For quite a long time it was believed that the decline in fertility was associated with the economic difficulties that arise with the birth of each subsequent child. When we noticed in the 60s that the birth rate was declining, they began to conduct sociological research, using questionnaires to find out the living conditions of families.
To the question: “why don’t you have more children?”, the following answer options were given:
1) there is not enough salary;
2) problem with living conditions;
3) it is difficult to place children in child care institutions;
4) inconvenient operating mode;
5) lack of help from grandparents;
6) ill health of one of the spouses;
7) ill health of existing children;
8) conflicts between spouses.
In general, they thought that if we help solve these problems, the birth rate will rise. It would seem that everything is clear. But to the question: “Under what conditions would you have another child?” - many, especially those with two children, answered: “under no circumstances.”
Gradually, experts began to come to the conclusion that the decline in fertility cannot be studied only from the point of view of interference. A number of authors (V.A. Borisov, A.N. Antonov, V.M. Medkov, V.N. Arkhangelsky, A.B. Sinelnikov, L.E. Darsky) developed the concept of “family needs for children”. It lies in the fact that spouses do not at all want to have an unlimited number of children. A person’s desire to procreate is not biological, but social character, and manifests itself very differently at different times and under different conditions.
The theory of the institutional crisis of the family explains why the birth rate throughout the world falls to a family of one or two children, which automatically means depopulation. According to this theory, people were interested in having many children only until industrial age. In those days, the expression “family is the unit of society” was much more consistent real situation affairs than in our era. The family truly acted as a miniature model of society.
The family was a production team (for families of peasants and artisans, who made up the vast majority of the population). Children from a very early age participated in family production and were of undoubted economic value to their parents.
The family was a school in which children received from their parents all the knowledge and work skills they needed for a future independent life.
The family was an institution social security. In those days there were no pensions. Therefore, the elderly and disabled people who lost their ability to work could only count on help from their children and grandchildren. Those who did not have a family had to beg.
The family was a place of leisure. As a rule, family members relaxed and had fun together.
In the family, that is, in marriage, sexual needs and the need for children were satisfied. Extramarital affairs were condemned by public opinion. Hide them from others in conditions rural areas or small towns it was very difficult, especially if these connections were long-term and regular.
Having children (primarily sons) was a necessary condition in order to be considered a full member of society. Childlessness was condemned by public opinion, and married couples without children suffered psychologically from their inferiority.
Children also performed an emotional and psychological function, since parents experienced joy and a sense of mental comfort from communicating with them.
Thus, with all their shortcomings, traditional families basically coped with their functions: they provided for themselves economically, socialized new generations, took care of the older generation and produced as many children as were enough (even with the then very high mortality rate) for physical survival of humanity. At the same time, the population in different historical periods either grew or was relatively stable.
Of course, during disasters - wars, crop failures, epidemics, etc. - the population declined sharply, but subsequently the high birth rate compensated for all these losses. Under normal conditions, that is, in the absence of such cataclysms, there has never been a steady trend towards a decrease in population due to the excess of mortality over the birth rate for a long time - this has become possible only in our era.
With the advent of industrialization, the situation changed dramatically. The family lost its production functions and ceased to be a labor collective. Family members - husband, wife and grown-up children (the use of child labor was especially characteristic of the era of early capitalism) begin to work outside the home. Each of them receives an individual wages, independent of the composition of the family and its presence in general.
Accordingly, there is no need for a sovereign head of the family as the head of family production.
In addition, the increasing complexity of knowledge necessary for socialization and subsequent labor activity, leads to an extension of the training period. If in a traditional peasant family 7-year-old children already became good helpers for their parents, then in a modern urban family children go to school until they are 17-18 years old, and if they then enter institutes and universities, they remain dependent on their parents until they are 22-23 or more. years.
But even after they start working, they do not give their earnings to their parents and generally leave the parental family at the first opportunity. Their desire for separation is especially intensified after marriage, and in contrast to the era of majorat and minorat, when the son who inherited the property remained with his parents, all children separated and only housing difficulties could prevent this (which is very typical for our country).
So, in the pre-industrial era, the economic component of the need for children played an important role. But if he were the only one, the birth rate today would drop to zero. Economic value of children in modern conditions is expressed not even by zero, but by a negative value, and a considerable one at that.
The emotional and psychological component of the need for family and children is that family and children give a person emotional satisfaction. In marital relationships, this satisfaction manifests itself in the sexual and psychological spheres. Communication between parents and children brings joy and fills life with meaning.
That is why children do not stop being born even when, from an economic point of view, they no longer bring income to their parents, but, on the contrary, only losses.
Demographic policy that uses only economic levers (benefits and allowances for families with several children, taxes on childlessness) has never produced lasting results. Although quite popular “the concept of obstacles to the birth of children” widespread, including in scientific circles. It is dominated by the opinion that the birth rate is too low due to difficult material living conditions.
It follows from this that it is necessary to alleviate these conditions by providing families with a small child or several children with various benefits and allowances, and the birth rate will increase so much that the threat of depopulation will be eliminated. This point of view is based only on everyday logic and “common sense” considerations, but is not supported by statistics. A low birth rate, which does not provide even simple replacement of generations, is observed in all economically prosperous Western countries. The decline in fertility itself occurs not only in conditions economic crisis, as is the case in present-day Russia, but also in conditions of economic recovery.
Two centuries have passed since demographers became aware of the feedback paradox. When the birth rate was very high and its artificial limitation in marriage was not practiced, the average number of children born in families of all social groups differed little, and the difference between them was associated mainly with differences in the average age at first marriage among women belonging to different social groups. groups. The average number of surviving children also depended on social differences in mortality. The decline in child mortality began earlier among the most educated, cultural and affluent groups of the population.
Therefore, in these groups (earlier than in others), parents acquired confidence that all their children would survive and began to practice artificial birth control. The birth rate declines first among the social elite, as well as among the intelligentsia, then among workers, and only lastly among peasants. At a time when society as a whole undergoes a transition from a high level of fertility to a low one, the effect of the “feedback” mechanism becomes most noticeable. However, after the process of declining fertility spreads to all social groups, and its level no longer ensures simple replacement of generations, this Feedback weakens and may disappear altogether.
Some authors, resorting to data manipulation, tried to prove that in this case the feedback is replaced by a direct one, and rich families have, on average, more children than poor ones. But even when such differences appear in the average number of children between families belonging to different social groups, these differences remain small and unimportant, since none of these groups is no longer able to reproduce itself naturally. In such circumstances it does not matter much in what social groups population, the birth rate is higher, and in some groups it is lower, since in all groups it is still below the line of simple generational replacement.
In addition to the concept of interference, there is concept of child-centrism(its author is the French scientist A. Landry, and the most active supporter in our country is A.G. Vishnevsky). The child becomes the center of the modern family, which presupposes one child - this is the concept of child-centrism. Still, regardless of the different points of view of demographers, one thing can be recognized - the current family does not think about the death of their children. If previously there was a very high probability of death of young children, now few people take into account that a son or daughter will die before their parents. If in countless messages in the media mass media In the case of accidents, the family circumstances of the victims would definitely be indicated and those episodes would be mentioned when they were the only children of their parents; many families would understand that one child is too little.
