC ignores.
see also DEMOGRAPHY.
Internet resources:Website of the State Statistics Committee of the Russian Federation data from the 2002 population census
www. perepis 2002.ruVladislav Galetsky
LITERATURE Poor M.S. Medical and demographic study of the population. Moscow, 1979Vishnevsky A.G. Population reproduction and society. M., 1982
Volkov A.G. Family object of demography. M., 1986
Estimation of human losses during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. demographic balance method. Bulletin of Statistics 1990, No. 9
Andreev E.M., Darsky L.E. and Kharkova T.L. Experience in assessing the population of the USSR 1926-1941. Bulletin of Statistics 1990, No. 7
Population of Russia in the 1920-1950s: numbers, losses, migrations. Collection of scientific papers. M., 1994
Materials of the International Scientific Conference “Population Reproduction, Migration and Employment in Russia in the Period 1996-2005” ." M., 1995
Materials of the All-Russian Scientific Conference « Depopulation in Russia: causes, trends, consequences and ways out.” M., 1996
Rybakovsky L.L. Russia and the new abroad: migration exchange and its impact on demographic dynamics. M., 1996
Rybakovsky L.L., Zakharova O.D. Demographic situation in Russia: geopolitical aspects. M., 1997
Arsky Yu.M., Danilov-Danilyan V.I., Zalikhanov M.Kh. and etc. Environmental problems: what is happening, who is to blame and what to do. M., MNEPU, 1997
Population of Russia over 100 years (18971997 ). Statistical collection. M., 1998
Population of the Russian Federation by sex and age as of January 1, 1998
Estimated population of the Russian Federation until 2015. Statistical Bulletin. M., 1998
Materials of the International Scientific and Practical Conference “State and Prospects of Demographic Development of Russia”, M., October 29, 1998
Andreev E.M., Darsky, L.E., Kharkova T.L. Demographic history of Russia: 19271959. M., 1998
Russia 1997. Socio-demographic situation. VII Annual report of the Institute of Socio-Economic Problems of Population of the Russian Academy of Sciences. M., 1998
Russia 1998. Socio-demographic situation. VIII Annual report of the Institute of Socio-Economic Problems of Population of the Russian Academy of Sciences. M., 1999
Materials of the II All-Russian Scientific Conference “Russia XXI century”. Abstracts of reports. Moscow, 1999
Lesson “Population of Russia”
Goals: 1. Introduce students to new terms and concepts.
2. Begin the formation of ideas and knowledge about the population of Russia.
3. Introduce the main indicators characterizing
The population of Russia and its place among the countries of the world.
4. To form an idea among schoolchildren about demographic crises
And their role in population changes.
5. Introduce demographic policy in Russia.
Equipment: diagram “Number of countries in the world”, graph “Number of
Population on the territory of Russia in the 18th-21st centuries,” graph “Fact-
The actual and hypothetical population size for
Modern territory of Russia (1900-2000)
During the classes:
I. Organizational moment.
II. Presentation of new material:
Question: What do you know about the topic of discussion?
(write on the board)
Assignment: Write down in your notebook the questions that you would like answered.
For now, these questions will remain unanswered. We will return to them at the end of the lesson.
Population size is one of important factors development of each country. After all, the population that participates in labor is the main productive force, while at the same time the population acts as the main consumer of all created material goods.
Question: How can I get population information?
Using the population census.
The first population census in Russia was carried out in 1897. The population within the modern borders of the Russian Federation was 67.5 million people. Latest census was carried out as of 0 o'clock on October 9, 2002. As of this date, 145.2 million people lived in Russia. The next population census is planned for 2010.
Question: How are further changes in population identified?
Using current accounting.
Question: Using what indicators?
(Creating a cluster on a blank page):
Taking into account all these indicators, the population of Russia today is 142 million people.
Question: What is happening to the population? Is it increasing or decreasing?
Decreased by 3 million people.
The science that will help us understand the population dynamics in Russia is called demography (show slide).
Slide: demography (from the Greek demos - people and grapho - writing) is the science of population.
The number of births and deaths is a natural movement of the population; those who arrived and departed are mechanical.
