The structure of the real economy at the beginning of the 21st century. The Russian economy at the beginning of the XXI century. Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug-Yugra

Russia may not be afraid of a large-scale crisis in the economy for at least another three years - provided that banking system endure

Over the past 15 years, the Russian economy has gone through a classic resource cycle, suffered from the "Dutch disease" and ended it with neither factors nor resources for growth. Independent of oil and gas economy in Russia is no more than 10%. At the same time, the Russian economy is managed not by the market, but by the interests of officials. However, “fat reserves” have been accumulated for several years to come, the head of the economic program Carnegie Moscow Center Andrey Movchan.

Andrey Movchan (photo: 24smi.org)

"THE MAJOR PART OF ECONOMIC EVENTS IS DETERMINED BY THE WILL OF MANAGERS"

From numerous meetings with the audience, interviews, questions from the media and listeners, I concluded that most of our readers are interested not so much in scientific theories or curious facts from the life of the world or Russian economy, but in short qualitative, rather than quantitative answers to direct and simple questions - what was, what will be, and how the economic heart will calm down.

Unfortunately, not all questions have unambiguous answers. And the question "how much will it cost ..." does not make much sense - most likely, chances and circumstances still unknown to us will affect the value of assets more than we are able to imagine. But nevertheless, it is possible at least, identify these factors and try to define the scope of the possible - even in the field of questions in the forehead.

Two important caveats. First, the answers are based on today's situation and the information available now. There is always a risk that the situation will change and that we do not have enough information to assess it. Secondly, the main part of economic events is determined not by the spontaneous formation of supply and demand, which is subject to strict laws, but by the personal or collective will of certain managers, who are not always rational, often incompetent, always pursuing their personal, clan, party and other goals, distant from the tasks of balancing the economy. These actions and their consequences are much more difficult to predict, but the possibility of such irrational interventions cannot be discounted.

RESOURCE CYCLE AND THE DUTCH DISEASE

What happened to the Russian economy in the 21st century?

Over the past decade and a half, the Russian economy has experienced a classic resource cycle and the “Dutch disease” - banal and well-studied phenomena. The rise in oil prices at the beginning of the century created the effect of rapid growth budget revenues and allowed the authorities to refuse to stimulate the process of expansion tax base. Moreover, the ability to control oil flows allowed the authorities to consolidate indirect control over the hydrocarbon industry, banking business and through them - over the entire economic and political life of the country, which significantly negatively affected the development of any non-oil business and the effectiveness of economic and budgetary decisions.

In fact, by 2008, 65–70% of Russia's budget consisted (directly or indirectly) of revenues from hydrocarbon exports, and the correlation of GDP growth rates, federal budget revenues, and reserves with changes in oil prices reached 90–95%. Against this background, the ruble turned out to be significantly overvalued due to the massive influx of petrodollars - in 2006–2007, its market rate exceeded the calculated inflation rate by 35%. Thus, three negative factors influenced the economic development of Russia.

1. The authorities, in their desire to control financial flows, deliberately worsened the investment climate, refusing to protect the rights of investors and entrepreneurs, and even discriminating against investors and businessmen. This led to a reduction in investment flows, a rise in the cost of money, a decrease in entrepreneurial activity, and even an ever-increasing loss of financial and human capital - the export of capital from Russia during this period amounted to more than $1 trillion, and the best businessmen and professionals constantly left the country.

2. Sterilization of additional profits into reserves increased the value of money, reducing the attractiveness of investment and making it impossible to develop capital-intensive or slow-growing industries.

3. An overvalued ruble and populist government measures aimed at unjustified wage growth, together with high taxes sharply overestimated the cost of production, making domestic production unprofitable.

Ultimately, Russia degraded in almost all areas of the economy, without creating a competitive productive sphere, despite the overall growth in income due to the export of hydrocarbons and even outpacing growth in consumption. In the structure of Russian GDP, up to 20% was occupied by hydrocarbon production. Even up to 30% of GDP was trade, hypertrophied due to huge flows of imports at the expense of petrodollars (30% of GDP is about twice as high as the average for developed countries). The internal energy market and infrastructure accounted for about 15% of GDP. Another 15% came from government projects; 9% was the share banking sector- as a result, no more than 10% of Russia's GDP is attributed jointly to the sphere of independent services and non-resource production.

It was superimposed on unreasonable social politics- Income growth outpaced GDP growth even taking into account the oil component. The budget has become an employer of almost 30% of the workforce directly and another 8% of the workforce indirectly, taking on an unreasonable burden. The pension reform failed because of the half-heartedness and indecisiveness of the authorities. In addition, the budget was overburdened with ambitious inefficient projects and hypertrophied spending on defense and security. Finally, budget spending bloated not only because of cost inefficiencies, but also because of high levels of corruption.

Ultimately, after the fall in oil prices, Russia was left with an undiversified, quasi-monopolized economy that lacks both the factors and resources for growth.

... AND THERE WILL BE NO CRASH

Can we say that Russia is suffering an economic collapse?

No, not yet. During the years of high oil prices, Russia has accumulated sufficient reserves. Gold and foreign exchange reserves are now three times the expected volume of imports in 2016. Enterprises have created a sufficient number of fixed assets. The population has accumulated more than $250 billion in banks and perhaps as much in cash, more than doubling the average living space per person, formed a stock of durable goods.

The fall in household incomes has certainly become unprecedented, but even with $35 a barrel of oil, it brings us back to the levels of 2004-2005 - times not rich, but quite stable. In general, per capita GDP in Russia in 2016 will be, according to pessimistic forecasts, about $7.5 thousand - at the end of the seventh ten countries, next to Turkmenistan, slightly below China (and GDP according to PPP, apparently, is about $13-14 thousand - somewhere then in the ninth ten countries where Algeria, the Dominican Republic, Thailand, Colombia, Serbia, South Africa). These figures are modest, but still far from catastrophic (the zone of color revolutions begins at about $6,000 nominal GDP per capita and $9,000-10,000 PPP).

If the current situation persists (oil does not exceed $35 per barrel, no reforms are taking place), Russia may not be afraid of a large-scale crisis in the economy for at least another three years - provided that the banking system survives.

Andrey Movchan

Moscow Carnegie Center , 25.02.2016

Andrey Movchan- Head of the economic program of the Carnegie Moscow Center.

Born in 1968 in Moscow.

Graduated from the Faculty of Mechanics and Mathematics of Moscow State University. Lomonosov (1992), Financial Academy under the Government of the Russian Federation (1996) and University of Chicago Booth GSB (2003). He has a Certificate of Professional Competence of Supervisors and Employees of Banks and Investment Firms (Cyprus), a qualification certificate of the FFMS 1.0.

1993 - 1994 - head of department economic analysis Alfa Group.

1994 - 1995 - Deputy Chairman of the Board of the Guta Financial Group.

1995 - 1997 - headed the planning and economic department commercial bank Russian Credit.

1997 - 2002 - Managing Director of Troika Dialog investment company.

2003 - created and for 6 years led the group "Renaissance Investment Management".

2009 - created investment company"Third Rome".

Wife Olga, a cardiologist, both are fond of ballroom dancing.

There are four children in the family.

Tyumen region

KHANTY-MANSIYSKY AUTONOMOUS DISTRICT-YUGRA

Department of Education and Science

SURGUT STATE UNIVERSITY KHMAO

DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS

DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC THEORY

DAY DEPARTMENT

TEST

BY DISCIPLINE: economic theory

ON THE TOPIC: “Peculiarities of the development of the Russian economy in XXI century"

Completed by the student:

Sharikova I.V.

Checked by: Mikityuk L.M.

In the last quarter of the 20th century, mankind entered a new stage of its development - the stage of building post-industrial society, which is the result of what is happening in modern world socio-economic revolution. It is known that each socio-economic revolution is based on its own specific technologies, production and technological systems and production relations. For a post-industrial society, this role is primarily played by information technologies and computerized systems, high production technologies, which are the result of new physical-technical and chemical-biological principles, and innovative technologies based on them, innovative systems and innovative organization of various spheres of human activity. Its end result, in our deep conviction, should be the creation new form economic organization - innovative economy. An analysis of the results of the study of domestic and foreign scientists on this issue convinced us that the creation of an innovative economy is a strategic direction for the development of our country in the first half of the 21st century.

The main purpose of this work is to analyze the development trends of the Russian economy in the 21st century. The set goal necessitated the solution of a number of interrelated tasks:

Consider the main areas of activity of the Russian economy XXI century;

· to analyze the problems of Russia's budget policy in the 21st century;

· explore the prerequisites for the globalization of the Russian economy;

· study the innovative direction of development of the Russian economy.

