Story
The development of the Soviet oil industry received a powerful impetus after the oil crisis of 1973-1974. Oil export revenues have risen sharply, and investment in the oil industry has also increased. The Soviet leadership sought to maximize oil production, and this task was accomplished: production peaked in 1988, when production amounted to 11.8 million barrels per day.
However, by the late 1970s and early 1980s, serious imbalances had emerged in the Russian oil industry. The pursuit of the plan led to an increase in the cost of production: year after year, each new ton of oil required more and more investment. In 1970-1973, the share of the oil sector in capital investments of the entire industry was about 9 percent, and in 1986 it more than doubled and amounted to 19.5 percent. Many deposits were used irrationally, which led to their premature depletion and damage to environment. Despite all efforts, oil production began to decline in the late 1980s. By that time, the USSR was already firmly hooked on the oil needle: the share of proceeds from the sale of fuel and energy resources in Soviet foreign exchange earnings reached the most high level in 1984 and amounted to 55 percent. As is known, the subsequent fall in world oil prices had catastrophic consequences for the Soviet economy.
Nineties romance
In the early 1990s, hopes were pinned on foreign capital for the restoration of the oil and gas industry. The famous Decree No. 1403, signed by Boris Yeltsin in November 1992, which launched the formation and privatization of Rosneft, LUKOIL, YUKOS and Surgutneftegaz, provided for the sale of up to 15 percent. shares of these companies to foreign investors.
Moreover, the state stopped financing the oil and gas industry, and in order to attract external investment, it provided joint ventures (JVs) with significant benefits, primarily the right to export 100 percent. of all oil produced. The beginning of the 1990s saw a real boom in joint ventures in the Russian oil industry. By the end of the 1990s, when export preferences were abolished, the joint ventures were producing more than 20 million tons of oil per year.
At an early stage, joint ventures were created mainly by small foreign companies, but in the early 1990s, the giants of the world oil and gas business also came to Russia. In 1994-1995, the Russian government signed three production sharing agreements (PSAs). Two concerned projects on the Sakhalin shelf: Sakhalin-1 with Exxon and Sodeco and Sakhalin-2 with Shell, Mitsubishi and Mitsui. The third agreement on the development of the Kharyaga field in the Nenets Autonomous Okrug was signed with the French Total.
It was these three PSAs that reflected the changing attitude of the state towards Western oil companies. The history of these projects is different. Thus, negotiations on Sakhalin-1 began back in the 1970s, when the Soviet government decided to involve Japanese companies in the development of the project. In the early 1990s, Exxon entered the project. The history of Sakhalin-2 began in 1991, when the Soviet government announced a competition to prepare a feasibility study for the development of the Piltun-Astokhskoye and Lunskoye fields. The competition was won by a consortium of Western companies, which were later joined by Shell and Mitsubishi. Finally, development of the Kharyaga field began in 1999. Total was hired to develop two of the field's six production facilities. All three agreements were signed by the Russian government several months before the adoption of the PSA Law in December 1995.
Notably, three PSAs provided for legal protection against any subsequent legal restrictions, which could worsen the position of foreign investors. The agreements were signed under conditions that placed them outside Russian jurisdiction. In the mid-1990s, such an “extraterritorial” status of projects did not bother the government Russia. Oil production in the country was falling, and there was a catastrophic lack of investment in new projects. At average price oil in 1995 18 dollars. per barrel and imperfection tax legislation, which could change unpredictably at any moment, agreements became the only way to attract multi-billion dollar investments from Western companies. After the adoption of the PSA Law, the government selected more than 20 projects for their development, now in accordance with the PSA standards that came into force.
Love in cold weather
However, further implementation of the PSA regime has stalled. The government has been unable to agree, either internally or with stakeholders, on the regulatory framework necessary to implement projects in accordance with the just adopted by law. And by the beginning of the 2000s, the general position in the industry: oil prices began to rise, which increased the return on investment in production projects and reduced the attractiveness of PSA for foreign investors. The owners of the growing Russian companies were also not interested in attracting foreign companies on production sharing terms. The first such transaction was the purchase of 10 percent by BP in 1997. shares of the SIDANCO company from the structures of Vladimir Potanin. In 2003, BP merged its Russian assets with TNK and actually acquired about half of the shares of TNK from the Alfa-Access-Renova consortium. In 2004, ConocoPhillips acquired 7.6 percent from the government. shares of LUKOIL, and later bought additional shares from Vagit Alekperov and other Russian shareholders of the company. Khodorkovsky himself was close to selling a large stake in YUKOS to ExxonMobil in 2002-2003, but for known reasons the deal did not take place.
It is worth noting that in the early 2000s, some Western companies were ready to directly invest in oil and gas projects in Russia without a PSA, that is, under the terms of a standard tax regime, and even without large Russian partners. Thus, in the mid-1990s, Shell expected to develop the Salym field in the Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug under the terms of a PSA, but later agreed to begin work under the normal tax regime and made its first investments in 2004. In 2003 in Western Siberia The American company Marathon began operating, which acquired “ Khanty-Mansiysk oil corporation."
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As oil prices rose and Western companies became increasingly interested in investing in the Russian oil sector, dissatisfaction grew within the government with respect to the three PSAs concluded in the first half of the 1990s. The main complaints were related to the fact that projects were becoming more and more expensive. Shell, the largest shareholder of Sakhalin-2, suffered the most from state pressure on PSA operators. In 2005 and 2006, the project was literally bombarded with various inspections, which revealed not only inflated costs, but also violations of environmental legislation. The then head of Rosprirodnadzor, Oleg Mitvol, estimated the environmental damage from Shell’s activities on Sakhalin at $50 billion, an amount comparable to the damage from Hurricane Katrina. At the end of 2006, Sakhalin-2 shareholders sold 50 percent. plus one share in the company operating the project to Gazprom, after which all environmental claims were dropped.