One of the main factors in the decline in the birth rate is the destruction of the traditional institution of marriage as a contract in which the husband undertakes to support the family, and the wife to bear children and run the household. Now sexual and friendly communication is possible without joint housekeeping, obligations, etc. Illegitimate (formally) children in many countries of Western Europe make up from a third to a half of all births, in Russia - almost 30%. Everywhere, the out-of-wedlock birth rate is growing, but its growth does not compensate for the fall in the marital birth rate—in general, the birth rate is falling.
So the relationship between the problem of declining birth rates and the destruction of marriage is very strong. But in our time there is no direct connection between the birth rate and death rate. IN modern Russia Population decline is determined not so much by high mortality as by low birth rate. The nature of the replacement of generations depends on mortality only when the level of the latter is high in childhood and youth, and a significant part of each generation does not live to see the average age of the parents at the birth of children. Nowadays, more than 95% of born girls survive to this age.
A further reduction in mortality is extremely important for humanitarian and economic reasons, but has little effect on the nature of the replacement of generations. With a total fertility rate of 1.2-1.3 children, which is what is observed in today’s Russia, the population will decline, even if average duration life will reach 80 years. Therefore, in order to increase the birth rate to a level that ensures at least simple replacement of generations, it is necessary to influence not only the economic component, but also the social and emotional-psychological components.
One of the most pressing problems for the national security of the Russian state is the demographic situation in the country. It is known that the birth rate in modern Russia, despite a certain improvement associated with relative increase living standards in the 2000s (compared to the 1990s) and some government measures to stimulate demographic growth remain at a fairly low level. By at least, it is hardly possible to say that the Russian birth rate currently covers the needs for replenishing the country's population. Russian citizens are rapidly aging, especially in the “Russian” regions of the country, where the lowest birth rate is observed.
Causes of demographic decline
A strong demographic decline was observed in Russia throughout almost the entire twentieth century and was associated not only with changes in the socio-economic and socio-cultural foundations of the Russian state, but also with the fact that during the years of wars, revolutions, collectivization and industrialization, and political repression, the Russian state lost 140 -150 million people. Accordingly, since a significant part of the dead were people of both sexes of childbearing age, as well as children and adolescents, the number of potential newborns who could have been born to victims of domestic global cataclysms decreased by tens of millions of people.
However, an equally significant role in the demographic crisis in Russia was played by the decrease in the number of children the average Russian woman has. According to A. Vishnevsky, one of the largest domestic experts in demography, for the period from 1925 to 2000. the birth rate decreased by an average of 5.59 children per woman (A. Vishnevsky. Demography of the Stalin era). Moreover, the most active decline in the birth rate occurred in the period from 1925 to 1955. – that is, for the periods of industrialization and collectivization, the Great Patriotic War, post-war restoration of Soviet infrastructure. The population of modern Russia decreases annually by about 700 thousand people, which allows us to speak of the country as gradually dying out (yes, that’s exactly how, without mincing these words, President Vladimir Putin himself described it back in 2000, and 6 years later - in 2006 year - he said that the population of Russia could halve by the end of the 21st century if drastic measures are not taken to improve demographic situation in the country).
Very often, in everyday judgments about the reasons for the decline in the birth rate, there is an explanation for the low birth rate by social conditions, primarily the insufficient material well-being of the population, the lack of well-paid jobs for parents, separate and large housing, and the infrastructure of kindergartens and schools. However, when compared with third world countries or pre-revolutionary Russia, such arguments do not stand up to criticism. We see the conditions in which the bulk of the Central Asian population lives, not to mention Africans or residents of South Asia. However, overcrowding, poverty (and sometimes outright poverty), and lack of social prospects do not at all prevent people from having children - and in quantities of “five and above.”
In fact, the reasons for the decline in the birth rate in Russia in the twentieth century lie rather on an ideological plane. Their main incentive is the devaluation of traditional values and the destruction of the way of life of the Russian and other peoples of the country during the revolution and, especially, the post-revolutionary Stalinist transformations. One cannot help but pay tribute to the Stalin era as a period of maximum development of industry, defense, security of the Soviet state, the spread of universal literacy of the population, accessibility medical care(albeit not very qualified, but still significant).
However, for a rapid breakthrough in the economy of the USSR, it was necessary to mobilize as many citizens as possible, attracting to work almost the entire working population of the country, including both men and women. According to A. Vishnevsky, “the very methods by which the Stalinist leadership of the USSR sought - and achieved - a “great turning point” in people’s life were such that they recklessly destroyed the entire system of traditional values, including family ones” (Vishnevsky A. Demography during the Stalin era).
Despite the fact that Stalin and his entourage negatively assessed the activities of the “leftist” wing of the Bolshevik Party, which in the first post-revolutionary years insisted on the complete destruction of the institution of the family, which promoted the sexual freedom of men and women, freedom of abortion, in reality the “left communists” had a lot borrowed. And, first of all, a specific model for organizing family relationships. It can be called proletarian, since it was the proletariat, as a class of wage workers, mainly living in cities and employed in factory production, that made such an organization of the family possible. For a peasant, the number of children did not matter much; moreover, having many children was in favor, since children are future hands; where you can feed two, you can always feed three, and so on. The peasants also had the opportunity to place their numerous offspring in their hut, or, if their children grew up, in a hut built nearby, in an extension.
In contrast, the urban proletarians, huddled in rooms and apartments of tenement buildings, could not afford numerous offspring. Both due to the lack of places for accommodation, and due to the different nature of labor activity, the proletarian worked for a salary and the child became just another eater, reducing the well-being of the family without any return (when he grew up, he did not work on his father’s farm, like a peasant son, but went to earn his own bread, that is, did not bring direct material return to the parental family). Moreover, in urban proletarian families, as a rule, women also went to work. Women workers who found themselves in a situation of independent choice of work activity and place of residence developed a completely different model of sexual behavior. Firstly, they were much less dependent on the opinions of others than peasant women. Secondly, being self-employed workers, they could indulge in the behavior that they considered necessary. Naturally, for them too having many children was an obvious hindrance - after all, it directly interfered with factory work.
The concept of the “new woman” and fertility
The ideology of family policy in Soviet Russia was formed under the influence of the concepts of the “new woman”, which began to take shape in the 19th century in the works of both domestic and foreign writers and philosophers of a revolutionary-democratic persuasion. In Russia, N.G. wrote primarily about the “new woman”. Chernyshevsky. In the West, the idea of women's emancipation received much greater development. The ideology of feminism has formed, which currently includes many branches - liberal, socialist, radical, lesbian and even “black” feminism. What the spread of feminism in the countries of Western Europe has led to is needless to say, this situation is quite deplorable for European societies and is the cause of significant contradictions between various groups of the European population.