The first acquaintance with the text of the Guidelines for the Government of the Russian Federation for the period up to 2008 makes a good impression. "" Priority directions activities of the Government of the Russian Federation, allowing to ensure high and sustainable rates economic growth» are:

1. Raising the standard of living of the population, promoting the development of "human capital".

2. Removal of structural constraints on economic growth.

3. Promoting competitiveness Russian companies strengthening their position in the domestic and foreign markets.

4. Socio-economic development of the regions of the Russian Federation.

5. Rational integration of Russia into the world economy”.

However, two things immediately caught my attention. Firstly, from the text quoted above, the idea arises that the increase in the standard of living of the population is carried out in order to achieve high and sustainable rates of economic growth. Indeed, a high standard of living means, in particular, a high level of income of the population. They, in turn, form effective demand and savings, taxes on the income of the population replenish budget revenues, etc. Both that, and another, and the third is a necessary condition of maintenance of high and steady rates of development of economy. However, is growth, and not concern for the welfare of the population, the highest goal for which the government works?

Secondly why only an increase in the standard of living, and not primarily an increase in the population and life expectancy?

A person does not live to produce more goods, but increases their volume and variety in order to live better. If the population dies out, then not only doubling, there may be no one to carry out simple reproduction.

Therefore, it is necessary to put a person at the forefront and look at him as an end, and not just as a means of economic growth.

To live, a person must create, produce. If production or its result is a product, profit, etc. - is absolutized, a person is reduced from the image and likeness of God to the level of a living tool of labor or a living machine. In society, such a transformation is the wider and deeper, the more the use of human labor power is carried out not by its carrier, but by another person or social institution. What happened under the slave system, feudalism, socialism of the 20th century and is happening under capitalism.

Questions are natural: is the development of the economy really so dynamic, are incomes growing so fast that the country does not have time to spend them, is the public sector really so well financed that the incoming revenues turn out to be excessive in terms of the expediency of increasing spending?

The absolute and relative values ​​of the budget deficit or surplus reflect the quality of work on the implementation of the budget balance principle established by the Budget Code, i.e. equality of incomes and expenses, covering planned expenses with revenues mobilized to the budget.

An effective budgetary policy of the state is impossible without the rapid growth of socially and technologically oriented public spending, thanks to which the state is able to give the necessary direction to the entire industrial policy, to change the structure of production, taking into account the realities of international competition and their own needs. An active structural policy of the state may require the planning of budget deficits. The most benign sources of covering the deficit are envisaged, primary incomes, which are traditionally less efficient, are redistributed, and the institution of public internal debt is used.

What's new in budget policy in the transition from a deficit budget to a surplus?

Firstly, now a surplus is formed, but still with a primary deficit. External loans are increasingly replacing internal loans, and the latter become not very short-term, like GKOs, but long-term (at the beginning of 2004, bonds with a maturity of 5 to 30 years amounted to 455.8 billion rubles out of 682 billion rubles of the total domestic debt).

The main directions of development of the Russian economy in the 21st century .

PLAN

Introduction 3

5

5

10

13

13

18

Conclusion 31

33

Introduction

In the last quarter of the 20th century, humanity entered a new stage of its development - the stage of building a post-industrial society, which is the result of the socio-economic revolution taking place in the modern world. It is known that each socio-economic revolution is based on its own specific technologies, production and technological systems and production relations. For a post-industrial society, this role is primarily played by information technologies and computerized systems, high production technologies, which are the result of new physical-technical and chemical-biological principles, and innovative technologies based on them, innovative systems and innovative organization of various spheres of human activity. Its end result, in our deep conviction, should be the creation of a new form of economic organization -innovative economy . An analysis of the results of the study of domestic and foreign scientists on this issue convinced us that the creation of an innovative economy is a strategic direction for the development of our country in the first half of the 21st century. This circumstance served as the main motive for choosing the topic of the course research.

Basicpurpose course work is an analysis of trends in the development of the Russian economy in the XXI century. The set goal necessitated the solution of a number of interrelated tasks:

    reveal the prerequisites for the current economic growth of the domestic economy;

    analyze the problems associated with economic growth;

    explore the prerequisites for the globalization of the Russian economy;

    to study the innovative direction of development of the Russian economy.

The subject of the research is the possible directions of development of the Russian economy in the 21st century.

The object of the study is the Russian economy.

The term paper consists of an introduction, main part and conclusion. In the introduction, the relevance of the topic of the course work is substantiated, the tasks, subject and object of the course research are determined. The main part is devoted to the study of the problem posed. In conclusion, the main results of the study are formulated.

Chapter 1 economic development Russia

1.1 Economic growth: from recovery patterns to structural reforms

Discussion of socio-economic problems modern Russia often conducted in isolation from the experience of other countries, and above all post-communist ones. One gets the impression that for researchers of Russian realities there is no experience of almost three dozen other countries that, having emerged from socialism, are solving problems similar to ours.

This remark fully applies to the discussion of the problems of economic growth, which began in Russia in 1999. Two concepts of explaining the nature of this growth dominate in Russian literature. The first relates it to the real depreciation of the ruble after the 1998 crisis and the favorable situation on the oil market. The second reason for the growth is the reforms carried out by the Russian government in the conditions of political stabilization that came after the 2000 elections. These reforms are certainly important for long-term sustainable growth as well. Indeed, for Russia, the oil market situation and the real exchange rate are the most important macroeconomic policy factors affecting growth. But the nature of the current growth is still different.

In the context of the experience of other countries, it is easy to see that GDP is currently growing throughout the post-Soviet space. Moreover, at the first stage, approximately in 1992-1994, there was no growth in any of them. In 1995, the first signs of economic growth appear in the Baltic countries (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia), as well as in states that were involved in military conflicts or were subject to blockade (for example, in Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan).

In 1996-1998 the first signs of economic growth began to be observed in other post-Soviet states, but they were extremely unstable and often followed by recession. However, since 1998 growth has been observed almost everywhere (see Table 1).

Table 1.

Growth rates of the physical volume of GDP in the post-Soviet states in 1996-2004

1996

1997

1998

2002

2003

2004

Azerbaijan

1,3%

5,8%

10,0%

7,4%

11,1%

9,9%

Armenia

5,9%

3,3%

7,3%

3,3%

5,9%

9,6%

Belarus

2,8%

11,4%

8,4%

3,4%

5,8%

4,1%

Georgia

11,4%

10,6%

2,9%

3,0%

2,0%

4,5%

Kazakhstan

0,5%

1,7%

1,9%

2,7%

9,8%

13,2%

Kyrgyzstan

7,1%

9,9%

2,1%

3,7%

5,4%

5,3%

Moldova

5,9%

1,6%

6,5%

3,4%

2,1%

6,1%

Russia

3,4%

0,9%

4,9%

5,4%

9,0%

5,0%

Tajikistan

16,7%

1,7%

5,3%

3,7%

8,3%

10,2%

Uzbekistan

1,7%

5,2%

4,4%

4,4%

3,8%

4,5%

Ukraine

10,0%

3,0%

1,9%

0,2%

5,9%

9,1%

Latvia

3,3%

8,6%

3,9%

1,1%

6,6%

6,5%

Lithuania

4,7%

7,3%

5,1%

3,9%

3,9%

4,0%

Estonia

4,0%

10,4%

5,0%

0,7%

6,9%

4,5%

Source: Statistical Yearbook. Interstate Statistical Committee of the CIS. Moscow, 2005

Thus, the presence of growth is not directly related either to the political regime (it differs significantly in the listed countries), or to the implementation of reforms reminiscent of the Russian reforms of 2000-2001, or to oil prices (among the countries mentioned, there are both net exporters, and net importers of oil and oil products). In addition, if we trace the dynamics of the real exchange rate of national currencies in 1995–2004, we can see that in some states the real exchange rate has fallen significantly, while in others it has strengthened (see Table 2).

Table 2.

Real exchange rate national currency to the US dollar in post-Soviet states (according to CPI), 1995=100

1996

1997

1998

2002

2003

2004

Azerbaijan

126%

135%

131%

104%

99%

93%

Armenia

107%

104%

106%

104%

95%

93%

Belarus

110%

89%

44%

56%

39%

46%

Georgia

130%

134%

99%

107%

105%

103%

Kazakhstan

118%

131%

125%

80%

84%

85%

Kyrgyzstan

86%

100%

64%

55%

60%

63%

Moldova

113%

120%

70%

72%

86%

87%

Russia

120%

125%

45%

63%

71%

78%

Ukraine

166%

187%

113%

89%

113%

134%

Latvia

110%

111%

118%

116%

110%

104%

Lithuania

121%

129%

133%

131%

128%

126%

Estonia

110%

103%

118%

102%

95%

93%

Source: Calculations based on data from International Financial Statistics 2005. IMF, 2005.

Thus, each of the post-Soviet states has its own characteristics, but all of them manifest themselves exclusively against the backdrop of economic growth. This suggests that the sources of this growth, as well as the previous decline in economic activity, must be sought in other processes.