Population of Russia
born died arrived departed
Question: There is such a term - “population reproduction”. Where do you think we should place it in the cluster?
Cluster:
Population of Russia
born died arrived departed
Natural movement mechanical movement
(population reproduction)
Under natural movement(reproduction) of the population is understood as the totality of the processes of fertility, mortality and natural increase, which ensure the continuous renewal and change of human generations (show slide).
Slide: B population reproduction is a set of processes of fertility, mortality and natural increase that ensure the continuous renewal and change of human generations.
Demographers determine natural movement by two indicators: birth rate and death rate, which are calculated per 1000 inhabitants.
(show slide)
Slide: Fertility is the number of births per year per 1000 inhabitants (P).
Mortality rate is the number of deaths per year per 1000 inhabitants (C).
Cluster:
Population of Russia
born died arrived departed
Natural movement mechanical movement
(population reproduction)
By subtracting the birth rate from the death rate, natural increase (NI) is determined (show slide).
Slide: Natural increase (NI) = Fertility (P) – Mortality (C)
Population of Russia
born died arrived departed
Natural movement mechanical movement
(population reproduction)
Fertility (P) mortality (C)
If the birth rate is higher than the death rate, the population grows; if it is lower, it falls.
Question: What would you call a sharp increase in population?
What about the sharp decline in population?
(show slide)
Slide: A sharp increase in population - a demographic explosion.
Population of Russia
born died arrived departed
Natural movement mechanical movement
(population reproduction)
Fertility (P) mortality (C)
Natural increase (EP = R-C)
population explosion
(R! > S)
Slide: A sharp decrease in population (as a result of excess mortality over birth rate) is calleddemographic crisis or depopulation(cluster).
Population of Russia
born died arrived departed
Natural movement mechanical movement
(population reproduction)
Fertility (P) mortality (C)
Natural increase (EP = R-C)
population explosiondemographic crisis
(R! > S) or depopulation (P
Question: Under what situation does the population not change?
When birth rate equals death rate.
Question: What is the state of Russia?
Able demographic crisis, i.e. population decline.
Despite this process, Russia, in terms of the number of inhabitants, is one of the ten countries in the world whose population exceeds 100 million people - it ranks 8th.
Fertility, mortality, and natural growth are basically biological processes. But, nevertheless, the socio-economic living conditions of people have a decisive influence on them.
Assignment: open the textbook on page 237. Rice. 197 “Population on the territory of Russia in the 18th – 20th centuries.
Slide: graph “Population on the territory of Russia in the 18th-21st centuries.” (or document camera)
Years are plotted horizontally with an interval of 50 years, and vertically – the population of Russia in millions of people. Now, comparing these indicators, follow the movement of the line reflecting changes in population. Answer the questions.
(Students complete this task for 5 minutes, working in groups of two. Conclusions are written down in a notebook)
Questions:
1. During what periods did the curved line suddenly change its smooth course?
From 1850 – 1900 and 1950 – 2000
2. In what time period did it “pulse nervously” especially, reflecting
Difficult periods in the country's history?
- 1st demographic crisis: from 1914 – 1922 total losses ranged from 12-18 million people. Reasons - World War I, then revolution, civil war, famine (1921 - 1922), emigration from Russia.
- 2nd demographic crisis– in the 30s, total population losses are estimated from 5 to 6.5 million people. Reasons - forced collectivization Agriculture(merger of small peasant farms to collective farms), the collapse of the NEP, industrialization, repression ( punitive measures) and the famine of 1933-1934.
- 3rd demographic crisis- the population of Russia suffered the greatest losses in the Great Patriotic War (1941-1945). The number of deaths at the front and in the rear approached 18 million, and taking into account the decline in the birth rate, the total losses ranged from 21 to 27 million people.
In the 90s came4th demographic crisis– after the collapse of the USSR, an economic crisis occurred, which was accompanied by inflation, rising prices, unemployment, and uncertainty about the future. And also Afghanistan, Chechnya. Starting in 1992, natural population growth became negative, but in the graph we see that the population continued to grow.