The development of the Kharyaga field by Total was also accompanied by a constant conflict with government agencies. In the early 2000s tax authorities annually disputed Total's costs and refused to approve cost estimates for the project. In 2003, the French company even filed a lawsuit against the Russian government in the Stockholm Arbitration Court, demanding compensation for the costs it had incurred. The conflict continued until Total and another foreign participant in the project, Statoil, agreed in 2009 to transfer 20 percent. in the project of the state-owned Zarubezhneft.
In order to sell gas to end consumers in Russia, ExxonMobil must supply them with gas through pipelines controlled by Gazprom. Access to these pipes is also necessary for the American company if it wishes to sell its gas outside Russia, to China or Korea. Over the past few years, ExxonMobil and Gazprom have been unable to agree on the price of gas from Sakhalin-1. Still, ExxonMobil succeeded in maintaining control over the project. One can only guess what arguments convinced Russian leadership abandon attempts to use force against ExxonMobil, similar to that, which was carried out in relation to Sakhalin-2.
One way or another, the development of PSA in Russia has come to a standstill. Today, the share of PSA operators accounts for only 3.2 percent. of total oil production and 3.6 percent. of total gas production in Russia. This production volume is comparable to that of an average Russian company, such as Bashneft or RussNeft. PSA projects in Russia play a much more modest role than in resource-rich CIS countries, for example, in Kazakhstan and most countries far abroad, where the production sharing regime is applied.
Oil and gas production from Sakhalin projects will increase, but the persistent allergy to PSA among the Russian political leadership is too strongly associated with loss state control in the "dashing nineties". In 2008, speaking about the PSA, Vladimir Putin said that Russia would not allow “colonial use of its resources.” Foreign companies are encouraged to operate in Russia under the standard tax regime. The trouble is that the development of the oil and gas industry under this regime has no prospects.
Tax impasse
Manufacturers in Russia pay the same taxes as other companies on added value, profit, property, and social contributions. In addition, oil companies pay a mineral extraction tax (MET) and, if they export the oil they produce, an export duty. The mineral extraction tax is calculated according to a formula approved in 2002: the amount of the tax depends on the current price of oil and the ruble-dollar exchange rate. With the price of the Urals brand being 100 dollars. per barrel and the exchange rate of 29 rubles per dollar, the producer must pay the state about 18 dollars. from every barrel of oil produced. However, this tax is not so terrible for oil companies, as an export duty, which is calculated on a progressive scale: the higher the price of oil, the higher the duty rate. Since August 2004, the export duty rate for oil prices above 25 dollars. per barrel is 65 percent.
Thus, if other taxes are taken into account, when oil prices are high, the tax burden on exporters exceeds 90 percent. Current tax system was established in the mid-2000s, when the task was to withdraw excess profits from oil companies and fill Stabilization Fund. High the tax burden did not ruin oil companies, but made investments in new fields unprofitable. It is significant that large Russian companies such as LUKOIL and TNK-BP have intensified their search for projects outside Russia since the early 2000s, largely due to the unfavorable tax climate.
IN last years the government tried to regulate tax regime, for example, by establishing preferential mineral extraction tax rates for old depleted deposits. Since October 2011, the marginal rate of export duty on oil was reduced from 65 to 60 percent; at the same time, however, export duties on petroleum products were significantly increased. Despite these cosmetic reliefs, the development of new large projects under the existing tax regime still remains unprofitable. Moreover, those important oil projects that have been carried out in Russia in recent years have become possible only thanks to the political influence of companies that have achieved special tax breaks for themselves. These projects include the Filanovsky field in the northern Caspian Sea, which is being developed by LUKOIL, and the Vankor field, Rosneft’s largest project in Eastern Siberia; both companies received from the state the right, secured by special government orders, not to pay export duties on oil from these projects at the initial stage of their development. It should be noted that Rosneft’s benefits for the Vankor field expired in May 2011 and were not extended.
Arctic hobby
In recent years, against the background of a tightening of the tax regime, the state has begun to show growing interest in the development of new promising oil and gas areas, primarily on the Arctic shelf. Development of Arctic projects is possible only with the participation of foreign companies; the only such project carried out by Gazprom, the development of the Prirazlomnoye field on the shelf of the Pechora Sea, has shown in practice that without foreigners Russian companies cannot advance Arctic projects. The long-suffering project lasted for 16 years. The platform for developing the field was built at defense enterprises in the north of Russia, primarily at the Sevmash plant. At the same time, the field development scheme was revised several times, and the cost of the project was constantly growing. As a result, it exceeded the initial estimates many times over and amounted to almost $4 billion, which casts doubt on the project’s payback. It is characteristic that Gazprom Neft Shelf, a division of Gazprom that is developing Prirazlomnoye, still advocates using the PSA regime for the project.
So, the development of the Arctic shelf is possible only in partnership with foreign, primarily Western, companies that have the necessary technological and financial resources. At the end of the 2000s, the Russian leadership decided to begin full-scale development of the Arctic. The following scheme was chosen: the government issues licenses to state-owned companies Gazprom and Rosneft, which then attract foreign partners to develop the fields, transferring to them minority stakes. Issuing licenses turned out to be a simple matter. Already in 2010, Rosnedra, an agency under the Ministry natural resources and ecology, the licensing authority issued six licenses for the development of offshore fields to Rosneft and two to Gazprom. This year, Rosnedra plans to issue about 15 more licenses, and several dozen will be issued in total. At the same time, the more complex task of developing a clear shelf development strategy and tax regime is mired in bureaucracy.