In Russia, feminist ideas, including the concept of creating a “new woman,” found grateful supporters among representatives of revolutionary parties and movements, primarily the Social Democrats. The Social Revolutionaries - the “populists” - were still largely soil-minded, although similar theoretical constructs were spread among them. During the revolutionary years, the main theorist of the concept of the “new woman” was Alexandra Kollontai. This amazing woman - politician, diplomat, revolutionary - managed not only to form her own concept of family and sexual relations in a socialist society, but also with her own biography to largely demonstrate what the image of a “new woman” is.
According to Kollontai, the traditional image of a woman from time immemorial has been associated with humility, a focus on a successful marriage, and a lack of initiative in building one’s own life and independence in life. A traditional woman is such a specific addition to a man, his companion and ally, essentially deprived of her own “I” and, often, her own dignity. In contrast to the traditional image of a woman, Kollontai put forward the concept of a “new woman” - self-sufficient, politically and socially active, treating a man as an equal and truly being his equal in building her own independent life.
The image of the “new woman” is, first of all, the image of an unmarried woman. Let us add - and, as follows from the disclosure of this image, childless - after all, the presence of a child, especially two or three, not to mention five, deprives a woman of her independence in the understanding of Alexandra Kollontai. She names three main principles for building new love and marriage relationships: equality in mutual relationships, mutual recognition of the rights of the other without claiming full ownership of the partner’s heart and soul, comradely sensitivity towards one’s love partner (A. Kollontai. Make way for winged erostus. 1923. ).
Already in the mid-1920s. Kollontai's work was officially criticized in the Soviet Union. Gradually, its concept turned out to be forgotten - they preferred to remain silent about it. Moreover, as Soviet statehood strengthened, the country's leadership was left with no other options other than a partial return to traditional values. The official press, literature, and cinema of the Stalin era promoted the type of Soviet woman who managed to combine the features of Kollontai’s “new woman” in terms of party and social activity, labor exploits, and the traditional family behavior of a mother and wife. However, it is not difficult to guess that the ideology of the Soviet state was at odds with the actual practice of organizing family and demographic policy. Formally, motherhood was promoted, divorce was assessed negatively, and abortion was banned by the Soviet government in 1936, but in fact social politics The Soviet state was not aimed at truly strengthening the demographic foundations of the country.
The decline in the birth rate during the Stalin era indicates that measures taken to ban abortion did not produce the desired result. Firstly, in the Soviet Union, women for the most part found themselves employed. Those who received higher and secondary vocational education, after graduation educational institutions were sent to work in distribution - often to completely different regions of the country. Their chances of getting married quickly decreased. And the system of state propaganda itself, to a large extent, did not orient women (as well as men) towards family values.
Although the Soviet state needed numerous workers, soldiers and officers, new engineers and scientists, and indeed took colossal steps in this direction (just look at the number of educational institutions of all levels that appeared precisely in the Stalin era, at the number of children “from the people”, who have received high-quality professional education and achieved heights in various fields of scientific, military, industrial, cultural activities), something turned out to be irretrievably lost. And this “something” was the very meaning of childbearing and creating a strong, full-fledged family. The family was deprived of its economic, economic, and social content, although it was proclaimed a “unit of society.” Children could be raised in kindergarten, husbands or wives could be changed periodically (if they weren’t happy with some of the nuances of living together, or if they were simply “tired”), living together between a man and a woman in a city apartment had practically no economic significance.
After Stalin passed away and “de-Stalinization” Soviet Union even those measures to maintain the birth rate that Stalin tried to introduce by banning abortion were canceled. Despite the fact that after the war there was even some population growth, it was not possible to reach a level of birth rate that would allow the population of the Soviet state to increase many times over time. What happened in the post-Soviet period should not be recalled. In the 1990s, economic factors also played a role, and, to an even greater extent, the final destruction of traditional values and their replacement with a Westernized surrogate. Moreover, if in the Soviet model of family and sexual policy women at least oriented themselves, if not towards family life, then to creative activity “for the good of the homeland and the party,” then in the post-Soviet period, the values of personal material well-being finally eclipsed all other life guidelines.
Since motherhood and marriage are no longer considered real values by most Russian youth, a global “shortage of children” has emerged.
Although many sociological surveys of young Russians indicate that family remains the most important life value for Russian youth (or at least the second most important), there is an obvious discrepancy between what is desired (as Russians respond to sociologists) and what is actual. The latter is not encouraging - the country has an extremely high divorce rate - 50% of marriages break up, which keeps Russia among the world leaders in the number of divorces. As for childbearing, it was only in the 2000s, after the introduction of real financial incentives, that citizens began to have more children (however, some skeptics explain the relative increase in the birth rate in the country in the 2000s by the fact that during this period the “demographic boom” generation entered childbearing age » 1980s, and the socio-economic conditions of life in the country have relatively stabilized).
An important role here was played by the introduction of so-called payments. " maternity capital", which is paid upon the birth of a second child and when he reaches the age of three years. The decision to start paying out maternity capital was made in 2006, and in order to prevent the possibility of it being used for personal gain by representatives of marginalized sections of the population, it was decided not to issue it in cash, but to issue a special certificate allowing them to purchase housing for a certain amount , close mortgage, pay for the child's education.
Currently, maternity capital is about 430 thousand rubles. The amount is not small - in some regions of Russia you can use it to buy your own home or, at least, to really improve your living conditions. The conditions and emergence of other opportunities for spending maternity capital in the interests of the family and children are discussed. However, it is impossible to achieve an increase in the birth rate through material motivation alone. Moreover, considering that in order to receive maternity capital you still need to give birth to your first child. Therefore, some sociologists assess the very idea of materially stimulating the birth rate very skeptically, citing the fact that only representatives of marginal segments of the population or migrant diasporas will give birth in order to receive assistance from the state in the amount of 430 thousand rubles. That is, even in this case, the problem of demographic security of the Russian state will not be solved.
Abortion threatens demographics
Another problem in Russia in the field of fertility is abortion. Abortion was officially allowed in Soviet Russia immediately after the October Revolution. In 1920, the RSFSR allowed termination of pregnancy not only for medical reasons, becoming the first country in the world to legalize abortion. Abortion was banned in 1936 and legalized again only in 1955 after the “de-Stalinization” policy. Between 1990 and 2008. In post-Soviet Russia, according to official data, 41 million 795 thousand abortions were performed. This quantity covers the real needs of the Russian state in labor force(about 20 million people in specified period), which allows many public and political figures to view abortion as a direct threat to the demographic security of the Russian state.
About half of the country's population is against abortion in Russia today. Sociological surveys show a gradual reduction in the number of supporters of abortion - from 57% of respondents in 2007 to 48% in 2010 (Levada Center. On the reproductive behavior of Russians). The views of opponents of abortion are usually expressed by nationalist political movements and religious organizations. Among them there are both absolute opponents of performing any abortions, including even abortions for medical reasons, and moderate opponents of abortions who recognize the possibility of them being performed in justified cases (medical reasons, rape, social instability, etc.).