Question: What resources did this growth come from?
Due to mechanical movement population. People from the former Soviet republics returned to Russia after the collapse of the USSR.
To estimate how many people Russia has lost, it is necessary not only to summarize the figures already given, but also to calculate the more distant consequences of demographic losses.
During the Great Patriotic War, the number of births was almost half as much as in previous years. 20–25 years later, at the end of the 60s, those born during the war entered marriageable age, but the number of young families was much smaller, as was the number of births. Here the “demographic echo of the war” manifested itself. Another 20-25 years later, in the early 90s, the situation repeated itself (“the second echo of the war”).
Slide: graph “Actual and hypothetical (in the absence of demographic crises) population on the modern territory of Russia (1900 – 2007) or through a document camera (textbook p. 238, Fig. 198).
Demographers have calculated that with “normal” demographic development, i.e. without losses from the war, famine, leaving the country and repressions, the population of Russia by the year 2000 would have been approximately 300 million people instead of 142 million. And instead of population growth, every minute 3 people are born in Russia, and 5 die.
Assignment: Calculate how many people the population of Russia has decreased in one lesson?
During the lesson alone, 225 people died, and 135 were born. The population of Russia decreased by 90 people. The birth rate in Russia does not ensure simple reproduction of the population (there are two children in a family).
Question: Raise your hand, who has three children in the family? Who has two? One child?
Is the situation in your class driving population growth in the country?
If the situation is not changed, then according to UN forecasts, about 120 million people will live in Russia by 2025, and up to 100 million people by 2050.
American writer Upton Sinclair wrote that “birth control is a great achievement of the human mind, equal to the discovery of fire and the invention of printing.”
The Russian government seeks to manage the reproduction of the population by carrying out statedemographic policythrough various measures: economic, administrative, legal, educational and propaganda, aimed at increasing the birth rate and reducing mortality.
Question: What was the name of 2008 in Russia?
Year of the family. And we believe that Russia will emerge from the demographic crisis, although much remains to be done.
Marking system:
“v” - a tick marks what was previously known (that is, “I know”).
“−” - something that contradicts the original ideas is noted (“thought
Otherwise").
“+” - marked with a plus sign new information(“found out”)
"?" - a question mark is placed if there is a desire to know about something in more detail (“I want to know”).
"!" - an exclamation point can be added if any information needs to be remembered.
Demographic policy in Russia
Demographic policy represents the purposeful impact of the state on demographic processes - either with the aim of maintaining existing trends, or with the aim of changing them - if they are unfavorable.
American writer Epson Sinclair wrote that “birth control is a great achievement of the human mind, equivalent to the discovery of fire and the invention of printing.”
Demographic policy is a complex of various measures:
Economic (paid leaves and various benefits for the birth of children; benefits for children depending on their number, age, type of family; loans, credits, tax and housing benefits, etc.);
- administrative and legal (legislative acts regulating marriages, divorces, the position of children in families, alimony obligations, protection of motherhood and childhood);
Educational and propagandameasures designed to shape public opinion, norms and standards of demographic behavior, and a certain demographic climate in society.
In 2007, a new “Concept of the demographic policy of the Russian Federation for the period until 2025” was adopted.
The Concept provides an assessment of the current demographic situation in the Russian Federation and defines the following: tasks :
Reducing the mortality rate of citizens;
Preserving and strengthening the health of the population, increasing the duration of active life, creating conditions and creating motivation for leading a healthy lifestyle;
Increasing the birth rate;
Strengthening the institution of family, reviving and preserving the spiritual and moral traditions of family relationships;
Attracting migrants in accordance with the needs of demographic development.
The concept also defines comprehensive measures, the result of which should be an improvement in the demographic situation in the country.
One of the most important measures is to create motivation among the younger generation to lead a healthy lifestyle.
Reflection. In the process of collective work, information is discussed based on the following questions:
- What did you know from what you read?
- What information was new to you?
- What raised doubts or what do you disagree with?
- What did you read that turned out to be the most important, i.e. what do you need to remember?
(or give as homework)
IV. Summarizing.
Question: Have you received answers to all your questions? If not, is it good or bad?