First of all, let's try to analyze what caused the decline in production in 1992-1994, which then gave way to economic growth.

The phenomenon of post-socialist recession has been studied quite well, and the main factors that determine its deployment are clear. It is worth paying attention to the nature of the socialist gross domestic product. The traditional concept of GDP used in a market economy is not applicable to a meaningful analysis of socialist economies. The correct use of the concept of GDP imposes well-known limitations, which primarily include: the presence of a market economy, in which the share of the state (budget) is relatively small and there is democratic control over the formation of public spending. From this follows the fundamental principle used in calculating GDP: if people pay for certain goods and services, then this means that they (goods and services) are of value to them. The latter is a necessary condition for the inclusion of these products in the welfare calculation.

Obviously, the situation described above does not correspond to the realities of a socialist economy, where production and distribution of products are tightly regulated, there is no market, as well as democratic control over public spending. In such a situation, a significant amount economic activity is not a contribution to wealth growth, which in many cases turns GDP growth into a statistical illusion. In relation to socialism, the concept of GDP is extremely conditional, because there are not always basic prerequisites that would allow one or another economic activity to be considered meaningful, focused on real needs. In other words, the needs and motives of economic activity in the socialist and market economies are qualitatively incomparable - what is meaningful in the first may turn out to be completely meaningless in the second, which sharply limits the possibility of comparing GDP expressed in value units (money). When the socialist system collapses, these qualitative differences come to the surface: it turns out that a significant part of economic activity is the one for which no one will ever pay in a market and democracy, either as a consumer or as a taxpayer.

That is why the process of post-socialist transformation primarily consists in the gradual redistribution of resources from those types of activities and enterprises that cannot function under market conditions to those types of activities that are in demand under market conditions. At the first stage, the volume of resources released always exceeds the volume of their use in new industries, which predetermines the decline. Then the economy passes through the "inflection point" - when the volume of resources involved in production becomes greater than the volume released from previously employed in inefficient industries. This is the nature of post-socialist transition and growth.

Then there is the problem of modernization associated with the collapse of the old economic system and the time needed to make it work. market institutions. This is the second important factor that determines the course of the post-socialist recession. After market institutions have emerged and begun to function, the post-socialist recovery begins.

The main factors that determine the duration and depth of the post-socialist recession are:

a) the scale of the sector of the economy, the products and services of which are not in demand by the market;

b) the scale of the use of market instruments under socialism;

c) the presence in the social memory of the population of information about pre-socialist market institutions.

Based on this, one can understand, for example, why in Eastern Europe and the Baltic countries, which lived under socialism for two generations, the recession lasted less than in most post-Soviet space where three generations lived under socialism.

1.2 Analysis of the problems of recovery economic growth in Russia

It is obvious that the modern recovery growth in Russia differs significantly from the recovery growth after the civil war and revolution.

First, the level of decline in production in 1991-1998. was significantly lower than during the revolution and civil war. Therefore, the recovery rates are now also lower.

Secondly, the Russian economy of the NEP period was generally a market economy, like the Russian economy of 1913. The economic structures that were being formed at that time, with all their differences (a significantly smaller share of foreign trade in GDP, less marketability of agriculture, a greater role public sector etc.) resembled the structure of the Russian economy in 1913 to a greater extent than the structure of the market-based economy of modern Russia resembles the structure of the socialist economy of the RSFSR in 1990.

But a number of processes that were characteristic of the recovery growth of the NEP period are also manifesting themselves in today's Russia. The first characteristic feature of recovery growth is its unexpectedness. V. Groman at one time drew attention to the fact that no one in the State Planning Commission expected the rate of recovery of industry that was ensured after the stabilization of economic ties and financial stabilization in the 1923/24 financial year. Gosplan proceeded from the premise that without large-scale capital investments it would be possible to bring the volume of industrial production by 1927/28 to only 50% of the pre-war level. In reality, by 1927/28, industrial production almost reached the level of 1913.

A similar situation is observed in our time. Russian government predicted for 2000 from a 2.2% fall to 0.2% GDP growth, the IMF predicted growth of 1.5%, while real growth was 9%. (Note that GDP growth in Ukraine in 2001 was 9%, while the IMF forecast was 3.5%.)

The reasons for errors in forecasts are understandable and are closely related to the very nature of recovery growth. Since the GDP forecasting methods used are based on the extrapolation of the trends of the previous period, the predictive dynamics of production factors and the economic situation, it is easy to understand that all of them are not very suitable for predicting a surge in economic activity due to the stabilization of economic ties.

Then we have to deal with the second surprise, but already unpleasant. It turns out that regenerative growth by its nature is fading. The mechanics of this process is understandable: recovery growth is ensured by the use of already created capacities and a trained skilled workforce. It takes place with relatively little capital investment, but its resources are quickly depleted.

So, in the period 1998-2004. the number of people employed in the Russian economy increased by 8.9 million people (from 58.4 to 67.3 million). The shortage of skilled labor found expression in the rapid growth of the real wages. During 2000-2004 real wages increased by 1.7 times. A similar trend is also observed in other CIS countries (see Table 3).

Table 3

Growth rates of real wages in the CIS countries in 1996-2004

1996

1997

1998

2002

2003

2004

Azerbaijan

19,0%

53,0%

20,0%

20,0%

18,0%

16,0%

Armenia

13,0%

26,0%

22,0%

11,0%

13,0%

5,0%

Belarus

5,0%

14,0%

18,0%

7,0%

12,0%

30,0%

Georgia

53,0%

37,0%

25,0%

2,0%

3,0%

22,0%

Kazakhstan

2,0%

5,0%

4,0%

7,0%

12,0%

13,0%

Kyrgyzstan

1,0%

12,0%

12,0%

8,0%

2,0%

11,0%

Moldova

5,0%

5,0%

5,0%

13,0%

2,0%

15,0%

Russia

6,0%

5,0%

13,0%

22,0%

21,0%

20,0%

Tajikistan

14,0%

2,0%

29,0%

0,3%

8,0%

11,0%

Ukraine

5,0%

2,0%

3,0%

6,0%

1,0%

21,0%

Source: Statistical Yearbook. Interstate Statistical Committee of the CIS. Moscow, 2005

V. Groman, in his works dating back to the 1920s, also pointed to the outstripping growth of real wages as a characteristic element of the recovery processes compared to labor productivity.

Market surveys conducted by the IET show a sharp change in the balance of assessments of the sufficiency of production capacities to meet expected demand in the period 1998-2004. Estimates of the need for labor force are also undergoing a change in connection with the expected demand: the lack of equipment and qualified personnel is increasingly regarded as a serious obstacle to the growth of production.

A drop in growth rates after reaching peak levels and involving the most available resources into the economic circulation almost inevitably gives rise to economic and political debates about the reasons for the fading growth rates and ways to increase them. If the initially extremely high growth rates at the beginning of the recovery period are perceived by both the authorities and the expert community as pleasant surprise, then both the political elite and society get used to focusing on these abnormally high growth rates as a guideline for policy development, as a starting point in assessing the policy being pursued.

Chapter 2. Study of the main directions of development of the Russian economy in the 21st century

2.1 Prerequisites for the globalization of the Russian economy

Globalization is the growth in the volume and diversity of world economic relations, accompanied by increased economic dependence of the countries of the world, has now become the main trend in the development of the world economy. It manifests itself primarily in the growth of international trade volumes, financial and investment flows ahead of material production.

The globalization of the world economy is generated by the action of a number of factors associated with qualitative changes in material production and infrastructure.

Market modernization is the transition of the economy to a new technological basis and the simultaneous formation of an adequate management mechanism. The world economy knows 2 types of modernization:pioneer Andcatching up .

Pioneer is characteristic of the world's leading technological and economic progress. Catching up modernization is typical for countries that are in the second "echelon" of development. The main difference between such modernization and the pioneering one is that it is based on the development of technologies and economic mechanisms that have already been created in the leading countries.

Distinctive features:

    Delay in development;

    Lack of internal resources due to the backlog of national production. Forced use of non-market methods to assert their positions in the world economy.

    The establishment of a strong national economy that takes control of the course of economic modernization, etc.

Modern production forces require the mobilization of ever larger accumulations, monopolization economic resources large economic entities and the state. Thus, "catching up" modernization contains high risk nationalization of the economy, the suppression of democracy and a rollback in reforms.

Features of the "catching up" development of the domestic economy:

1. The economic development of Russia for almost two centuries has a common nature, goals and content with the development of other countries. The Soviet economic system became a powerful mechanism for accumulating the country's material capital and for separating labor from property. Her logistical component was adequate to the material and technical basis of early and mature industrialism, and the beginning of its crisis in the late 60s. coincides with the transition of the world economy to late industrialism.