First of all, Russian public figures and traditionalist philosophers object to the practice of abortion. For them, abortion is not only a threat to the national security of the Russian state, one of the reasons for the reduction in the potential population of the Russian Federation, but also a challenge to religious values, traditional ideological guidelines, initially inherent in almost all peoples of the world, but being destroyed in the process of detraditionalization of modern society, the adoption of individualistic and consumerist values of modern Western capitalism. After all, the ideology of “child free” - voluntary childlessness, elevated to a virtue by modern “creaks” and narrow-minded consumers seeking to imitate them, is a purposeful inculcation of essentially anti-Russian principles of refusing to have children, creating a full-fledged family in the name of “own realization”, which more often In all, it is just an opportunity for everyday and carefree “hanging out,” shopping, or even just idleness, drunkenness and drug addiction.
Reducing the birth rate is one of the goals of numerous “family planning” associations, which initially arose in Western European countries on the initiative of feminist movements and sponsored by international financial circles interested in reducing the population - primarily in developed countries, since here large number population means an increase in social responsibility and economic pressures on the capitalists. Therefore, it is more expedient to “reduce” the number of the indigenous population, while simultaneously importing foreign migrants from backward countries of the “third world” who will be ready to do hard work without social guarantees and any requirements to improve their situation (now the experience of modern Europe shows that this is far from not so, and many migrants do not work at all in their new place of residence, but they even demand social guarantees and all kinds of privileges, but it is no longer possible to change the situation for most Western countries).
Philosopher Oleg Fomin-Shakhov, who is one of the most staunch opponents of abortion in modern Russia, emphasizes that “the problem of abortion for today's Russia is, first of all, a problem of demographic security. At the International Conference on Population and Development, held in Cairo on September 5–13, 1994, a program of action was adopted that essentially represented voluntary-compulsory self-reduction sanctions for Russia. The program stated that for sustainable regional and global socio-economic development it is necessary to take measures to reduce the birth rate, primarily through the development of family planning services (contraception, sterilization, abortion “in adequate conditions”)” (O. Fomin-Shakhov. Russia without abortion. Newspaper "Zavtra". Electronic version dated June 5, 2014).
At the same time, Oleg Fomin-Shakhov proposes to use the American experience of the pro-life movement, that is, opponents of abortion and supporters of preserving human life already in the womb. American pro-lifers, according to Oleg Fomin-Shakhov, for the first time brought the issue of abortion into the mainstream social problems, whereas before them abortion was regarded as a personal sin of a person or as a crime against the laws of the state. The question was also raised about the essence of abortion as a tool of biopolitics to regulate the population of individual states. As for Russia, it is obvious that its vast territories and Natural resources have long been the envy of a number of neighboring states. Throughout history, the Russian state has faced hordes of foreign conquerors, but today more far-sighted theorists and practitioners of the global financial oligarchy can afford to use such technologies as biopolitics, that is, regulation of childbirth in Russia, the mortality rate of the population, including propaganda mechanisms - propaganda of abortion, a “free” lifestyle, all kinds of social deviations, criminal subculture, etc.
Another famous philosopher Alexander Dugin, in his article “Childbirth as a Philosophical Problem,” connects the lack of desire for childbearing with the destruction of traditional values of Russian society, rejection of religious values and the adoption of alien individualistic models aimed at the exclusive “self-worth” of a person. Within the framework of this axiological model, childbirth becomes an obstacle to a “free”, but in reality – aimless and characterized only by consumerism – human life. “The system of dirty monstrous lies, naked Russophobia, aimed at destroying our cultural and physical code, leaves no desire to create an honest, cultural, Orthodox Russian family and raise a large number of wonderful Russian children. And it is no longer obvious whether the argument for young people will be that if they do not give birth to children, there will be no Russia,” writes Dugin (A. Dugin. Childbirth as a philosophical problem).
Should abortion be banned in modern Russia? Of course, a total ban on abortion is hardly possible in modern conditions. And this step will not be really justified and understood by the population. However, strict control over the practice of abortion must be introduced - and this is one of the necessary measures towards ensuring the demographic policy of the Russian state. First of all, all cases of abortions by Russian women must be strictly controlled, taking into account the reasons for their commission. Thus, for medical reasons, in the interests of preserving the life of a woman, after rape (the criminal background of abortion), abortions should be allowed. The possibility of abortion should also be left for families who already have several children or are experiencing reasonable financial difficulties.
However, the bulk of abortions performed by young, childless, middle- or high-income women with no apparent health problems should be prohibited. Please note that there is no attack on a woman’s personal freedom here. It is enough to use contraception, not to have a promiscuous sex life, that is, to take care of yourself and adhere to at least basic moral and ethical principles - and the need to periodically go for an abortion will disappear by itself. In the end, in most countries of the world - in almost all Latin American countries, countries of Africa, the Islamic East, in some Catholic countries of Europe, abortion is prohibited and these countries somehow exist, many - quite well.
Are there any prospects?
The practice of materially stimulating the birth rate, which Russia switched to during the reign of V.V. Putin, is of great importance for the development of the birth rate in the country. However, economic messages alone cannot encourage people to start families and give birth, especially in modern society with its temptations and information pressure of corresponding propaganda. A whole range of measures is needed - social, economic sphere, the spheres of culture and education, health care, creating the prerequisites for a truly full-fledged upbringing of little Russians and for their very birth. This includes the payment of decent child care benefits, and the possibility of introducing a “maternity salary” for women with many children who decide to devote themselves entirely to child care, and assistance to children’s families in improving living conditions (increasing living space depending on the increase in the number of children in the family) , and the provision of additional means of transport and household appliances for large families. All these activities must be carried out at the federal level and under the strict control of the relevant authorities.
In any case, without delving into specifics, it should be noted that the Russian state may find opportunities to organize such events in the direction of ensuring the demographic security of the country. There will be no shame in attracting public organizations, who have long, at their own peril and risk, at their own expense, been working among the population of the country, promoting the values of family and childbirth, preventing the spread of alien Russian society Western values. On the other hand, it is possible to use foreign experience, including inviting trusted foreign experts for consultations in the direction of improving the demographic policy of the Russian state.
But the state's main attention should be paid to information and propaganda policy. While consumer values are advertised in the media and cinema, the model of behavior of a “socialite” - a prostitute who does not have children - is portrayed as desirable for a woman, Russian men are denigrated, shown as losers from whom children cannot be born, even a threefold increase in maternal capital, the introduction of additional childbearing benefits will not improve the situation in the field of demographic security of the Russian state.