The government has not yet approved state program shelf development. The division of roles between state-owned companies remains unclear: initially it was assumed that Gazprom and Rosneft would create a joint company as an operator of offshore projects, then they would develop the fields separately: Rosneft for oil, Gazprom for gas. The division of “spheres of influence” between state-owned companies, however, never took place. Firstly, many license areas have not been explored, so they cannot be definitely divided into oil and gas. Secondly, in the absence of clear political guidelines, Rosneft and Gazprom began to compete for new shelf licenses, with Rosneft laying claim to gas-bearing areas in the Barents Sea.
Partnership with many unknowns
The result was a paradoxical situation. For the first time since the mid-1990s, the state is interested in attracting foreign oil and gas companies to projects in Russia. However, since there is no clear strategy and tax regime, foreigners are offered not only to deal with state-owned companies competing with each other, but also to enter into projects whose profitability cannot be calculated. At the same time, state-owned companies prefer not to invest own funds in the exploration of licensed areas, inviting foreign partners to pay themselves for the pleasure of working on the Russian shelf. In other words, the following offer is made to foreign companies: you take on the technological and financial risks of the project, and if you are lucky and find oil or gas, then we will agree on a tax regime. And if they don’t find it, it means you’re out of luck and the money was wasted.
Some foreign companies seem ready to start work even under such conditions. Over the past year, Rosneft has signed several agreements to develop offshore projects: with Chevron and ExxonMobil for areas in the Black Sea and with BP for areas in the Kara Sea and with ExxonMobil for the same areas. However, the signed agreements do not mean that Western companies intend to seriously invest in offshore projects. Rather, they seek to “stake out” their participation in these projects and, spending a minimum of money, agree on the terms of further work. In addition, two of the three agreements signed by Rosneft have already lost force: Chevron left the project to study Shatsky Val in the Black Sea, citing unfavorable geological factors, and Rosneft’s deal with BP was torpedoed by the Russian partners of the British company.
The deal with ExxonMobil, announced at the end of August 2011, involves seismic exploration and drilling of exploration wells in the Kara Sea. However, the tax regime for further development of the fields will be determined in the future, and until then the American company is unlikely to invest in the project amounts close to those announced by representatives of Rosneft and Russian government. Rosneft is now actively looking for additional partners for the exploration and development of offshore fields and is likely to find them, but the lack of a clear tax regime will significantly complicate the implementation of these projects.
A clear example These difficulties are caused by the project to develop the Shtokman field in the Barents Sea. This giant deposit, located 600 kilometers from the coast, was discovered in 1988. In the 1990s, it was controlled by joint ventures of Gazprom and Rosneft; in 2004, Rosneft ceded its share in the project to Gazprom. Sluggish negotiations with potential foreign partners interested in developing Shtokman have continued since the early 1990s. In the mid-2000s, Gazprom intensified the negotiation process with Western companies, but the Russian gas monopoly showed great pickiness when choosing partners, demanding the most favorable conditions for itself. In 2006, Gazprom stated that it was not satisfied with the proposals received from Western companies. It was decided to leave control over the field in the hands of Gazprom, and to involve Western companies exclusively as contractors.
As a result of lengthy trading, which took place with the participation of top government officials, in 2007 Gazprom signed agreements with two contractors, Statoil and Total, who received 24 percent respectively. and 25 percent. in the project operator company. However, development of the field never began. In 2008, a global outbreak broke out financial crisis, which led to a sharp decline in gas demand in Europe. Meanwhile, in the United States, another potential consumer of gas from Shtokman, shale gas production has sharply increased and gas purchases from abroad have decreased. Thus, gas from the Shtokman field, inevitably expensive, turned out to be uncompetitive even before it began to be produced.
After several years of negotiations with Western companies, in the summer of 2011 the government finally decided to grant property tax breaks to the operator of the field, but this belated decision alone cannot ensure the profitability of the Shtokman project. Unless additional and larger scale tax benefits, an investment decision on the field is unlikely to be made. Thus, the unfavorable tax regime remains one of the main factors preventing the start of field development.
At the same time, neither Gazprom nor its Western partners can afford to officially abandon the project: too much effort has been spent on achieving existing agreements, and, especially for Gazprom, keeping Shtokman afloat is a matter of prestige. Instead, companies regularly state that they remain committed to the project, but the investment decision and, accordingly, the start of production is periodically postponed for a year or two.
They can if they want
Although the Shtokman project has been shelved, France's Total recently acquired a 20 percent stake in another large-scale gas project. The project for the development of the South Tambeyskoye field and the construction of a plant for the production of liquefied natural gas is known as Yamal LNG. This project demonstrates that in certain circumstances the government is able to quickly provide oil and gas companies with most favored nation treatment, including tax issues.
The South Tambeyskoye field is located in the north of the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug. In the late 2000s, Yamal LNG, which owns the license for the field, was resold several times and in 2009 came under the control of NOVATEK, Russia's largest private gas production company.