2. Under the influence of internal contradictions and ongoing reforms, the Soviet economic system itself developed in the direction of market economic relations. The economic system that had developed by the beginning of the 80s. cannot be unequivocally interpreted as non-market, although it differs significantly from the system of market relations in developed countries. By the beginning of the fifth wave of reforms, the result of economic modernization in the USSR was the formation of a hybrid type of market - a specific economic system, which was based on the distortion of the market mechanisms of the "bureaucratic market" (a system of horizontal and vertical trading in the process of adopting and fulfilling planned targets). The logic of economic development undermined material and technical base of the Soviet economic system and led to the modernization of the main features of its economic mechanism in the direction of moving the center of acceptance economic decisions for more low levels hierarchy of centralized management (to ministries, departments).

Waves of Russian reforms fall on the upward phase of the “long wave” of N.D. Kondratiev. According to his calculations, the rise of "long waves" falls on the periods 1788-1814 (I wave), 1849-1873 (II wave), 1896-1920 (Witte-Stolypin's reforms). According to modern calculations, the next rise of the “long wave” occurred in 1952-1974 (Khrushchev-Kosygin reforms), and in the late 80s and early 90s, the rise of the 5th wave, which corresponds to the modern market reforms of the Russian economy. This is proof that the overall process of market modernization of the Russian economy over the past 200 years is quite consistent with the logic of world economic development. In the “wavelength” rise stage, Russia's lag behind the leading countries of economic progress intensified, which forced the authorities to go for reforms “from above”.

For the country, the foreign policy factor has always been the prevailing factor in choosing a course for the creation of an advanced industry.

The specifics of Russian industrialization has always been that the funds for its implementation were withdrawn from existing production, and not created in the course of natural capital accumulation. In Russia, there has always been a change in the areas of investment - funds were directed mainly to the military and related industries. In addition, the withdrawn funds could not be enough for the development of all modes in all sectors of the economy. Therefore, the system of economic development in Russia has long been fragmented.

4. Russia's breakthroughs on the path of market modernization inevitably ended with rollbacks of reforms falling on the decline in the "long wave". Common to the phases of counter-reforms in the economic sphere was the introduction of restrictions on the development of market relations, the curbing of freedom of management while increasing state intervention in economic life.

With “catching up” development, 2 strategies are mainly used: import-substituting and export-oriented.

The first puts forward as a priority the creation of diversified industrial complexes, designed to saturate the domestic market and only then expand their exports.

The second puts international industrial cooperation at the forefront. The condition for Russia's successful advance along the path of economic progress is, first of all, the concentration of its own efforts and resources on the formation of an efficient, technologically advanced and competitive market economy. In the 21st century, Russia will be forced to adhere mainly to an import-substituting strategy.

At the same time, the country cannot refuse to use the advantages of export-oriented development. Foreign economic relations, including foreign trade, are able to activate their own potential.

Russia's exports are dominated by goods characterized by low price elasticity, price volatility, a long-term downward trend in prices, and a rather slow expansion of demand. In addition, the market for some goods is not free. The oil market is controlled by OPEC, the ferrous metals market is regulated by the largest Western countries, the sale of natural gas is limited by the presence and conductivity of the pipeline network.

The share in the Russian export of machinery and equipment is negligible and is 5 times lower than in the export of an "average" highly developed Western country.

Food products and agricultural raw materials take too much place in Russia's imports. At given state sphere material production Russia has become heavily dependent on foreign supplies.

In geographic structure foreign trade the tendency to weaken the role of the CIS countries persists. The market capacity and solvency of CIS partners are small, and their ability to participate in industrial cooperation, especially when it comes to creating high-tech products, is currently limited.

Composition of the main trade partners of Russia in 2004 did not change. The top ten includes Germany, USA, Ukraine, Belarus, Italy, China, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Great Britain, Finland.

The Russian economy has a number of advantages:

1. Provision of the country with the main types of mineral resources. The country feels the need to import from outside a relatively small range of raw materials: manganese, chromium, titanium, lead, mercury and some others.

2. Relative cheapness of some factors of production (there are significant production assets and qualified cheap work force). The inclusion of Russian entrepreneurs in international cooperation could be carried out by manufacturing units, parts and components on orders from foreign manufacturers of finished products.

3. Unique advanced technologies in a number of industry sectors (aerospace and nuclear industry, shipbuilding, production of laser technology and computer science, cartography and geodesy, development software conducting geological surveys).

In my opinion, in order to realize these advantages and obtain an effect, the following points should be taken into account in the ongoing reforms:

- settling finances abroad by non-return of export earnings, non-equivalent barter, payment for fictitious imported goods and services, smuggling. It is necessary to tighten state control over these operations.

- imperfection and incompleteness legislative framework countries. For example, in Russia there are no legislative or other legal acts on the issue of competitiveness. Therefore, it is necessary to create a capable interdepartmental commission on competitiveness.

- the competitive entry of our products to the foreign market will require the revival and intensification of scientific and industrial cooperation between enterprises and foreign countries. It is necessary to strengthen the commercialization of the scientific results of our country.

In the perspective of the world economy, it is possible to single out 3 poles of economic power:

    European

    american

    East Asian.

Russia can become:

    participant in 1 or 2 superblocks at once (European and East Asian)

    leader of an independent integration association of the CIS

    independent outsider.

2.2 Innovative economy as a strategic direction of Russia's development in the 21st century

In solving the problems of the country's exit from the crisis, ensuring the dynamically sustainable development of the economy, the primary role belongs to innovations, innovative activities that can ensure the continuous renewal of the technical and technological base of production, the development and production of new competitive products, and effective penetration into the world markets for goods and services. This requires reforming all spheres of public life, and above all, the economy.

What is meant by innovation economy? Conducted analysis current trends development of the economies of the leading Western countries say that the innovation economy is the economy of society based on knowledge, innovation, on the benevolent perception of new ideas, new machines, systems and technologies, on the readiness for their practical implementation in various fields human activity. It highlights the special role of knowledge and innovation, primarily scientific knowledge. In an innovative economy, under the influence of scientific and technological knowledge, the traditional spheres of material production are transformed and radically change their technological basis, because production that is not based on new knowledge and innovations is not viable in an innovative economy.

Information technologies, computerized systems and high production technologies are the basic systems of the innovation economy. In their development, they radically transform all means of obtaining, processing, transmitting and producing information, radically technologize intellectual activity (for example, automation of design and technological preparation of production, automated control over the course of production, automation of financial and accounting reporting and organizational and administrative activities, multilingual automated translation, diagnostics and pattern recognition, etc.).

What are the main features of an innovative economy?

It seems to us that the economy of a society is innovative if the society:

    any individual, group of persons, enterprises anywhere in the country and at any time can receive any necessary information about new or known knowledge, innovations (new technologies, materials, machines, organization and management of production, etc.), innovative activities, innovative processes;

    modern information technologies and computerized systems are produced, formed and available to any individual, group of persons and organizations, ensuring the implementation of the previous paragraph;

    there are developed infrastructures that ensure the creation of national information resources in the amount necessary to support the constantly accelerating scientific and technological progress and innovative development, and society is able to produce all the necessary multifaceted information to ensure dynamically sustainable socio-economic development of society and, above all, scientific information;

    there is a process of accelerated automation and computerization of all spheres and branches of production and management; radical changes are being made social structures, which result in the expansion and activation of innovative activity in various fields of human activity;

    welcome new ideas, knowledge and technologies, are ready to create and introduce into wide practice at any time necessary innovations for various functional purposes;

    there are developed innovative infrastructures that are able to quickly and flexibly implement the innovations needed at a given time, based on high production technologies, and deploy innovative activities; it must be universal, competitively carrying out the creation of any innovations and the development of any industries;

    there is a well-established flexible system of advanced training and retraining of professionals in the field of innovation and innovation, effectively implementing comprehensive projects for the restoration and development of domestic industries and territories.

The basic concepts of the innovation economy are innovation, innovation activity, innovation infrastructure. What are these concepts, what is their content and scope? Let's take a brief look at these concepts, because the tactics and strategy of forming an effective innovative economy in the country largely depend on their correct understanding.

Innovation, innovation activity, innovation processes are concepts that currently have the most diverse and broad interpretations. The development and extension of these concepts to processes related to everything new, including new ideas and inventions, new scientific achievements, new knowledge and technologies, new results of fundamental and exploratory research work, etc., are generated by the everyday idea and confusion of two concepts : innovative and new. A broad interpretation of innovation activity as new covers everything that is understood as scientific and technological progress, mixes scientific and innovative priorities, gives rise to false ideas about the similarity of requirements for infrastructures that provide scientific or innovative development. To substantiate this thesis, we will proceed from the following understanding of scientific and technological progress: it is advisable to conditionally divide scientific and technological progress into two main interrelated and complementary components - a component of scientific and technological achievements and a component of industrial and technological achievements.