In the information sphere, the Russian state should take as a basis the policy of promoting strong and large family, spreading the cult of fatherhood and motherhood, increasing respect for children's men and women. Special television programs, Internet sites, and printed publications should be created that affirm family values. Moreover, the activities of these projects must be adequate and in demand in modern conditions, which will require additional involvement of specialists in the field of psychology, television and radio broadcasting, journalists, cultural and artistic figures. Accordingly, in educational institutions Policies should also be implemented aimed at promoting family values and correct models of sexual and marital behavior. Mechanisms can be developed to support young mothers in obtaining vocational or additional education at preferential terms. The Russian state must understand that without people there will be no state, without children there will be no future. It is people who are the main value of Russia, and the Russian authorities should take care of their worthy existence and reproduction.
Let's now look at the myths about the reasons for the decline in the birth rate and point out the real reason for this phenomenon.
Myth one: Declining birth rates are a natural phenomenon and should be accepted as normal. A nuance is important here: yes, the phenomenon is natural for sociogenesis (more on this later), but it does not follow from this that it should be recognized as the norm. Here's a quick tip: diseases are a natural phenomenon, aren't they? But this does not mean that they should be considered the norm - a completely healthy person should be the norm, even if he exists only in theory. Of course, modern postmodernism seeks to philosophically blur the concept of the norm, reaching the point of “illness is simply a different way of existence” (J. Lacan), and liberal ideology requires that everything that does not cause direct physical harm to another individual be considered normal, but let’s not digress.
The essence of the myth: all Europeans are like this - they don’t want to give birth, but are we slurping cabbage soup with bast shoes? There is no need to worry, we will die for the company!
From the fact that a decrease in the birth rate in modern society relative to a peasant society is natural, it does not in any way follow that a decrease below the replacement level should be considered the norm. Decreasing is normal, but not as much! Once again I recommend Thilo Sarrazin’s book “Germany: Self-Liquidation”.
Myth two- reducing the issue to economics: “if they have enough money to raise children, they will have them.” The myth is easily refuted by the fact that in Europe, which was very prosperous in material terms until recently, they do not want to give birth. Social payments are also not a solution to the problem; they do not increase the number of desired children in a family. There is a positive effect: women statistically begin to give birth a little earlier, but for this the benefits must be quite large. The reason is simple: in any case, raising a child costs more than size social benefits, and at the same time, after giving birth, a woman automatically lags behind in career growth and in most cases loses her qualifications somewhat, which affects further earnings. Well, to be honest, caring for a baby, which is required around the clock, is much harder work than a regular job “from 9 to 18,” especially if not in production, but simply in the office (just don’t fall into postmodernism like "Both spouses must take maternity leave“- this will not solve problems with the family’s finances, and a man is not evolutionarily “sharpened” for caring for babies, his role comes later). In other words, in order for social benefits to be guaranteed to increase the birth rate, they must at least be equal to the average salary in the country, which no state budget can support.
In addition, the payment of cash benefits actually stimulates the birth rate - but precisely among the marginal part of the population, for whom money is, right now, more important than the future of their children. I will quote Vladimir Mukomel, a leading researcher at the Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences: “Both foreign and Soviet experience demonstrates that attempts to materially stimulate the birth rate evoke a response either from marginal groups of the population or from representatives of ethnic groups prone to having many children.”
I note that against the backdrop of this myth, there are sometimes calls for a kind of reduction of sociogenesis - they say, since the number of children decreases with an increase in the standard of living, then let's go back to the pampas! Only rural subsistence farming, only hardcore! Usually accompanied by excessive religiosity. Due to the obvious insanity of the concept, we will not analyze it: after all, if its propagandists are so against progress for the sake of poverty, then why are they writing such appeals on a computer on the Internet?
Myth three: declaring migration a panacea for all ills. I will quote Igor Beloborodov, director of the Center for Demographic Research: “Replacement migration carries with it a number of social risks that are already being felt today... Let’s list just a few of them: disruption of the ethno-demographic balance; interethnic conflicts; increase in drug addiction; ethnic crime; deterioration of the sanitary and epidemiological situation; threat of loss of strategic territories, etc.”
To be honest, I don’t see the need to examine this issue in detail; a violation of the ethno-demographic balance is quite enough. And if someone declares that there is nothing wrong with this - all people are equal, etc., then he should honestly, “head-on”, ask the question, without arguing with the formal equality of rights, etc. different peoples: WHY are you promoting a position that inevitably violates the ethno-demographic balance of countries precisely in the direction of decreasing the relative number of representatives of the white race? Using the example of Europe as an example, everything is very clear.
Myth four: Improving the quality of life is much more important than quantitative population growth. The same connection to money as in myth No. 2, but “with reverse side”: they say, the quality of children depends only on the amount of money invested, you need to save! I will quote I. Beloborodov once again: “it is often assumed that quality parameters can have a positive connotation only when quantitative indicators decrease. ... The main motive for discussions about the priority of quality over quantity, as a rule, is the desire to expediently spend state and family funds.”
And again: no one argues with the fact that quality of life is an important parameter, but this does not mean that for this reason it is permissible to reduce the birth rate below the level of self-reproduction of the nation - obviously, right? I would like to take this opportunity to note that since fertility is important Total population, then appropriate social guarantees are required for Total population, a guaranteed decent standard of living, and not abstract economic indicators such as GDP, etc.
Fifth myth: family crisis. Let me clarify: it is a fact that there is a crisis in family relationships. And it negatively affects fertility (we’ll look at it in more detail in the next article). However, the myth is precisely what is declared overriding importance this factor. There is an influence, but not critical: modern life makes it possible to raise children alone (which, of course, is bad - but possible), and even more so with the support of family.
Usually this myth is pushed by the guardians of condo-patriarchal values.
Perhaps, the option “family planning” can indirectly be attributed to the same myth (and to the same category of its adherents): they say, sex education is unacceptable, it corrupts children, teaches them to use contraception instead of getting married as virgins and giving birth, giving birth, giving birth. Here we must distinguish the need for adequate sexual information in school (and along with the ethics of intergender and family relationships, etc.) from what liberals mean by this: propaganda of the normality of homosexuality, etc., not to mention the approach to sex only as physiology - I think everyone is aware, and we won’t get distracted. The difference is similar to the difference between the Soviet commission for juvenile affairs and modern juvenile justice.
Sixth myth- about the “decline of spirituality”, i.e. Previously, people were “highly spiritual” and gave birth, but now they have become materialistic and therefore do not want to give birth, but take care of themselves. Is it the case of ancient times, when children were born as if on an assembly line, half died in childhood, and whoever lived to be forty years old was essentially an old man, since the average life expectancy was late XIX century in Russia - just over 30 years.
In this case, the standard logical error posthocnonpropterhoc is obvious: yes, a couple of centuries ago people were much more religious, but the high birth rate was also due to the lack of normal contraception, very early marriages, etc. Now you can compare the birth rate in very religious countries, and the birth rate in them will be quite clearly different: religious factors can delay, but not stop, the development of society.