Despite the fact that in Gazprom’s official strategy the development of the South Tambeyskoye field was planned for the 2020s, Novatek decided to speed up the project. The launch of the first stage of the LNG plant with a capacity of 5.5 million tons per year is planned for 2016, with two more stages in 2017 and 2018. At the same time, the state’s reaction to the private company’s project differed sharply from the usual bureaucratic red tape. Over the past year, the Yamal LNG project has received unprecedented government support. The government promised the private company Novatek 12-year tax holidays according to mineral extraction tax. At recent competitions organized by Rosnedra, Novatek received licenses for several large fields in Yamal, thereby increasing the resource base of the project. In addition, Novatek may receive government subsidies for the purchase of LNG tankers for the development of these fields. The crowning achievement of generosity was the provision of an export channel to Novatek, virtually bypassing Gazprom.
State support for Novatek chronologically coincided with the appearance of Gennady Timchenko, co-owner of the oil trader Gunvor and an acquaintance of Vladimir Putin, among its shareholders. Timchenko himself denies any personal background to his successes in the Russian raw materials business. However, after Timchenko purchased a stake in Novatek in 2009, according to press reports, now Timchenko and Leonid Mikhelson, the chairman of the company’s board, own a block of its shares close to a controlling 10, the value of the shares has increased several times. Never-before-seen government support for a private gas producer obviously reflected in the rapid growth of the company's value.
Strategy and risk
For twenty years, foreign companies in Russia have experienced both state love and state anger. The rise of the oligarchs in the 1990s put an end to the PSA regime, but opened the way for Western companies that wanted to invest in the capital of Russian oil and gas structures. The rise of state capitalism during the Putin era has forced foreign companies to seek partnerships with Rosneft and Gazprom. But achieving this goal turned out to be difficult not only because of the ambitions of Russian state-owned companies, but also because of excessive tax pressure on the oil industry. At the end of the 2000s, the political cycle in the oil and gas sector went into a second circle. As in the 1990s, those private companies whose owners have secured the support of government leaders are in the best position.
Under these conditions, there are two options for foreign companies. The first is the development of cooperation with Gazprom and Rosneft. In the foreseeable future, it is these two state-owned companies that will be able to cooperate with foreigners in megaprojects, such as the development of the Arctic shelf. In exchange, state-owned companies will demand investments, technologies, and assets outside of Russia. In addition, foreign companies will be expected to assist, primarily Gazprom, in the implementation of its pipeline projects in Europe. For example, it seems likely that the German Wintershall and the Italian Eni entered into the Gazprom project " South Stream“largely in order to facilitate access to deposits in Russia.
The second opportunity for foreign companies is cooperation with private Russian companies. As recent practice shows, it is precisely companies such as Novatek that can achieve tax preferences for their projects faster and more efficiently than the seemingly almighty Gazprom. Total has joined two significant gas projects, Shtokman in partnership with Gazprom and Yamal LNG in cooperation with Novatek. It is likely that Yamal LNG will be sold faster than Shtokman, in any case, over the past year Novatek has received an unprecedented state support, and Shtokman stood still.
Reverse side medals in cooperation with private companies are dependent on their owners, or rather, on their political connections, which allow them to achieve the favor of the state. Over the past 20 years in history oil and gas sector Russia has had many ups and downs. Yukos, the country's largest private oil and gas company, was liquidated in just two years. Structures that worked closely with Gazprom in the 1990s and received assets from the gas monopoly on favorable terms, for example, Itera and Stroytransgaz, lost support in the 2000s and were forced to return most of the assets to Gazprom. . More recently, Mikhail Gutseriev, who created one of the largest oil companies, RussNeft, from scratch, was subjected to criminal prosecution and emigrated to London in 2007, selling RussNeft to the structures of Oleg Deripaska. But by mid-2010, all charges against Gutseriev were dropped, he came to Russia and, as if nothing had happened, returned to the management of RussNeft.
Just like 10-15 years ago, foreign companies are forced to rely on the political influence of their partners. Cooperation with state-owned companies is politically safer and opens up access to significant projects, but the implementation of these projects may be delayed for years. Relying on private companies, whose owners can take advantage of their proximity to top political leadership, promises momentary favor from the state, but does not guarantee long-term support for projects, especially in the event of a change in political leadership or the withdrawal of their Russian shareholders from the projects.
13:08 — REGNUM Iran is beginning to select foreign companies that plan to take part in large local oil and gas projects. In particular, in the development of hydrocarbon deposits. This became known from a message posted on the website of the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC).
Acceptance of applications from foreign oil producers began on Monday, October 17, and will last until November 19 of this year. NIOC invites investors interested in the exploration and production of black gold to participate in the prequalification selection. The company will publish the final list of selected organizations on December 7. However, Iran has not yet announced a specific list of projects in question.
After the lifting of Western sanctions against Iran in January of this year, imposed for the country's nuclear program, Iran is trying to increase oil production and market share to pre-sanction levels. At first, the Iranian authorities stated that they would increase production to the planned 4 million barrels per day by June of this year, then by September. Now the dates have been postponed to 2019. It became obvious that without financial investments foreign companies Iran cannot cope on its own. Therefore, in order to increase the attractiveness of its oil and gas fields, Tehran approved in August this year new model oil contracts for foreign investors (IPC). According to the Iranian plan, the country's oil and gas industry needs about $150 billion in investment to increase production by a million barrels per day by 2020. Thus, over the next two years, Iran intends to sign contracts worth $25 billion with foreign companies.
The IPC provides for more flexible terms activities of foreign companies compared to past contracts. Details of the contracts have not yet been disclosed. But it is known that now foreign investors will be able to enter into contracts for up to 20 years, which will allow companies to at least recover their costs. The old contracts stipulated lump sum payment, and their validity period was only five years.