In the first case, the results of scientific and technological progress are scientific achievements - new knowledge, new scientific and technical ideas, discoveries and inventions, new technologies based on fundamentally new physical, chemical and biological principles. In the second case, the results of scientific and technological progress are production and technical achievements - innovations, the creation of which involves:

    professional purposeful development and bringing the results of scientific and technological achievements to the creation of new technologies, new systems, machines, equipment, new methods of organizing and planning production, etc.;

    practical implementation of the created results of production and technical achievements to the consumer either through the market or through the “order-execution” mechanism;

    ensuring the effective use and operation of the created innovative product;

    research and obtaining new scientific and technical achievements (if they are not available) necessary for the creation and implementation of innovations demanded by the market or the customer (we will call them innovatively directed scientific and technical achievements).

From the foregoing, we conclude that innovation activity should be understood as the activity of a team of people aimed at the implementation in public practice on a turnkey basis of production and technical achievements - innovations, the application of existing progressive technologies, systems, machines and equipment based on the use and implementation of scientific and technical achievements of domestic and world science and technology. It should ensure the elimination of the gap between the existing volume and the level of already obtained and tested scientific and technological achievements and their application in developing (created) enterprises.

It follows that the saturation of innovation activity is the most important condition for the formation of an effective innovation economy.

The effectiveness of innovation activities is largely determined by the innovation infrastructure. Therefore, the innovation infrastructure is the basic component of the innovation economy, the innovation potential of society. What is the innovation infrastructure, why is it the basic component, the foundation of the innovation economy?

The innovation infrastructure is the main instrument and mechanism of the innovation economy; it, as an “Archimedean lever and fulcrum”, is capable of raising the country's economy to a very high level. Based on this understanding, we see the innovation infrastructure as a set of interrelated, complementary production and technical systems, organizations, firms and relevant organizational and management systems that are necessary and sufficient for the effective implementation of innovative activities and the implementation of innovations. The innovation infrastructure predetermines the pace (speed) of the development of the country's economy and the growth of the well-being of its population. The experience of the developed countries of the world confirms that in the conditions of global competition in the world market, the one who has a developed infrastructure for the creation and implementation of innovations, who owns the most effective mechanism for innovation, inevitably wins. Therefore, for the effective functioning of the country's innovation economy, the innovation infrastructure must be functionally complete.

What does it mean? And this means that it should have a set of such properties that should contribute to the full implementation of engineering technologies for the creation and implementation of innovations across regions and the country as a whole. It is our deep conviction that the mentioned collection should contain a set of the following properties:

    distribution over all regions in the form of innovation and technology centers or engineering firms that can locally solve the problems of a functionally complete innovation cycle with the delivery of an innovation object on a turnkey basis;

    versatility, which makes it possible to competitively ensure the implementation of a turnkey innovative project in any area of ​​the manufacturing or service sectors of the economy;

    professionalism, which is based on conscientious and high-quality service to the customer or consumer;

    constructiveness, which is ensured by focusing on the final result. The development of an innovative project should be accompanied by a continuous analysis of the final results. The availability of reliable feedback on the achieved final results allows us to develop constructive priorities directly in the process of development of innovative activity and thereby provide a closed system of innovation management according to the scheme: innovations - investments - monitoring of final results - investments, etc.;

    high level of scientific and technical potential;

    staffing, first of all, by the leaders of innovative projects and the possibility of constant renewal and improvement of the personnel of the innovation infrastructure;

    financial security (presence working capital);

    a high level of tools that accelerate the receipt of the final result;

    flexibility that ensures the adaptation of the innovation infrastructure to changes in market requirements and external conditions.

As the results of our studies, as well as the experience of the developed countries of the world, show, the main core of the innovation infrastructure, the most adequate mechanism for the implementation of scientific and technical innovations - innovations, is the infrastructure of innovative engineering centers (firms, enterprises), which should accumulate the best domestic and foreign knowledge and technology and act for the customer as a system integrator and guarantor of the successful implementation of an innovative project and ensure coverage of the full innovation cycle: from studying the market situation for the final innovative product, a feasibility study of an innovative project and its development to a complete supply of equipment, its system integration, key” with staffing and subsequent service.

Let us dwell on the disclosure of the content of some of the properties of the innovation infrastructure listed above. Research and monitoring of market needs, the need for constant and prompt updating of manufactured innovative products require the introduction of flexible automation to be of paramount importance in the innovative economy. Comprehensive flexible automation with wide application information technologies and computerized systems is the core of the innovation economy. Therefore, the foundation of all structural transformations of the regional economy, the basis of the regional innovation infrastructure should be based on automated high tech and computerized systems with an end-to-end “paperless” cycle: “design - production - control - implementation”. It follows that the most important regional problem of the formation and development of an innovative economy is the solution of scientific, methodological, organizational and technological issues related to the development, creation and development of automated integrated design and production systems that automatically carry out an end-to-end “paperless” cycle and combine in one system of innovatively directed research, development work, processes of technological preparation and production planning, aimed, ultimately, at the creation of innovative products. Moreover, in such systems, three main stages characteristic of the creation of a new knowledge-intensive system should be automated in an end-to-end chain: designing innovations; production and assembly of the prototype of a new science-intensive system; commissioning and testing of a new science-intensive system.

An important problem that requires its actual solution in the conditions of an innovative economy is the advanced creation of an effective mechanism in the regions information support innovative activity. The effectiveness of this mechanism largely depends on the quality of continuous socio-economic monitoring of the regions. Such monitoring, in our opinion, should cover the observation, analysis, assessment and forecast of the economic, social, environmental, scientific and innovative situation in the region in order to prepare management decisions and recommendations aimed at improving and developing innovative activity. Monitoring of both innovation processes and more common processes structural transformation of the economy in the region aims the regions at effective management these processes. Therefore, one of the main functions in the field of information support of the innovative economy should be the function of automated monitoring of structural transformations in the region. In this regard, it seems appropriate to create automated centers for innovation and information support (ARCI) in the regions to constantly update and operate innovative data and knowledge banks. At the same time, it is necessary to proceed from the following provision: the subjects of innovation activity need, first of all, information that would contain appropriately ordered technical and economic, market and commercial, statistical information, information about the characteristics of industrial products, technologies, machinery and equipment, materials, types of services, etc. And here an important role belongs to the marketing of innovations and innovative activities at the enterprises of the region as an integral part of the information support of innovative ergonomics. Innovative marketing, representing a set of measures to study all issues related to the process of implementing innovative products of enterprises, namely: the study of the consumer and the study of the motives of his behavior in the market; research of an innovative product and channels for its implementation; studying competitors and determining the competitiveness of their innovative product; studying the "niche" of the market, in which the enterprise has the best opportunities to realize its advantages - should become one of the leading structures of the ARTI.

The creation of such a fundamentally new information structure at the regional level of industries and enterprises - an automated integrated information system focused on the integrated information support of the innovative economy, will contribute to the successful solution of the most important task of the innovative economy of the state: ensuring the competitiveness of enterprises, industries, regions and the country as a whole.

The formation of an innovative economy largely depends on the creation of an effective mechanism for managing the practical implementation of complex innovative projects in the regions. And here without state support innovative processes are indispensable. The need for financial and legal support for science and innovation, the intensification of innovation, the transition to new forms of solving economic, environmental and social problems regions characteristic of the innovation economy, urgently require regional governments to develop a responsible policy in relation to the management and development of innovation activities in the region, to intensify interaction on this issue between regional governments and federal governments. main form Such interaction, in our opinion, should be scientific and technical programs: state, funded from the federal budget, when priority economic problems are solved on the basis of the scientific and innovative potential of the regions, and regional programs with shared funding from the state and the region.

For the successful implementation of the regional innovation policy on the formation of an innovation economy, a set of scientific, organizational and technical measures should be carried out, the main of which, according to the author, are the following.

1. Development of a concept for the development of innovation activity and innovation infrastructure in the region with the definition of long-term strategic goals and means of achieving them in the framework of the formation of an innovative economy.

2. Development of a program for the innovative development of the region, which should be an address document indicating, in terms of resources, performers and terms, a set of measures aimed at achieving the goals of the innovative development of the region.

3. Inclusion of the main provisions of the program of innovative development of the region in the program of its socio-economic development.

4. Organization of practical activities of local and regional government on the implementation and adoption of relevant regulatory acts of regional significance, as well as on the implementation by them of the organizational and information support of this program.