Natural cause- this is de-peasantization, i.e. there is a process of reduction rural population in a cultivated area. I will quote A.N. Sevastyanov: “if at the beginning of the century the employed population of Russia consisted of 86% peasants, 2.7% intelligentsia and 9% workers, then by the 1990s. the share of workers in the RSFSR increased almost 7 times, the intelligentsia - more than 10 times, and the peasantry, as already mentioned, fell more than 7 times. It must be admitted that the communists brilliantly succeeded in the task that tsarism failed to cope with: the energy of de-peasantization was taken under state control and spent, by and large, on useful, important, grandiose goals. And all this in just seventy years is an unprecedented case in history that distinguishes us for the better from other nations” (note: by intelligentsia here we mean those engaged in mental work).
High birth rates are observed in countries where the majority of the population is rural. The transition to industrial production inevitably leads to a decrease in the birth rate. There are two main reasons, and they act not just simultaneously, but systematically.
Firstly, economic reason. Traditional society implies an appropriate type of farming: some kind of hydroponic farms or even just high-tech land cultivation - this is already an industrial way of doing things Agriculture, and it also has a high “entry barrier” both in terms of age and skills - a seven-year-old will not be able to work as a combine operator. And in the traditional peasant life, he had long worked as a helper, shepherd, etc. In such a household, having children was economically beneficial: they worked from early childhood. Industrial-type work involves long training, etc., and children in “ family accounting“become an expense item rather than an income item. Compare the situations themselves: “a five-year-old can already graze and feed poultry” (as an example) and “fully provide for a child until at least 17 years old, and in most cases, seriously help at least until graduation” (and I’m silent about housing issue); clearly? The birth rate causally correlates not with “spirituality”, but with the norm of lack of education (however, “spirituality” and education have an inverse correlation). As soon as a people becomes educated, since work requires education, the birth rate falls within a generation (the first one retains the habit).
Secondly, the lack industrial development always correlates with the lack of adequate medicine (and corresponding norms adopted by the population), which also applies to contraception. It is important to understand that we are talking not only about technical capabilities, but also about the culture of use: “Postinor” and especially abortion is, you know, not a method of contraception, as some actually practice. And the approach of “delaying an abortion until the deadline” does not have a positive effect on reproductive function. And this is all also a matter of culture, natural application, and a responsible approach to childbirth. In traditional cultures, the approach “once you get pregnant, then give birth” is common (and when the corresponding level collides with the moral norm “not necessary,” then mutations of behavior like “abortion as contraception” result).
Both reasons are interconnected and have a systemic impact. Some researchers focus on urbanization, but this factor is derivative.
So: the scientifically substantiated reason for the decline in the birth rate is de-peasantization, the transition to industrial society. This is a natural process of sociogenesis, but a decrease in the birth rate below the reproduction level is the suicide of a nation. The question arises: is it natural not just for a decline in the birth rate in a civilized society, but to such an extent? We'll talk about this next time.
The decline in total fertility accelerated in 2017
In contrast to the total fertility rate, a more adequate integral characteristic of fertility is the total fertility rate, which allows us to eliminate the influence age structure, although he himself is subject to the influence of changes in the birth calendar (“rejuvenation” or “aging” of the birth rate, a decrease or increase in the average age of the mother at the birth of children of different order).
The lowest value of the total fertility rate in Russia was noted in 1999 – 1.157 (Fig. 13). In 2000-2015, its value increased (except for 2005) - to 1.777 in 2015, which corresponds approximately to the level of the early 1990s and 15% below the level required for simple reproduction (2.1). In 2016, there was a decline - the value of the total fertility rate was 1.762, and in 2017 it accelerated - the value of the coefficient dropped to 1.621, which is 9% than in 2015, and a quarter lower than necessary for simple population reproduction.
Since the mid-1990s, the average age of a mother at birth has steadily increased. Previously, the opposite trend prevailed - the average age of a woman at the birth of a child decreased (except for the 1980s, when the proportion of children of the second and higher birth order increased). By 1994 it had dropped to 24.6 years, down from 27.8 years in the early 1960s. Since 1995, the average age of mothers has been steadily increasing. In 2016, according to Rosstat, it was 28.4 years, and in 2017, judging by the distribution of births by maternal age and the number of women of the corresponding ages, it was up to 28.5 years, which is 3.9 years higher than in 1994, and 0.7 years higher than in the early 1960s. Of course, then, with a higher birth rate, the contribution of births of higher orders (the second child and children of subsequent orders) to the total number of births was higher, which increased the average age of a woman at the birth of a child.
A more indicative characteristic of changes in the age of motherhood is the average age of the mother at the birth of the child. According to S.V. Zakharov, the average age of a mother at the birth of her first child decreased from 25.1 to 22.3 years in 1956-1992, and then, on the contrary, began to grow, increasing to 25.5 years in 2015. According to Rosstat, in 2016 it rose to 25.7 years, and in 2017 – to 25.8 years.
Figure 13. Average age of mother at birth of a child and total fertility rate in the Russian Federation, 1962-2017
The birth rate among Russian women living in rural areas has exceeded the replacement level. In 2012, the total birth rate of rural women in Russia increased to 2,215, and continued to increase in the next two years, rising to 2,318 in 2014 (Fig. 14). Then it began to decline again, amounting to 2.111 in 2015, 2.056 in 2016, and 1.923 in 2017. The birth rate of urban women, despite the increase, remains lower. In 2017, the total fertility rate of the urban population decreased to 1.527.
The birth rate among rural women grew faster in 2000-2015 than among urban women, as a result of which the differences between them began to increase again. If in 2005, when the differences became minimal over the entire observation period, the total birth rate in rural areas was 31% higher than in the city, then in 2013-2014 it was 46%.
Since the birth rate among the rural population began to decline rapidly as early as 2015, and among the urban population gradually only in 2016, the differences between them have narrowed to previously unprecedented levels. In 2016, the excess of the total birth rate of the rural population compared to the urban population was 23%. In 2017, it increased slightly, amounting to 26%, as in 2015.
Figure 14. Total fertility rate in the Russian Federation, 1960-2017*
*Before 1988 - assessment based on data for two adjacent years; 2014-2017 – including Crimea
Decrease in birth rate to extreme low levels in the majority Russian regions was accompanied by a decrease in regional differentiation in the total fertility rate. Only in a small number of federal subjects does its importance continue to exceed the level of simple reproduction. In 2017, there were only 4 such regions out of 85: the republics of Tyva (3.19), Chechnya (2.73), Altai (2.36) and Nenets autonomous region(2.35). Among other regions, the value of the total fertility rate varied from 1.22 to Leningrad region up to 2.08 in the Chukotka Autonomous Okrug (Fig. 15). In the central half of the regions, the value of the indicator in 2017 varied in a narrow range from 1.52 to 1.75 with a median value of 1.61.
A decrease in the total fertility rate in 2017 compared to 2015, when the highest value of the indicator was recorded for the entire period since 1991, was noted in all regions-subjects of the federation, with the exception of the Sakhalin region, where it increased slightly (from 2.02 to 2 ,03).