The Iranian National Oil Company already signed the first contract for the new model in October, not with a foreign company, but with the local Setad Ejraye Farman Emam. American media call this company part of the Iranian leader's conglomerate Ali Khamenei. Under the terms of the contract, it is envisaged to improve oil recovery methods and increase oil production at the Kupal field as part of the development of the second phase of the Yaran field.
Previously IA REGNUM reported that Norwegian, Dutch, and British companies had already announced at the end of August this year that they were interested in working together with Tehran in oil industry, and asked to be given the opportunity to study territories in the Caspian Sea. True, Deputy general director National Iranian Oil Company Gholam-Reza Manuchehri did not specify which companies we are talking about. However, according to Manouchehri, Tehran has already invited foreign investors to participate in the exploration and development of four hydrocarbon production projects simultaneously in the Caspian Sea. In particular, the Sardar-e Jangal deposits.
Regarding Russian-Iranian cooperation in the oil industry, in August the Russian Ambassador to Tehran Levan Dzhagaryan said that Russian oil companies are interested in Iranian oil projects. Basically, of course, we are talking about production projects, but participation in the field of oil refining and petrochemicals is also possible. Moreover, the option of creating a consortium of Russian oil companies to work in Iran is also acceptable, Dzhagaryan said.
Lukoil previously announced its desire to work in Iran. According to the Russian ambassador, the company is considering participation in projects to develop two fields in the area of the city of Ahwaz in western Iran. It is possible for Lukoil to return to the Anaran project, where the company worked before the imposition of sanctions. Also currently at the approval stage are memorandums of cooperation between Gazprom Neft and Gazprom with the Iranian oil and gas companies NIOC and NIGC in the development of oil and gas fields. Zarubezhneft and Tatneft also expressed interest in participating in Iranian projects.
PARTICIPATION OF FOREIGN OIL COMPANIES IN THE RUSSIAN OIL AND GAS COMPLEX.
(scientific supervisor prof.)
Russian State University of Oil and Gas named after.
This paper examines the current situation regarding the participation of foreign companies in the Russian oil and gas complex. Position foreign investment in the Russian oil and gas complex is quite contradictory. On the one hand, one may get the impression that unbearable conditions have been created for non-residents in the oil and gas complex of the Russian Federation. Licenses and deposits are being taken away and people are being squeezed out of business. On the other hand, active investments in oil and gas projects on Russian territory continue.
The current situation is such that foreign companies cannot do without working in Russia. The Achilles heel of energy multinationals is well known. They are deprived of inventory, which makes their business very unstable. And they simply have no other way but to fight for access to reserves. At the same time, there are not so many promising oil and gas regions in the world. And most of them have very strict rules of the game for non-residents.
Russia is also becoming an arena of struggle between the EU and the US for oil and gas resources. However, the rules of the game here are still clearer than in Africa. Thus, Russia turns out to be far from the worst place to do business. The harsh criticism of the political leadership of the Russian Federation in the Western media is explained by attempts to bargain for more for the majors. profitable terms presence in the Russian oil and gas complex.
The development strategy of Russian companies is also largely clear and logical. If foreign concerns seek to gain access to resources and enter into upstream projects on Russian territory, then it is important for Russians to enter the end-consumer market and become shareholders of downstream projects in the main hydrocarbon sales regions. Therefore, the emphasis is on the purchase and construction abroad of oil refineries, gas stations, underground gas storage facilities, gas distribution networks and even electricity generating assets.
As a result, a big bargaining begins. Western concerns intend to expand their presence in the Russian upstream. And domestic companies are in the European and Chinese downstream. This is where the idea of asset exchange comes from. But any exchange involves big disputes regarding their terms. And negotiations (as the situation around, say, the Yuzhno-Russkoye field shows) can continue for more than one year. They use any methods, including direct political pressure.
At the same time, each side understands its necessity for the other, although it tries not to show it in any way. The EU, which in reality is not able to solve the problem of energy shortages without the supply of hydrocarbons from the Russian Federation, does its best to promote the development of renewable types of energy and the expansion of purchases of oil and gas in Central Asia, deliberately trying to underestimate the real dependence on Russia. The Russian Federation responds to this with the idea of financial and technological self-sufficiency, assuring that it is capable of independently developing new deposits and implementing breakthrough projects such as Shtokman, Eastern Siberia or the Yamal Peninsula. Although in reality the level of technological problems there is so complex that they cannot be solved on their own. Not to mention that it would be more logical to share financial risks with non-residents. As a result, there is a serious struggle around exchange strategies, in which both companies and political elites are involved, which gives it a special flavor.
7 V Lately Special attention EU countries and USA in foreign policy are given to such regions as the Persian Gulf, the Caspian Sea and the Russian Federation. It is these territories that large western oil companies consider the most promising in terms of development and production of hydrocarbons. Russia has significant hydrocarbon reserves. Therefore, Western oil companies are striving to participate in mining projects in the Russian Federation. Over the years, the participation of foreign oil companies in Russian oil and gas production has increased from $0.564 to $16 billion.
The structure of investments of foreign companies in the oil and gas industry is dominated by investments in fixed capital, the share of which is about 76%. These investments are mainly aimed at the implementation of specific oil and gas projects, as well as the purchase of large shares (over 10%) of Russian oil companies, the acquisition of medium and small oil and gas companies.
The Americans were engaged in oil and gas projects in Russia even before the collapse of the USSR, although one cannot talk about achieving large-scale successes. At one time, American oil companies, primarily ExxonMobil and ChevronTexaco, wanted to buy out YUKOS assets, but V For known reasons, this became unrealistic. Another corporation, ConocoPhillips, is trying to buy up LUKOIL shares, but the Americans will not be able to consolidate even a blocking stake. The British achieved little more success. Having managed to create a joint company with a Russian TNK, BP partially strengthened its position in the global oil market. However, despite this, they were not allowed to participate in a number of auctions for large deposits, without even explaining the reasons.