Most likely no. You see what field of activity we still have ahead of us. And we will look for answers to all those questions that interest you in the following lessons.
Question: Who is satisfied with their job?
IV. Homework: §43, fill out the table:
Above, we determined Russia's demographic losses due to demographic catastrophes in the first half of the twentieth century, accumulated by 1954, at 76.4 million people. In addition, the mortality crisis of the last third of the last century caused new demographic losses - according to our estimate, 14.2 million people. However, in order to determine the overall demographic losses over the century, it is not enough to add these two figures.
The true losses in the second half of the century depended not only on what happened after 1954, but also on the legacy of the first half of the century. The failures that arose then were reflected both in the already achieved numbers and in the age pyramid of the population - its ruggedness predetermined new fluctuations in population dynamics even with a smooth, natural evolution of fertility and mortality.
Therefore, when determining the overall demographic losses over a hundred years, it is necessary to compare the actual dynamics of the population of Russia after 1954 with its hypothetical dynamics, which would eliminate the fluctuations caused by recent catastrophic development, and at the same time would take into account the probability of lower mortality in 1966-2000 in accordance with the hypothesis adopted when estimating losses due to the mortality crisis (see previous paragraph). This comparison is presented in Table 19.13, which serves as a continuation of Table 19.10, and in Figure 19.10.
Table 19.13. Actual and hypothetical population and accumulated demographic losses in Russia, 1954-2000, million people
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Population |
Accumulated losses |
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Actual |
In the absence of disasters and actual mortality |
In the absence of disasters and a decrease in mortality |
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Figure 19.10. The hypothetical population of Russia in the absence of losses due to demographic catastrophes of the first half and the mortality crisis of the last third of the twentieth century in comparison with the actual population, 1900-2000, million people
As follows from Table 19.13, if Russia had managed to avoid the demographic catastrophes of the first half of the twentieth century, then, with other things equal conditions, by the end of the century its population could be almost 113 million more people than it actually was. And if, in addition, it had been possible to achieve the reduction in mortality characteristic of other countries in the last third of the last century, then this excess would have amounted to almost 137 million people.
Of course, such estimates are always conditional and probably should not be taken literally. But they give a general idea of the “demographic price” that the 20th century cost Russia.
Notes
Under general demographic Losses are usually understood as a reduction in population caused by perturbation circumstances compared to the population size that would have occurred in the absence of perturbations. In this case, it is taken into account as an excess (compared to the “normal”) population decline due to mortality and migration - in this case they speak of human losses, as well as the number of failed births. It seems logical to include human losses from high mortality in the last third of the twentieth century as losses.
This is the highest estimate available. Soon after the end of the famine, they talked about 33.5 million and even more than 40 million in the RSFSR and Ukraine (Buchman 1923: 88). Modern Russian researchers believe that the population of famine-stricken areas in the RSFSR and Ukraine “reached up to 35 million people” (Population of Russia in the 20th Century 2000: 131). But the famine also affected the Transcaucasian republics and some areas of Central Asia.
There are also significant differences in estimates of the number of hungry people. M. Kalinin at the Ninth Congress of Soviets in 1921 spoke about 27-28 million starving people (at least 22 million according to the Central Commission for Famine Relief and another 5 million people close to famine). The authors of “Population of Russia in the 20th Century” believe that this “widespread figure in the literature... should be considered overestimated” (Population of Russia in the 20th Century 2000: 131).
“From 1925 to 1917, the number of death sentences handed down by the courts of pre-revolutionary Russia (including military courts) for so-called “political crimes” reached 6,360 in 92 years, with a maximum of 1,310 sentenced to death in 1906, the first year of reaction after the revolution 1905" (Wert 1999: 100).
“The modern American bourgeois press has completely undermined its credibility. This is the enemy who is served by two million Russian emigrants abroad from among the landowners and capitalists” (Lenin XXXII: 246).
As the famous Australian researcher S. Wheatcroft, who spent many years studying the problem of demographic losses from famine in the USSR, wrote, he was confident for a long time that losses from the famine of 1932-1933 were less than from the famine of 1921-1922, but when the archives were opened, was forced to change his mind (Wheatcroft 1990: 358).