Figure 15. Total fertility rate by regions of the Russian Federation, 2005, 2015 and 2017, children per woman
The change in the main characteristics of fertility is clearly visible if we compare age-specific fertility rates for different years. The age curves for 1990 and 2000 have a similar shape, with a pronounced peak in the 20-24 age group, although at different levels due to sharp declines in fertility at all ages (Figure 16). By 2010, the fertility curve had taken a completely different shape, with the highest birth rates in age group 25-29 years old. The birth rate increased noticeably in all age groups 25 years and older, especially significantly - by 32 points per mille - at the ages of 25 to 34 years, although in relative terms the increase was more significant at the ages of 35 years and older (2.5 times) with lower birth rate. The birth rate under 25 years of age has decreased slightly.
The age-specific birth rate curve in 2015 is located noticeably higher, since the birth rate increased in all age groups except the youngest (15-19 years), in which it continued to gradually decrease. The peak birth rate in the 25-29 age group has become more pronounced.
In 2016, the birth rate decreased in ages under 30, and continued to increase in age groups 30 and older. In 2017, the decline affected all age groups, and the fertility curve became more similar to the 2010 curve, but noticeably shifted to the right, towards age groups 30 years and older. Compared to 2015, the birth rate decreased in all age groups under 40 years old, most significantly in the group under 20 years old (by 23%) and in the ages from 20 to 30 years old (10%). At ages 40 and older, the slight increase continued, although the birth rate in these groups is extremely low.
Figure 16. Age-specific fertility rates, Russian Federation, 1990, 2000, 2010 and 2015-2017, births per 1000 women of the corresponding age
* 2015-2017 – including Crimea
Highest birth rate in last years observed in women aged 25-29 years. For the first time, it exceeded the birth rate in the 20-24 year old group in 2008, and over the subsequent years the gap between them only increased, although it narrowed slightly in 2017 (Figure 17). In 2012, the birth rate at the age of 25-29 years for the first time since 1990 exceeded the level of 100 births per 1000 women (107‰ in 2012-2013). In 2015, it rose to 113‰, but then began to decline again, dropping to 100‰ in 2017.
Based on one-year intervals, the highest birth rates in 2017 were observed at the ages of 25 and 26 years (102‰), at the ages of 27 and 28 years it was slightly lower (about 100‰) and even lower at the age of 29 years (98‰).
The birth rate at the age of 20-24 years, after almost doubling in the second half of the 1980s and in the 2000s, remains relatively stable at about 90 births per 1000 women. The increasing birth rate at the age of 30-34 years is gradually approaching this level (84‰ in 2016). In 2017, the birth rate decreased in both groups, amounting to 81‰ at the age of 20-24 years and 77‰ at the age of 30-34 years.
Compared to the mid-1990s, the birth rate at the age of 35-39 has almost quadrupled (up to 41‰ in 2016 and 39% in 2017).
The birth rate under 20 years of age is slowly but steadily declining, dropping to 19‰ in 2017. In the age group of 40-44 years, on the contrary, it gradually increases, but remains insignificant (9‰). In the age group of 45-49 years, there are also signs of an increase in the birth rate, but in general it has virtually no effect on the overall birth rate, and its level is close to zero.
Figure 17. Age-specific fertility rates, Russian Federation, 1958-2017*, births per 1000 women of the corresponding age (by five-year age groups)
*Before 1988 - assessment based on data for two adjacent years (the second is indicated on the graph); 2014-2017 – including Crimea
Since 2017, Rosstat has been publishing data on the distribution of births by maternal age and birth order. In 2016, most of the second-born children were born (41.1%) and slightly fewer first-born children (39.7%), which have long prevailed. In 2017, their shares were almost equal, amounting to 39% each (Fig. 18). At the same time, the share of children of higher birth order increased to 21% compared to 19% in 2016. These are mainly third children, whose share has risen to 15% compared to 14% in the previous year.
First-borns predominate among mothers of younger age groups (86% under the age of 20); as the mother’s age increases, their share decreases (up to 14% among mothers 40-44 years old). For mothers aged 45 years and older, the proportion of first-born children again increases slightly, which is often associated with attempts to use the last chances to give birth to a child, including with the help of modern reproductive technologies. The share of births to mothers 45 years of age and older is insignificant, but there are signs of its increase: in 2016 it amounted to 0.1% of the total number of live births, in 2017 - 0.2%.
The bulk of births occur to mothers aged 25-29 years (33.5%) and 30-34 years old (28.9%), noticeably less among mothers aged 20-24 years (17.8%) and 35-39 years old ( 13.3%).
Since in Russia, due to the wave-like deformation of the age structure, the number of generations of different years of birth differs markedly, it is more correct to talk about the contribution of the birth rate of different age groups to the total birth rate. In recent years greatest contribution it includes the birth rate at the age of 29-29 years (about 31% in 2009-2017). The contribution of births aged 20-24 fell to 25% in 2017, although it was 39% in 2000. The contribution of fertility at the age of 30-34 years, on the contrary, increased to 24% (15%), at the age of 35-39 years - to 12% (5%), at the age of 40-44 years - to almost 3% (1%) , 45-49 years old – up to 0.2% (0.04 in 2000).
Figure 18. Distribution of live births by maternal age and birth order,
Russian Federation, 2017, %
The characteristics of fertility in women with different levels of education are also of interest. In the statistical bulletin about natural movement of the population of the Russian Federation for 2012, Rosstat for the first time presented data on the distribution of live births by age and education of the mother. Similar data are presented in subsequent bulletins for 2013-2017.
According to these data, the proportion of children born to mothers with higher education. If in 2012 it was 39% (45% for mothers with higher and incomplete higher education) of the total number of mothers whose level of education was indicated when registering the child, then in 2016 and 2017 it was already 50% (54%). Just over a quarter of children are born to mothers with secondary vocational education, but their share has decreased slightly, amounting to 26.6% in 2016 and 2017 versus 29.0% in 2012. As a result, the share of children born to mothers who received higher or secondary vocational education increased from 68% in 2012 to 77% in 2017.
Mothers without vocational education accounted for 19.3% of births in 2017, including 13.4% for women with complete secondary education and 5.0% for women with basic general education. In 2012, the proportion of births to mothers who did not have higher or secondary vocational education exceeded 25%, including 17.8% among mothers with complete secondary general education, and 6.0% among mothers with basic general education.
The proportion of mothers whose level of education is unknown has decreased significantly: in 2017 it was 7.9% compared to 22.5% in 2013 and 26.3% in 2012. The proportion of mothers whose level of education is unknown is higher in younger and older age groups, and especially in the group for which the mother’s age is also unknown.
If we consider the distribution of births by maternal age depending on the level of education, we can note the most pronounced shift towards older ages among women with higher education (Fig. 19). In this group of women who became mothers in 2017, the age groups 25-29 and 30-34 years old account for the most high beats born (38% and 36%, respectively), and for the age group 20-24 years - the lowest (8%).