We consider it necessary to emphasize the following provision. In the context of the development of innovative activity (in a society with an innovative economy), the attitude towards the main productive force of society - a person of highly intellectual, highly productive labor - should completely change. The role of highly qualified specialists in the innovation economy is very important and will constantly grow. Therefore, in our deep conviction, the training of personnel capable of effectively managing innovation processes, developing and implementing innovative projects is a priority regional and federal problem. In this regard, it should be emphasized that the objective need for innovative development, the formation of an innovative economy requires the development of a new concept of training. According to the author, it should be based on the following principles:

    formation, development and self-realization of a creative personality;

    constant focus on generating promising scientific and technical innovations and finding ways and methods for their practical implementation in innovation;

    orientation towards the training of highly qualified and highly intelligent specialists, system managers of innovation activity;

    consideration of education and training of personnel as an integral part of the production process, and the costs of training personnel - not as costs for employees, but as long term investment necessary for the prosperity of enterprises, industries and regions;

    training in the management of social and psychological aspects of the process of creating high-tech innovations, the use of the creative potential of the team, the accelerated large-scale implementation of innovative developments in practice;

    creation of a system of continuous training and advanced training of personnel, integrated into the system of production of innovative products;

    cooperation of universities and other universities of the region with the leading enterprises of the region implementing innovative projects, and their joint activities in the field of curriculum development, publication of textbooks and monographs on innovative technologies, systems of machines and equipment, in the training of highly qualified specialists in new professions and promising scientific and innovative areas.

Innovative practice (the production of knowledge-intensive innovative services in the broad sense) requires working capital. It is almost impossible to get this working capital (for example, a loan) in modern conditions without special support measures. Therefore, at present, the domestic production of innovative services, deprived of working capital, loses the best (knowledge-intensive) projects in the country to foreign firms using a balanced foreign market to obtain the required working capital. Our research, as well as our analysis of advanced domestic and foreign experience, show that in an innovative economy, in order to eliminate the mentioned shortcoming, it is necessary to unite innovative and investment function. Such an association will increase the interest of performers in the successful implementation of all stages of a single innovation and investment cycle, which can be achieved by focusing all performers on the final result: the responsible delivery of innovative products on a turnkey basis and participation in the implementation and maintenance of created innovative goods and services.

An effective mechanism for implementing a single innovation-investment cycle is innovation-engineering-investment centers (firms, enterprises). Such IIS centers will be able to ensure the efficient production of knowledge-intensive innovation and investment services already at the expense of their own working capital with subsequent (based on the results obtained) investments in new projects, etc. It follows from the foregoing that the activation of the formation of an innovative economy is associated with accelerated creation of domestic innovation-engineering-investment network infrastructure distributed across all regions.

Conclusion

So, summing up the presentation of our vision of the formation and development of the economy in our country in the 21st century, we will try to give short answers to the following three questions:

1. What is the strategic goal of the formation and development of the economy in Russia in the near future?

2. What resource to ensure the achievement of the strategic goal?

3. How to ensure the achievement of the strategic goal by the intended resource?

The strategic goal of economic development in our country for the coming years should be integrated development domestic industries and territories to the level of their competitiveness in the world.

Higher education should become the main resource for achieving this goal. System higher education, providing the main component of development - personnel, should be urgently supplemented with an innovative component. The system of higher education should and can perform the functions of a system coordinator for the restoration and development of enterprises and territories of the country.

To ensure the effective achievement of the strategic goal, the infrastructure of higher education in Russia should be supplemented with innovative and investment structures (centers, complexes, companies, institutions ...) so that universities form educational, scientific and innovative complexes. It is the system of higher education that is the most promising for building on its basis the Russian innovation and investment network, which should play the role of a bridge connecting science and production in all regions and industries. This is explained the following properties domestic higher education: the distribution of higher education in all regions; high scientific and technical potential of higher education; the universality of the system of higher education, its intersectoral nature: scientific schools of Russian universities cover all areas of the country's economy; interaction of the higher school through its graduates with all regional and industry structures; a relatively high level of the information support system of higher education, including global and local computing information networks connected in single system; high public support for higher education; flexibility of the higher education system.

The main advantage of the proposed approach is that through such a development of the higher education system, it is possible to effectively integrate the results of higher education, academic and industrial science in Russia, as well as the advanced results of science of the world community in the creation, implementation of innovative projects and the development of innovative activities, which is a prerequisite for creating country of an effective innovative economy.

List of used literature

    XXI Century. Formation legal framework economic activities of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation / A. Gorodilov et al. — Kaliningrad: Yantar. skaz, 2002. - 200 p.

    Alekseev A.I., Mironenko N.S. Territorial organization and integration into the world economy of Russia at the turn of the century // Izv. RAN. Ser. Geography. - 2000. - N 6. - S.18-27.

    Anti-crisis economy of Russia: the beginning of the millennium. - St. Petersburg: Faces of Russia, 2000. - 446 p.

    Valovoy D. Alternatives to the economic development of Russia in the 21st century. / Recorded by V.Semenov // Probl. theory and practice of management. - 1999. - N 6. - P.44-47

    Vladimirsky E.A. The Russian economy in the twentieth century (political and economic aspect): Proc. allowance / SPbGASU. - SPb., 2000. - 206 p.

    Quality is a strategy for the 21st century: Mater. Vseros. scientific-practical. conf., 27-28 Feb. 2001 - Saransk: Publishing House of Mordov. un-ta, 2001. - 188 p.

    Kudrov V. The place of Russia in the world economy at the beginning of the XXI century // World economy and international relationship. - 2000. - N 5. - S.75-83.

    Obolensky V.P. Russia's foreign economic policy on the threshold of a new century // Mirov. economics and international relationship. - 2000. - N 2. - C.51-61.

    Path to the 21st century: Strategic problems and prospects of the Russian economy. - M.: Economics, 1999. - 793 p. — (Systemic problems of Russia).

    Sokolova O.Yu. Trends in the interaction of business entities in Russia in the XXI century / Sarat. state social-econ. un-t. - Saratov, 2002. - 228 p.

Description of the presentation on individual slides:

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Russian Federation Russia is the largest country in the world. Internationally, it is a great power. Russia plays a huge role in international relations. Russia is a multinational country. Russia is a Eurasian power. Russia is a country with rich history and culture.

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Russia's population Russia ranks 9th in the world in terms of population. Since 1992, Russia's population has been declining. But the demographic hole of the 1990s has been successfully overcome. Since 2010, the birth rate began to exceed the death rate. The largest people in terms of numbers is the Russian people. Population census: 2015 - 146 million people.

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Economy of Russia The economy of Russia is the fifth economy in the world (according to data for 2014) in terms of GDP. In 2014, the share of the Russian economy in the world economy was 3.3%. Russia is one of the leading countries in the world. Russia has a high-tech economy. Russia is among the five leading countries in the world. Russia - developed country. Comparison of the Russian economy and the economies of the leading countries of the world in 2014 (GDP):

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Russian economy 1989 1997 2014 1. USA 1. USA 1. China 2. USSR 2. Japan 2. USA 3. Japan 3. China 3. India 4. Germany 4. Germany 4. Japan 5. China 18. Russia 5. Russia The economy of the USSR from 1938 to 1991 ranked 2nd in the world after the USA. Before the collapse of the USSR in 1990, many records and the highest indicators in the economy were set. In the 1990s, after the transition of the Russian economy to liberal rails, the Russian industry began to rapidly collapse. This process reached its peak by 1998, when the industrial production index dropped to a level of 48% of the peak value of 1991. In the 2000s, the measures taken to protect and develop the domestic industry led to its rapid growth: by 2008, the industry won back most of the losses, the volume of production rose to a level of 85% of Soviet indicators. From 2008 to 2013, Russian industry grew by another 4%, to a level of 89% from 1991.

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Industry of Russia The industry of Russia is represented by many branches and enterprises. Russia is one of the main industrial powers of the world. Despite the fact that in the 1990s there was a serious decline in production, since 2000 the Russian industry has shown strong growth. Russia is one of the few countries in the world capable of producing virtually any type of manufactured goods.

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The structure of Russian industry Rosstat divides the entire industry of Russia into 3 categories: 24% - Mining. 65% - Manufacturing industries. 11% - Production/distribution of electricity, gas and water.

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Industry of Russia In 2013, the share of industry in Russia's GDP was 29%, and 19% of the total number of employees were employed in industry. In 2014, two important events for our industry took place at once: the exchange of sanctions and a strong depreciation of the ruble against world currencies. Another round of import substitution has begun, and at the same time, the Russian economy is being decoupled from dollar loans.

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Industry of Russia The most developed industries in Russia are the extraction and processing of hydrocarbons, metallurgy, chemical production, mechanical engineering, the production of various types of transport and food production. Hundreds of new plants are built every year in Russia. For example, in 2013, 450 new plants were put into operation in Russia. In 2014, 237 plants were put into operation in Russia, which is 1 facility in 1.5 days.