As an example, we can cite the testimonies of eyewitnesses who survived the famine of 1932-1933 in Ukraine collected in a three-volume book published in the USA (Oral History Project 1990).
One would have to have a completely perverted consciousness to give this figure the following interpretation: “About 845 thousand - such is the scale of the so-called unjustified repressions” (Khorev 1992). In general, as soon as at least some information about mass illegal repressions began to appear on the pages of the public press, many fighters for truth and exposers of lies were discovered trying to drown it out. “Solzhenitsyn wrote from the words of others, that is, as they say, from camp jokes. An anecdote is usually called a lie” (Dugin, Malygin 1991: 66), - such and similar comments were contained in one of the first articles analyzing supposedly authentic documents from “authorities” about repressions. The authors of the article demonstrated knowledge not only of these documents, but also of various estimates of the number of repressed people, published in the West since the 20s, but never available to the Soviet reader - it seems that they used a collection of publications stored in the same “special storage” from which it is still not possible to extract complete reliable information about what actually happened.
The resolution of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR dated August 7, 1932 with the innocent title “On the protection of the property of state enterprises, collective farms and cooperation and the strengthening of public (socialist) property” categorically demanded “to be used as a measure of judicial repression for theft of goods on railway and water transport ...for theft (theft) of collective farm and cooperative property... capital punishment social protection execution with confiscation of all property, with replacement under mitigating circumstances by imprisonment for a term of at least 10 years with confiscation of property” and prohibited the application of amnesty to criminals convicted in such cases. And so that local authorities do not consider any violations too insignificant to be shot for, the supreme power always gives additional explanations. “In order to combat the theft of beets during digging and harvesting... in relation to persons stealing beets, apply the decree Central Executive Committee and Council of People's Commissars of the USSR dated August 7, 1932." (Resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR dated September 17, 1932). “Apply to persons convicted of sabotage of agricultural work, theft of seeds, sabotage underestimation of seeding standards, sabotage work on plowing and sowing, leading to damage to fields and a decrease in yield, deliberate breakdown of tractors and machines, destruction of horses - as thieves of collective farm property. property decree of August 7, 1932" (Resolution of the USSR Central Executive Committee of January 30, 1933; cited in: Maksudov 1989: 292-293).
It was prepared in pursuance of the decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of July 2, 1937, in which the NKVD authorities were asked to “register all kulaks and criminals who returned to their homeland so that the most hostile of them would be immediately arrested and shot in the order administrative conduct of their cases through troikas.”
The source of this data is a certificate from the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs sent to G. Malenkov and N. Khrushchev on January 5, 1954.
Certificate signed by the Prosecutor General, the Ministers of Internal Affairs and Justice, presented to N. Khrushchev in February 1954. The attitude of researchers towards this note varies. V. Zemskov respectfully calls it “an official state document” (Zemskov 1991a, 6: 13). Antonov-Ovseenko, without any respect, asserts that “at the beginning of 1954, when the Lubyanka chroniclers wrote this report, the party leaders had not yet recovered from Stalin’s hypnosis” (Antonov-Ovseenko 1996: 4). The total number of convicts in this certificate (3,777,380) and in the KGB report (3,778,234) practically coincides, but only in the first case it refers to the years 1921-1953, and in the second - to 1930-1953. Such “minor” discrepancies in official data occur at every step.