Among foreign companies operating in Russia, the bulk of oil production falls on BP (36.6 million tons), ConocoPhillips (about 10 million tons), Sakhalin Energy (about 1.5 million tons), Vanyoganneft ( about 1.3 million tons).
The participation of foreign companies in gas production in the Russian Federation is very limited. A special feature of the Russian gas industry is its significant monopolization by the world's largest gas concern, controlled by the Russian government. Russian independent gas producers and foreign investors have significant problems with access to gas pipelines and the ability to implement gas projects.
To date, several forms of interaction have developed in the Russian Federation
Russian and foreign companies:
Purchase of a stake in a large Russian oil company;
Creation joint ventures and consortia with Russian organizations;
Signing production sharing agreements;
Acquisition of small and medium-sized Russian subsoil users;
Carrying out contract work and concluding service contracts;
Straight economic activity companies registered abroad, including in offshore zones (with Russian roots).
Purchases of shares A large Russian vertically integrated structure is supported by the British BP and the American ConocoPhillips. Negotiations on concluding this type of deal are taking place at the level of governments of countries whose companies are creating joint businesses. This type of interaction acquires a strategic nature and, as a rule, is politically well protected.
11Examples of foreign investors entering the oil and gas business through creation of joint ventures and consortia JV Rosneft and ConocoPhillips (“Polar Lights”) can work with Russian companies; LUKOIL and ConocoPhillips, Rosneft and Sinopec, Gazprom Neft and Chevron, as well as Royal Dutch, Shell and Sibir Energy (Salym Petroleum).
Projects under the terms of a production sharing agreement (PSA) - currently
Currently, three projects are being implemented: development of the Kharyaga field, Sakhalin-1 and Sakhalin-2.
Entry of foreign investors into oil and gas companies in Russia through purchase, financing of small oil enterprises . Foreign corporations are actively acquiring small companies that are not part of large oil companies, and also register legal entities in Russia to participate in projects for the development of small fields: Eastern Transnational Company, ByTes, Pechoraneftegaz, Samara-Nafta and others. Thus, in Eastern Siberia, the license for exploration and development of the Dulisminskoye field is held by NK Dulisma, owned by Urals Energy Holdings Ltd. (Great Britain), and the Tambeyskoye field is controlled by Tambeyneftegaz and Repsol (Spain).
Eastern transnational company" (VTK - subsidiary Swedish West Siberian Resources Ltd.) has been operating in the Tomsk region since the mid-1990s, owning licenses for areas in the Alexandrovsky and Kargasoksky districts. According to the official report, last year the company's oil production amounted to 497 thousand tons.
Cyprus oil production and exploration company Urals Energy Public PCL was established in the early 1990s. The main assets of the company were three production enterprises in Komi - Tebukneft, Ukhtaneft and RKM Oil - with an oil production volume of about 1.5 million tons per year. In 2003 these assets were sold to LUKOIL for 4.2 billion rubles. Urals Energy now owns a number of licenses in the Nenets Autonomous Okrug and production assets, in particular Arktikneft, purchased in 2003. at LUKOIL. The Urals Energy group, which is developing the Dulisminskoye oil and gas field in the Irkutsk region, plans by the end of 2009. increase oil production to 19 thousand barrels per day. Moreover, by the third quarter of 2009. Urals Energy expects production to increase to 15 thousand. bbl/day Behind this year Urals Energy plans to invest about $90 million in the development of the company and is considering the possibility of acquiring new assets. By 2011 the company expects to increase oil production to 50 thousand barrels per day. South Tambeyskoye field (licensed by " Tambeyneftegaz") in terms of reserves (1.2-1.3 trillion cubic meters of gas and 40-50 million tons of condensate) are comparable to Gazprom’s largest fields, Zapolyarnoye and Medvezhye. In June 2005, -invest acquired a 25.1% stake in Tambeyneftegaz.
However, in the same year " Tambeyneftegaz" at the instigation of its majority shareholder Nikolai Bogachev, he transferred the license for South Tambey LNG.” After a series of trials last fall, Gazprombank-invest challenged the transfer of the license in court. Mr. Usmanov acted as a mediator in this transaction, and structures affiliated with him negotiated with Mr. Bogachev. As a result, a settlement agreement was concluded on the purchase by the structures of Alisher Usma-
new 75% stake in Tambeyneftegaz. In May of this year, Invest purchased the remaining stake. According to unofficial information, total amount transactions amounted to $350-360 million, while Yuzhno-Tambeyskoye is estimated at $1.5-2 billion.
Participation of foreign companies in contract work and conclusion of service agreements
contracts . Today, foreign capital is behind the majority of service operators operating in Russia - the Eurasian Drilling Company, the Integra group and the Russian divisions of the world service corporations Schlumberger, Halliburton, Baker Hughes and others. The activities of foreign corporations as contractors are mainly concentrated in those sectors where Russian technologies are inferior to Western ones:
In exploration and production of hydrocarbons on the shelf;
Well design and construction;
Telemetry while drilling;
Formation assessment to optimize drilling and positioning of directional wells;
Well services for production stimulation (including hydraulic fracturing, acid treatment, etc.);
Well testing;
Sampling on the surface and from the bottomhole zone;
Use of MultiPhase measuring instruments and pumps;
Well monitoring;
Temperature and pressure measurements using fiber optic methods;
Standard and “intelligent” well completion techniques.