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High-tech products of Russia These products are produced by a wide range of Russian industries. In some industries, Russian products are the world's leading and most high-tech products. High-tech products of the Russian Federation: 1. Defense industry 2. Microelectronics 3. Nuclear industry 4. Medical equipment 5. Space industry 6. Robot building 7. Aviation industry 8. Engine building 9. Automotive industry 10. IT sector

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Mechanical engineering in Russia Russia ranks 11th in the world in terms of the number of motor Vehicle. Car production in Russia increased from 1.2 million cars per year in 2000 to 2.2 million cars in 2012. The largest automakers in Russia are AvtoVAZ ( cars), GAZ (small trucks and vans), KAMAZ (large trucks and dump trucks), LiAZ (buses).

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Mechanical Engineering in Russia Rostselmash is one of the world leaders in agricultural engineering. It accounts for 65% Russian market agricultural machinery and 17% of the world market for this machinery. The largest Russian enterprises of railway engineering: Tver Carriage Works, Uralvagonzavod, Carriage Building Company of Mordovia, Vagonmash, Kaliningrad Carriage Works, Torzhoksky Carriage Works.

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Shipbuilding in Russia Major centers Russian shipbuilding are St. Petersburg, Severodvinsk, Nizhny Novgorod, Kaliningrad region. There are 168 shipbuilding enterprises in Russia, 86 of them are state-owned. The world's largest submarine and icebreaker are designed and built at Russian shipyards. In Russia, a new ship is being laid every day.

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Aircraft industry in Russia Most of the aircraft manufacturing enterprises in Russia are united in the United Aircraft Corporation (UAC). In 2014, UAC delivered 161 aircraft. In 2014, Russia overtook the United States in the production of combat aircraft (more than 100 units were manufactured). In 2015, Russia produced more than 300 helicopters, reaching the level of the USSR in terms of this indicator.

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Russian space industry The Russian space industry is one of the most powerful in the world. Russia leads in manned space exploration and in orbital launches. Russia carries out more than 40% of all space launches in the world, and the Russian global navigation system GLONASS is one of the two global navigation systems in the world, along with the American GPS. Another important event was the construction of the Vostochny cosmodrome and the launch of the first rockets. Russia has 3 spaceports.

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Russian defense industry Enterprises of the Russian military-industrial complex (military-industrial complex) make up the world's second largest complex of defense industries, providing its products to the Russian army (the second most powerful in the world) and creating a solid foundation for Russia's security, as well as allowing the country to consistently occupy second place in arms exports in the world (27% of the world arms market in 2014).

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Russian defense industry The Russian military-industrial complex is one of the most important and most high-tech industrial sectors in Russia. Russia is the world technological leader in this industry. Important inventions in the field of armaments have been made in Russia since ancient times.

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Russian nuclear industry The Russian nuclear industry is the strongest in the world. Rosatom ranks first in the world in terms of the number of simultaneously constructed nuclear power plants and is the absolute leader in the uranium conversion and enrichment market. Russia possesses all known nuclear technologies, and Russia alone possesses some technologies.

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Robotics in Russia In 2014, Russia supplied the largest medical university in Japan with its robotic simulators for surgical operations. The Unicum artificial intelligence system developed in Russia was successfully tested in 2015. The created complex gives machines intellectual capabilities, which implies the complete exclusion of human intervention. Now they will be able to independently solve peaceful and combat missions, distributing roles within the group.

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Microelectronics in Russia Microelectronics in Russia has rich experience in creating microcircuits, microprocessors, computers and other devices. One of the largest manufacturers of microelectronics in Russia is the Mikron company. In 2014, the eight-core modern microprocessor Elbrus-8C was put into production in Russia. As of 2015, the Russian Research Institute of Molecular Electronics is in the top 5 leading microelectronic enterprises in Europe.

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Oil industry of Russia In terms of oil reserves, Russia ranks 7th in the world. The oil industry is developing in many regions of the Russian Federation. New oil fields are being discovered. Russia supplies oil to many countries of the world (without oil, the industry in these countries will stop). Russia exports enough oil to seriously influence world events.

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Gas industry Russia Russia ranks first in the world in terms of gas production and explored reserves and provides about 20% of its world production. The gas industry provides more than 50% of domestic energy consumption, about 15% of foreign exchange earnings from Russian exports and about 5% of tax revenues in budget system Russia. Gazprom is the world's largest gas producing company.

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Metallurgy of Russia In 2009, Russia ranked 4th in the world in terms of steel production, 3rd in the world in production of steel pipes, and 3rd in the world in export of steel products (rolled steel exports in 2007 amounted to about 27, 6 million tons). In terms of aluminum production, Russia ranks 2nd in the world (after China), its export is 1st; in production and export of nickel - 1st place in the world; in production (shipments) of rolled titanium - 2nd place.

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Housing construction in Russia Before the collapse of the USSR in 1987, a record was set for the number of new housing commissioned. In 2014, Russia for the first time surpassed the volume of housing commissioning in the RSFSR (81 million square meters). Now more housing is being built in Russia per year than in the RSFSR in best years. In addition to apartments, Russia is building a large number of private houses (dachas, cottages), which were built much less in the USSR.

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Housing construction in Russia The rate of housing commissioning is growing every year. The housing itself is also changing, it is becoming more comfortable. In 2014, more than 1 million apartments were put into operation in Russia. Russia has one of the highest share of the population living in own housing in the world, as a result of privatization in the 1990s and 2000s.

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Agriculture in Russia Agriculture in Russia is one of the most actively and successfully developing sectors of the Russian economy. Contrary to popular myths, agriculture in the country is not only extremely profitable and profitable, but also almost completely ensures Russia's food security, and also allows you to export significant amounts of agricultural products abroad.

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Agriculture in Russia Russia has 10% of all arable land in the world. More than 4/5 of arable land in Russia falls on the Central Volga region, the North Caucasus, the Urals and Western Siberia. Russia ranks 1st in the world in the production of rye, oats, barley, sugar beet, sunflower, buckwheat. In 2014, a record grain harvest since 1990 was harvested - more than 110 million tons.

The geostrategic position of Russia in the period after the collapse of the USSR allowed and encouraged the country's leadership to carry out further development states by reviving their power and achieving the goal of becoming one of the leading powers in the multipolar world, confidently overcoming the opposition of traditional and newly emerged competitors and gaining reliable and numerous allies. To what extent has Russia succeeded in solving the pressing problems of the first decade?

In one of his pre-election articles, Vladimir Putin writes: “Today, in terms of the main parameters of economic and social development, Russia has emerged from a deep recession ... we have reached and overcome the indicators of the standard of living of the most prosperous years of the USSR” (Putin V.V. “Russia is concentrating - challenges, to which we must answer).

Results of the first decade

This peppy conclusion, on the one hand, is pleasant, but on the other hand, it means that more than 20 years of ours have actually been lost. Over these decades, the rest of the world has gone far ahead, and we are glad that we managed to return to the level from which the fall began. Which is more - joy or sadness. And what do statistics and other authorities say about this? Let's look at tables 1 and 2.

Table 1

As you can see, the available opportunities were not implemented in the best way. Particularly depressing are the indicators that characterize the main wealth - the savings of the population and the quality of life, the growth of GDP is insignificant and the raw material structure of the economy is still archaic, which slows down its development and ability to counter the growing threats to the security of the country and each of its citizens.

table 2

Of course, the losses of the last decade of the last century, connected with the dishonest privatization of public property and the incompetent to criminal conversion of military production, which caused great harm in all spheres of society, were too heavy. But there was also no proper activity and creativity, especially on the part of those in whose hands the fragmented wealth of the country turned out to be. They responded sluggishly to the Russian president's call for a doubling of GDP within ten years, preferring not to invest in the real economy, but to export their income abroad. At the same time, the Treasury was skeptical of the call, forecasting lower GDP growth and diligently funneling colossal commodity export revenues into the Stabilization and successor funds. Real GDP growth often exceeded forecasts. By the end of the period, it slowed down, which was facilitated, firstly, by the withdrawal of very significant amounts from the economy into the “airbag” stored abroad, and secondly, by the global economic crisis.

“We need technology. It is short-sighted to hope that oil and gas will pull us out, - said Mikhail Eskindarov, rector of the Financial University under the Government of the Russian Federation. “And money that doesn’t work doesn’t do any good.” In 2008, state budget expenditures amounted to 7.57 trillion rubles, while in the Reserve Fund and the national welfare 7.6 trillion rubles lay idle. If they worked in the domestic economy, in its real sectors, then the doubling of GDP proposed by the President would have been achieved earlier, and investing in the real economy instead of the “airbag” would have given it a second doubling. But there was no second doubling, no re-industrialization, and the crisis hit our economy much deeper than the economies of the US and Europe.

It should be noted that the situation has not changed: when discussing the state budget for 2013 in the State Duma, the opposition parties noted the desire of the Ministry of Finance to underestimate real income, artificially show the deficit, and send the additional funds received from the export of oil and gas to reserve fund rather than investment, social needs, national defense and national security.