In 1988, a publication appeared in Belarus that spoke of the discovery of a secret burial in the Kurapaty tract on the outskirts of Minsk, which allegedly contained the remains of more than 200 thousand executed people. A government commission was created, which came to the conclusion that in 1937-1941, in the Kuropaty forest, the NKVD carried out mass executions of Soviet citizens. Summing up the results of the investigation, representatives of the General Prosecutor's Office of the Byelorussian SSR reported that in Kurapaty “at least 30 thousand citizens are buried”; in 1989, the government of the Byelorussian SSR adopted a resolution “On perpetuating the memory of the victims of mass repressions of 1937-1941 in the Kurapaty forest.” Later, several more investigations were carried out with unclear results, the number of those buried was called into question (the figure was said to be 7 thousand), and at the same time, various publications began to intensively develop a version according to which, in fact, victims of German executions during the war were discovered in Kurapaty (typical an example is the publication of the newspaper “Zavtra” [Rostikov 2000]). Let us recall, however, that in 1942-1945 the USSR operated The Extraordinary State Commission (ESC) to investigate the atrocities of the Nazi invaders, which had its branches in each republic and in each region. She investigated all the facts of such atrocities without delay, immediately after the liberation of the occupied territories, scrupulously collected information based on interviews with witnesses, interrogations of prisoners, exhumation of graves, etc. Could she have failed to notice the site of mass German executions on the outskirts of Minsk, even if there were “only” 7 thousand executed? If this were really the case, it would be possible to completely erase all the results of the work of this commission.
This figure is often repeated. See, for example: Antonov-Ovsienko 1996: 5.
In 1947, the death penalty in the USSR was briefly abolished; violation of the new decree was punishable by imprisonment for a term of 5 to 25 years. “A secret order was sent to the courts stating that the current penalty for petty theft from the place of work (imprisonment for a period of 1 year) is canceled, and such violators are now also subject to the Decree of June 4, 1947” (Wert 1999: 229 ).
The table uses data from the work of V. Zemskov (Zemskov 1999). According to other data, the number of prison inmates was 350,538 in 1939, 190,266 in 1940, 487,739 in 1941, 277,992 in 1942, 235,313 in 1943, and 1944. -m - 155,213, in 1945 - 279,969, in 1946 - 261,500, in 1947 - 306,163, in 1948 - 275,850 (Getty, Trittersporn, Zemskov 1993b).
The Soviet repressive system has lawyers, and they give completely different figures. “From the end of the civil war until the death of I.V. Stalin, i.e. over 33 years, the total number of repressed people amounted to 3.8-4 million people” (Rybakovsky 2003: 41). Well, as long as Roman law exists, even serial killers have the right to a lawyer. In reality only a number dead in the Stalinist repressive machine, apparently, there were more than 4 million.
“In January 1937, in order to take into account the population census, the NKVD of the USSR informed the statistical service that there were 263,466 people in contingent “A”, and 2,389,570 people in contingents “B” and “C”” (Tsaplin 1991: 163) .
The research of V. Tsaplin also indicates that the Gulag documents are not very reliable. He notes that according to reports, “the number of prisoners in groups “B”, “C” and “D” is almost the same as in group “A” [group “A” are prisoners used in the main production, the rest are employed in farms not classified as the main production, not working, etc.]. Such a relationship is unlikely. Most likely, something is deliberately left in the shadows” (Tsaplin 1991: 158). “The report on the use of prisoner labor in 1939 reports that in the UZhDS [Railway Construction Administration] system there were 94,773 of them at the beginning of the year, and 69,569 at the end of the year. The number of prisoners who worked, as noted in the same report, was 135,148,918 man-days Such a combination is impossible, since if during the year 94 thousand people worked every day without days off, then the number of days they worked would be only 34,310 (94 thousand per 365)” (Ibid., 160).
“At the beginning of 1938, there were 83,855 prisoners in the Dalstroy camps. In 1938, “the plan for the importation of prisoners was increased by 10 thousand people. Thus, the plan amounted to 71 thousand people.” In 1938, ships transported 73,368 passengers from Vladivostok, and mostly prisoners were transported to Dalstroy. If the prison population had been increased by 73 thousand people, then at the end of the year there would have been 157 thousand, but in reality it turned out to be 117,630 people. There was a decrease of 39,370 people, or more than 25%. Where did these people go?.. By the end of 1938, there were 117,630 prisoners at Dalstroy. In 1939, 70,953 people were brought in and “virtually liberated” (as in the document. - V.Ts.) 26,176 prisoners. Consequently, the number of prisoners would have to increase by almost 45 thousand to approximately 162,630 people. However, in reality, the average number of prisoners in Dalstroy in 1939 was determined to be 121,915 people. Consequently, almost 41 thousand prisoners left, that is, more than 25% of their possible total number” (Tsaplin 1991: 161). And according to the “accurate information” of V. Zemskov, 50.5 thousand people died in all camps of the USSR in 1939. Is this figure reliable? According to V. Tsaplin, who studied financial reports on the use of prison labor for 1939, most fully presented in documents, “2,103 thousand people passed through camps, colonies, prisons and other places of detention in 1939. Of these, at least 525 thousand people died” (Ibid., 161). But, of course, this assessment cannot be taken at face value.