In the 1990s, many Russian oil and gas companies registered management company in an offshore zone in order to minimize taxation. Then financial resources initially withdrawn from Russia abroad were returned in the form of foreign investments . Currently, there are a number of small companies that are controlled by Russian business, but are formally registered in other countries (Sibir Energy, Yeniseineftegaz and others). The use of this form of foreign investment makes it possible to protect capital previously withdrawn from the country from possible unfavorable changes in organizational and economic conditions in Russia. The policy of the Russian Federation in recent years has been aimed at the formation of a new organizational structure of the oil and gas complex, which is expressed in the strengthening of state-owned companies (Rosneft, Gazprom) and the transfer of all management and production divisions of Russian oil companies under state control. In this regard, at the end of 2006, the government submitted for consideration to the State Duma draft amendments to Law of the Russian Federation “On Subsoil”. The new amendments are likely to multiply the contradictions that already exist.
a lot and in current edition Law "On Subsoil". This includes a free reading of the Constitution, insignificant institutions, non-binding declarative norms, and elementary editorial negligence. In practice, this leads to certain objective conflicts between federal authorities and government authorities
subjects of the Federation, create serious complications, including litigation, for subsoil users when resolving issues of providing subsoil for use, procedures for use, taxation, etc. Meanwhile, many problems can be avoided by introducing current law amendments The Law “On Subsoil” was adopted 15 years ago, at the beginning of 1992. During this time, additions and changes were made to it 13 times, and a new edition was adopted in 1995. There have been numerous attempts to fundamentally replace it, for example, with the so-called Mining Code.
There are already more than a dozen options new edition. It was proposed to replace the licensing administrative system for granting subsoil use rights with a contractual civil law system, to replace competitions with auctions, etc. All this suggests that the law is alive, actively responding to ongoing changes in the economy, trying to ensure the efficiency of the subsoil use process. At the same time, a critical reading of the law makes it possible to identify numerous shortcomings in it that complicate the lives of subsoil users and government authorities.
For all its positive features, the current Federal Law “On Subsoil” contains a number of non-working declarative institutions and norms, as well as inaccurate, mutually exclusive and even erroneous provisions. Some of them have been changed or clarified in past years. However, a number of absurdities still remain. Moreover, some significant omissions of the legislator can be eliminated without changing the general ideology of the law and its mechanisms. Indeed, in many cases, problems are created by the careless attitude of the legislator and the legal departments serving him to the formulation of certain norms and institutions.
Amendments to the law on subsoil, regulating access to strategic subsoil areas, during their consideration at the Government meeting, caused virtually no comments. However, such comments arose during the re-approval of the bill.
There have been proposals to add to the law the list of minerals whose deposits can be classified as strategic, as well as to prescribe more stringent criteria for classifying deposits as strategic. One of the amendments provides for the formation federal body executive branch authorized by the government to control the implementation of foreign investments in the Russian oil and gas complex to identify a threat to national security as a result of the proposed transaction. Strategic activities also include the extraction of mineral resources in a subsoil plot of federal significance. Amendments to the Law “On Subsoil” include three selection criteria for subsoil plots of federal significance:
Availability of unique resources such as uranium, diamonds, pure quartz, rare earth metals;
The volume of recoverable reserves of the field (established only for oil, gas, gold and copper);
A subsoil plot is considered strategic if it is located on a strategic territory or within internal sea waters (that is, in an offshore zone).
Thus, all large onshore oil and gas fields, including those located in the undistributed fund ( total number about 30 oil and 40 gas facilities), and absolutely everything is on the shelf. Oil and gas companies that own licenses for large fields also fall into the category of strategic ones.
The status of a subsoil plot of federal significance will significantly limit the ability of foreign investors to buy Russian oil and gas assets. If the transaction falls within these parameters, then a foreign investor planning to gain control over a Russian company will be required to submit an application to the above-mentioned authorized body. At the same time, he may be asked to take on some additional obligations if government departments still consider the deal possible.
In the case of an oil and gas field, its owner may oblige to sell gas at domestic market prices or supply oil for government needs.
The bill restricts any investment from offshore zones. A company registered in such a zone, even if its entire authorized capital belongs to Russian citizens, is considered as foreign, since the legislation indicates that the status legal entity determined by the country where it is registered. According to the bill, foreign investors are required to approve a transaction to acquire a stake in a strategic enterprise that exceeds 25% plus
1 share. A foreign company will be able to receive more than a quarter in any major project only with the consent of the Russian government. Foreign or joint venture companies planning to participate in auctions for the right to develop large fields will have to create joint ventures with Russian state-owned companies (Gazprom and Rosneft).
High prices for oil and gas contribute to the accumulation of significant investment resources by Russian oil companies. This means that the participation of foreign companies in the oil and gas complex as a source of significant capital investments is becoming less relevant compared to the possibility of attracting technologies that can improve operating efficiency in harsh natural and climatic conditions.
geographical conditions (for example, on the shelf of the northern seas). Welcoming foreign companies into our market, Russia wants other countries to show an adequate attitude towards Russian companies and provide them with access to their market. By exporting the bulk of their products, Russian oil companies are interested in gaining access to oil and gas assets in consumer countries. In connection with this, it has changed public policy Russia in the oil and gas industry, which influenced the forms of interaction and interpenetration of foreign and Russian oil companies. First of all, these are joint projects with Russian state companies (Gazprom, Rosneft), for example: in Timan-Pechora, Eastern Siberia, in the north of Western Siberia (mainly in the Yamal-Nenets Autonomous Okrug) and on the shelf of the southern, Arctic and Far Eastern seas.