Define economic model

Ten years ago, when evaluating the geopolitical position of the country, generalized indicators of the economic, military and military-economic power of Russia and the largest countries of the world were given. Their analysis showed that the Russian Federation only surpasses Germany, France, England, Japan in terms of economic potential, and also the indicators of China and the United States in terms of the size of the territory. However, the degree of realization of the economic potential of our state turned out to be significantly lower than those of these countries, therefore, in terms of general indicators of economic power, Russia was weaker than the states shown in the table. The intra-system indicators of the military-economic security of our country were also disappointing, and the systems for supporting the structures of military counteraction to threats to national security due to their extreme limitations economic opportunities states are inadequate to the military and economic needs of the forces confronting real and potential military threats.

Nevertheless, at that time we believed that the Russian Federation had, although reduced, but still colossal economic potential. The revival of its power and return to the ranks of the most developed and powerful powers in the world was possible, but only with a comprehensive consideration of the main lesson of history - the consolidation of society around basic social values ​​and the tasks of confronting internal and external threats faced by our state. It is especially necessary to emphasize the urgency of this task today, since the threats to national security have increased significantly, and there has been no noticeable shift in the balance of power in favor of Russia.

Now Russia is focusing on adequately responding to the foreseeable challenges that the whole world is facing: a systemic crisis, a tectonic process of global transformation - a transition to a new cultural, economic, technological, geopolitical era. While we were trying to get away from socialism and become "like everyone else", these "everyone" came more and more firmly to the conviction that capitalism had exhausted itself. It is impossible to enumerate all the obstacles and tasks; let us name those that have already been clearly identified.

IN general view it is necessary to “complete the creation in Russia of such a political system, such a structure of social guarantees and protection of citizens, such a model of the economy, which together will constitute a single, living, constantly developing and at the same time stable and stable, healthy state organism” (V. V. Putin. “Russia focuses - challenges we must meet"). Such an organism guarantees the sovereignty of Russia and the prosperity of its citizens. Vladimir Putin also mentions words about justice, dignity, truth and trust. And what is “such” organism specifically?

Let us touch on some aspects of concretization of only one of these problems - the model of the economy.

First, we need to get off the raw material needle and move on to the innovative development of industry, agriculture and other sectors of the real economy. Without this, it is useless to talk about solving the problems of the economy and other spheres of life. And here the main difficulty is that in the economy that we are building, you can’t give orders. Other methods are needed. Private traders should be interested, and government officials should be selected politically and economically literate, professionally competent, creative and disciplined.

Secondly, it is necessary to destroy and eliminate the possibility of merging business with officials, to overcome corruption to the root (since it is recognized as treason), but at the same time not pushing the state out of the economy under the pretext of its alleged inefficiency, but expelling ignoramuses from the state apparatus, replacing them with honest ones. , economically literate people, only then the economy will become smart, efficient. Here we need a lot of creative work of lawyers and legislators in the field of improving economic law and colossal organizational work.

Thirdly, like air, it is necessary to achieve social unity in the country. It cannot be achieved without changing the decile coefficient several times, which is 1:15 in Russia as a whole, and in Moscow 1:50, while in European countries 1:7. Such a gap already threatens with a senseless and merciless revolt. Social cohesion cannot be achieved either without a progressive scale of taxation, without a substantial compensation contribution from the dealers in dishonest privatization and renationalization of that part of the property, the nature of which, as experience has shown, requires its withdrawal from private hands, and also without the liquidation of offshore companies. Many exemptions and innovations are required, but all this requires a strong political will, and not peppy pre-election calls and promises.

Thinking about the desired model of the economy, especially in terms of the defense industry, I suddenly stumbled upon the newly adopted federal law "On the Advanced Research Fund." We read: “The Foundation has the right to carry out income-generating activities only insofar as it serves the achievement of the purpose for which it was created and corresponds to this purpose.” We read more: Federal authorities state authorities have no right to interfere in the activities of the foundation and its officials". I think that this law would be very suitable for the entire economy, it is aimed at neutralizing the main flaw of the market economy, which focuses its subjects not on a functional effect (result), but on profit. On the other hand, we see a desire to eliminate bureaucratic obstacles, often created by incompetent actions of government agencies.

I am convinced that in an extremely contradictory socially oriented market economy it is very important not to imitate either under capitalist competition or under planned socialism, but in everything to see and observe the measure that determines the transition of phenomena to a new quality, even to its opposite.

Looking ahead 30-50 years

On the issue of restructuring and modernizing the economy, we often simplistically understand the relationship between the economy and national security, including national defense, repeating the wise statements of the authorities of the distant past that finance is the arteries of war, that three things are needed for war - money, money and money again. But since then, when it was said so, there have been major changes in the economy and military affairs.

The military construction of the 20th century showed that with the industrialization of the economy, it is very difficult for money to turn into military power, that issues of the structure of the economy, early economic mobilization and conversion in the processes of mutual transitions of economic and military power as elements of the system of power acquire a decisive role. Soviet Union vividly demonstrated these processes on the eve of the Great Patriotic War and during the conversion of military production in the 1990s. Chains of objective functional and temporal interconnections between sectors of the economy predetermine these processes, and colossal success and shameful defeat, the possibility of "cutting the corner" and failing another SAP depend on understanding and taking into account these ties in military-economic policy.

Ignoring these relationships during the years of conversion of military production made inevitable the rapid and such a deep collapse not only of the defense industry, but of the entire Russian economy in the 90s. This is also the reason for the extremely weak, unstable process of economic revival in the first decade of the 21st century. This is the mystery of the failures of Russia's neoliberal military-economic policy.

Military power in modern conditions implies such weapons and military equipment, the production of which is possible only if the structure of the real economy contains the most modern industries production using high technology. We are in a hurry to take care of problems post-industrial economy, but in fact they slid down to the pre-industrial, having lost mechanical engineering, the electronics industry, high technologies and highly qualified scientific personnel. The connection of other structures that ensure national security with the economy and its structure is similar. This connection should not be overlooked when talking about "smart" defense and protection from new threats, about the need to look beyond the horizon of 30-50 years ahead, allocating 23 trillion rubles for the development programs of the Armed Forces and the modernization of the defense industry, but putting up with the dominance of a raw material orientation economic policy and the outflow of brains and capital abroad.

What are the indicators related to national defense and national security in the past decade and in the future? The data in Table 3 shed light on this question.

Table 3

As we can see, spending on national defense in the first decade of this century did not rise above 2.84 percent in GDP and 18.63 percent in state budget spending and tended to decrease, while spending on national security, respectively, 2.41 and 11.1 percent. . The indicators of the first years of the new decade do not indicate their growth.

Financial speculation is trading in financial assets for the purpose of making a profit as a result of taking market risk. It has become one of the main financial activities along with investing, hedging, insurance, etc. Since the growth of finances is achieved both with investments and speculation, there is some clouding of thinking and degeneration of financial policy.

What is the underfunding of the defense industry? This may be a forced measure, a consequence of the extremely limited resources. But it can also be a way used by corrupt officials to enrich themselves under the guise of serving defense spending. In such a situation, military financiers have to take out loans from private banks at fabulous rates. The state pays for them by enriching the oligarchs and corrupt officials. How it was necessary to deal with financial fraud in the field of underfunding defense spending in the 90s of the last century is convincingly shown in the monograph of the former head of the Main FEU of the Ministry of Defense, Colonel-General V.V. security of Russia: problems and solutions”, St. Petersburg, 2003).

This is especially important to understand in the context of the country's transition to a socially oriented market economy with pluralism of forms of ownership. Since it is happening, it is necessary to gain knowledge and ability to work in market conditions without losing the colossal opportunities for systematic regulation economic processes. Almost a whole decade of existence of the defense industry in conditions of underfunding and fragmentation in the interests of the privatization of its enterprises, the loss of much of what is necessary to ensure its adequacy to threats and reliable competitiveness, also led to the failure of the first three government programs weapons in the past decade. This makes us rethink our attitude to financial and economic technologies, understand their enormous destructive and creative power and skillfully use it for creation.

We are talking about the role and place of the military-financial component in the system of determining factors and how to prevent its separation from military, economic and military-economic policy, how to ensure the fulfillment of their functional purpose. The main thing is to achieve the adequacy of military-financial and military-economic interests, to exclude the exaggerated influence of narrow departmental and private interests. It is necessary to ensure a combination of functional goals and economic interests in the system of contracts of subjects of military-economic relations, having developed in economic law the rules of the game acceptable to the parties, and creating an acceptable coercion mechanism for them in the form of economic sanctions, norms of legal responsibility, introducing new forms of economic relations, institutional innovations, modern market technologies.

One of the most effective means and ways to the goal is the creation, and in fact the revival of large integrated structures in the defense industry destroyed by privatization and conversion of military production.

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