For example, the Gulag chief, who made an inspection trip in one of the districts of the Narym Territory in the summer of 1931, reported that “the mortality rate in certain areas, mainly children, at the time of my stay, was 10-35 people per day. At this time, the estimated mortality figure can be calculated at about 1000 people” (Krasilnikov 2003: 165).
Such assessments are disputed. V. Zemskov, objecting to S. Maksudov, stigmatizes “the grandiose myth about the allegedly colossal losses of deportees during transportation”: “Mr. Maksudov must learn as an axiom that if 194.1 thousand Crimean Tatars were evicted, then the places of deportation received of these, at least 193.8 thousand. Mortality during transportation was, as a rule, from 0.1 to 0.2%” (Zemskov 1985). V. Zemskov believes in the documents known to him, but the document is not necessarily a certificate drawn up by an official from the “authorities”. Here is one of the testimonies of people who survived the deportation of the Crimean Tatars: “In tightly closed carriages, people died like flies from hunger and lack of air: we were not allowed to drink or eat... When they finally opened the doors in the middle of the Kazakh steppe, They gave us military rations without giving us anything to drink, ordered us to throw out the corpses right next to the railway track and did not allow us to bury them, after which we hit the road again” (Wert 1999: 219). “Axiomatic” 0.2% is the monthly mortality rate of the Russian population in the pre-war 1940. And we are supposed to believe that she was the same and even lower in these terrible echelons filled with old men and women with children?
The situation in which the deportations took place is illustrated by the monstrous story of the burning alive of 705 residents of the high-mountainous Chechen village of Khaibakh locked in a stable on February 23, 1944 (Gaev, Khadisov, Chagaeva 1994). A little more than three months remained before the tragedy in Oradour-sur-Glane, where 642 people died, but we were still the first.
The archives preserved, for example, the certificate “Generalized data from the Civil Commission for the Registration of Victims of German Atrocities on the Territory of the USSR as of March 1, 1946.” It states that the Germans killed and tortured 6,074,857 civilians and 3,912,283 prisoners of war, and in addition, 641,803 people died of starvation as a result of the siege of Leningrad (Polyan 2002: 735-736). A simple summation gives 10.6 million dead - and this is without direct losses during military operations.
Documents preserved in the archives of the USSR Central Statistical Office allow us to approximately reconstruct the calculation methodology and statistical materials underlying this assessment. It relied on data and estimates of the number of civilian deaths (direct losses) in the occupied territories (13.1 million people), estimates of military losses (from 7 to 8.8 million people) and estimates of losses combined into a rather vague category “the excess of the sharply increased mortality over the greatly reduced birth rate” in the occupied territories (3-3.5 million people). Another 2.4 million people were added to these losses - an excess of deaths over births in the unoccupied territory. In total, we received from 25.5 to 27.8 million people. The results of the calculations were transferred “upstream” and there they were transformed into a vague formula “over 20 million.”
As one of the authors believes, “those who are not yet tired of humiliating their own Motherland continue to overestimate the human losses of the USSR” (Rybakovsky 2000: 4). But the same could be said when defending the inviolability of both Stalinist and Khrushchev-Brezhnev assessments. And what does “continue to inflate” mean? They continued, basically, to underestimate, preventing the truth from being clarified. When the last “official” estimate was announced in the USSR - 27 million deaths - it turned out to be only at the level of the highest estimate made in the West back in the 40s. But serious research can correct this assessment not only upward, but also downward, in particular, by distinguishing between losses caused by the war and the “normal” functioning of the Soviet repressive machine (see below for more on this).