State structures have a political advantage over private ones, and by participating in a consortium with them, a foreign investor can, to a certain extent, protect himself from further economic and political risks.
In exchange for the right to extract oil and gas in the Russian Federation, foreigners will need to transfer ownership of shares in gas distribution, marketing or electricity assets in their territories (sale markets) to Russian partners. Foreign companies can also acquire a small private oil and gas enterprise developing fields that are not included in the list of strategic ones. It is also possible that foreigners may purchase stakes in large Russian oil companies (Gazprom, Rosneft, LUKOIL, Surgutneftegaz).
In conclusion, it is worth noting that on the Russian side, attracting foreign investors to large oil and gas projects will be motivated either by the import of technology or by the opportunity to gain access to the infrastructure of sales markets. Receipt financial resources from abroad plays a secondary role today. It is possible for foreign oil companies to provide services to improve production efficiency (for example, on the shelf).
The Russian oil and gas industry has received more foreign investment than any other. Oil and gas industry enterprises not only implement joint projects with foreign partners, but also attract funds by placing their valuable papers on the western financial market. It can be noted that only a few Russian enterprises and financial institutions succeed in raising funds in this way. The oil and gas industry also attracts foreign government funds and money from international financial institutions in a relatively large volume.
Foreign investors have not been able to place direct control over any of the Russian oil producing companies. This is explained by the fact that all these companies are very large enterprises of “strategic” importance. In addition, there is a direct ban on the sale of shares of a number of Russian oil companies abroad.
Due to the complex political and economic situation In Russia, the prospects for foreign investment in the oil and gas industry remain unclear. However, international oil companies have experience in developing countries and are able to overcome specific difficulties associated with the lack of a normal market environment and arbitrary actions of the authorities. However, in any case, it is unlikely that independent development of large fields by foreign companies will be possible, which would create competition for Russian oil-producing giants. Foreign capital is used by oil companies mainly for “import” modern technologies and financing the projects they implement.
The Purneftegaz company plans to attract foreign investment in the amount of $15 million by selling a large block of its shares acquired on the secondary market. The raised funds are planned to be used for the implementation of large investment projects, including joint development of the Komsomolskoye oil field with Shell, development and modernization of the Kharampur oil and gas field.
Societe Generale Vostok bank is lending to two oil producing companies - Tatneft ($280 million) and Chernogorneft ($50 million).
With the help of new technologies, the Komiarktikoil joint venture achieved a threefold increase in oil production from part of the Verkhne-Vozeyskoye field. The foreign founders of the joint venture are the Canadian company Gulf Canada and the English company British Gas. However, Gulf Canada expressed a desire to sell its 25% stake in the joint venture, emphasizing that although the investment was promising from a technical point of view, it was too risky due to constantly changing economic conditions.
The American oil concern ARCO (ARCO) announced on September 29, 1995 the acquisition of convertible bonds of NK LUKoil, which after conversion in April 1996 will amount to 5.7% authorized capital companies. ARCO purchased 241,000 LUKoil bonds worth $250 million. The bonds will be exchanged for voting shares totaling 40.9 million in April 1996, which will turn the American concern into the largest holder of LUKoil bonds.
The Anglo-American-Norwegian consortium consisting of Brown and Root, Smedvig, Petek and Instance won the tender for the right to implement the gas program in the Tomsk region. The program provides for the development of the North Vasyugan, Meldzhinskoye and Kazanskoye gas fields with proven reserves of about 300 billion cubic meters. gas
Kali-Bank GmbH, a subsidiary of the German company Wintershall AG, will provide the Russian joint stock company Gazprom has a loan in the amount of DM1 billion, the Gazprom press service told the Petroleum Information Agency. The loan will be used to implement the Yamal-Western Europe gas pipeline construction project.
RAO Gazprom and the German concern BASF signed an agreement to allocate 1 billion marks for the implementation of a project to supply Yamal gas to Western Europe. Funds from the German side for the development of gas fields in Yamal are allocated under Gazprom guarantees and the project is being carried out without the participation of the Russian government.
The international consortium Timan Pechora Company, consisting of Texaco, Exxon, Amoco, Norsk Hydro and Rosneft, intends to develop the Timan-Pechora field with recoverable reserves of about 400 million tons.
The South Korean financial and industrial group Hyundai is showing interest in the Kovytkinskoye gas field in the Irkutsk region.
US Exim Bank and the Central Bank of the Russian Federation have reached an agreement on issuing licenses from the Central Bank to open collateral accounts, which is actually the final step in the process of preparing for US Exim Bank's participation in lending to Russian enterprises Nizhnevartovskneftegaz, Permneft, Tatneft, Chernogorneft and Tomskneft "
The American fund Tempelton Investment Management intends to invest in Permneft and Komineft through its division, the Tempelton Russia fund.
The total cost of the project for the development of the Shtokman field in the Murmansk region, which will be Russian company“Rosshelf” is estimated at approximately $10-12 billion. It is planned to hold an international tender to finance the project. Some Western companies and banks, in particular the American Goldman Sax and Morgan Stanley, showed interest in the tender.
The government of the Russian Federation and a subsidiary of the French company Total, Total Exploration Development Russia, signed an agreement on the development of the Kharyaga oil and gas field on December 20, 1995. Recoverable reserves are estimated at 160.4 million tons. The agreement provides for the development of the field by a French company for 33 years, which will require an investment of $1 billion from Total.