Among those born to mothers with incomplete higher education, the peak in the distribution, for obvious reasons, is shifted to the age of 20-24 years (almost 46% of births). The distribution of births to mothers with lower education is also skewed towards younger age groups. Among those born to women who received only basic general education, almost a quarter were born to mothers under 20 years of age (22%), another quarter were born at the age of 20-24 years (26%).
Figure 19. Distribution of live births by maternal age depending on her level of education, Russian Federation, 2017, %
In 2017, for the first time in recent years, the proportion of children born to women who are not in a registered marriage stopped decreasing.
Until the mid-1980s, the proportion of those born out of wedlock barely exceeded 10%, and after 20 years it increased to 30% (in 2005). Similar trends in the growth of out-of-wedlock births were observed during this period or somewhat earlier in many European countries. However, in the second half of the 2000s, the share of births to unmarried Russian women began to decline and dropped to 21.1% in 2016 (Figure 22 in the section on marriage and divorce rates). A similar downward trend in out-of-wedlock births has not been observed in other developed countries. In 2017, the share of children born outside of a registered marriage was 21.2%.
Data on the distribution of those born outside of a registered marriage by maternal age, published by Rosstat for the seventh year in a row in the statistical bulletin on the vital statistics of the Russian population, make it possible to assess the contribution of such births to the total birth rate for individual age groups (Fig. 20).
The proportion of those born outside of a registered marriage is highest in younger age groups (97% among mothers under the age of 15, 48% at the age of 15-19). The lowest proportion of those born outside of a registered marriage is to mothers who gave birth at the age of 25-29 years (17%). As the mother's age increases, this proportion increases - from 19% in the age group of 30-34 years to 33% in the group of 45 years and older.
Figure 20. Distribution of births by age and marital status of the mother, 2017, thousand people and % of those born in a registered marriage
Births outside of a registered marriage reflect two types reproductive behavior: unplanned births as a result of a low level of contraception, primarily among young women, and on the other hand, the planned birth of a child with the intentional formation of a “maternal” family by women, as a rule, of older reproductive ages.
Among Russian regions, significant differentiation remains in the proportion of those born outside of a registered marriage, which is largely due to the preservation of the sociocultural characteristics of the marital and reproductive behavior of various ethnic groups. Thus, in 2017, the share of those born outside of a registered marriage ranged from 10.5% in the Kabardino-Balkarian Republic to 63.3% in the Republic of Tyva (Figure 21). High values of the indicator - up to 30% and above - are typical for a number of regions of the Far East and Siberia, and in the European part of the country - for the northern regions of the North-Western federal district(Nenetsky Autonomous Okrug, Perm region).
Compared to 2016, the proportion of those born outside of a registered marriage decreased in 30 of the 85 regions of the federation, and remained at the same level in 9. In 46 regions it increased, but the increase generally did not exceed a percentage point. It was greatest in the Pskov region - by 5 percentage points compared to 2016, but the same share of out-of-wedlock births - 23.4% - was also observed in the region in 2015.
Figure 21. Proportion of those born outside of a registered marriage by region-subjects of the Russian Federation in 2015-2016, % of the total number of live births
demographic birth rate mortality population
Since the change in the mortality rate in Russia was the most dramatic and has been widely studied, there are several different hypotheses in this regard:
Here is a list of the most popular ones:
1. Alcohol consumption
2. Environmental problems
3. Poverty and poor nutrition
4. The collapse of the healthcare system
5. Reaction to strong changes social conditions, stress
6. Compensation after a period of low mortality in the second half of the eighties
Let's look at some of them. Studies have shown that the health care system plays a fairly important role, but still not a decisive one. This is explained by the fact that most causes of death in our time are determined not by the quality of the healthcare system, but by self-preservation behavior.
Environmental problems can be ruled out immediately - the decline in production only caused an improvement in the environmental situation.
Alcohol consumption can play a fairly important role, since the percentage of deaths from alcohol poisoning, as well as its consumption, has increased during the reforms. But drunkenness cannot be considered as a cause - it is only a consequence of other factors, mainly spiritual.
Also, the increase in mortality may be caused by the compensation effect after the anti-alcohol campaign - that is, those who were supposed to die from alcohol poisoning in the second half of the eighties began to die only now, after the anti-alcohol measures of that time were lifted.
The dominant point of view is that one of the main reasons for our troubles is the worsening economic situation: for the nation to get healthier, it is necessary to improve the standard of living. However, after analyzing the dynamics of mortality over 25 years (since the mid-70s), we can find that none of economic indicators does not explain its trajectory.
A study conducted in the mid-90s in Russia showed that, from a medical point of view, people began to behave more healthy image life, while mortality has only increased.
In his book “Demographic Catastrophe in Russia: Causes, Mechanism, Ways to Overcome,” Doctor of Medical Sciences I. Gundarov presented the results of research into the causes of increased mortality in Russia.
Reasons for the decline in fertility
As was written above, when considering the birth rate in Russia, we can trace not one, but two problems. The first is a gradual decline in the birth rate throughout the entire period under review. The second is the sharp decline in the birth rate that began in 1987 and continues to this day.
It is extremely important to note that graph 1 exactly repeats the graph of the third and fourth phases of the demographic transition in its pessimistic second version.
According to the theory of demographic transition, all countries and peoples go through the same stages in their demographic history, each of which corresponds to a certain type of population reproduction.
If we consider the processes taking place in Russia today from the point of view of the theory of demographic transition, then we can assume that today's depopulation is not caused by some external circumstances - for example, reforms, but is a natural process occurring not only in Russia, but also in many other developed countries .
If we compare the birth rate schedule in Russia with the demographic transition schedule, then phase III began at the end of the 19th century, and phase IV - in 1987. Thus, the theory of demographic transition explains both of the above problems.
And although this theory does not say what follows the fourth phase, one can assume two options for the further development of events - either the situation will stabilize after some time (still at an insufficient level), or, what is more likely, it will worsen further.
Politicians, ordinary people, and even many researchers are of the opinion that any woman has a natural desire to have many children, and only the lack of conditions prevents her from realizing this desire, and as soon as the necessary conditions are created, the birth rate will immediately increase. This position is called the “interference paradigm.” Research shows that this approach is completely wrong. The real reason for the low birth rate is not that certain factors prevent a woman from having many children. The 1994 micro-census asked about the desired number of children under ideal conditions, and this number was 1.9 children, which is not enough even for simple population reproduction. That is, even if all interfering factors are eliminated and ideal conditions for the birth of children are provided, the problem of low fertility will not be solved. Consequently, the main reason for the decline in fertility should not be sought in some external factors, such as well-being or confidence in the future, but in culture and public consciousness.
There is a widespread opinion in society that the fall in the level of income of the population as a result of reforms is the main reason for the fall in the birth rate, and it is believed that economic factor is crucial. Unfortunately, this opinion is shared even in the highest circles of power. However, the results of studies conducted both in Russia and in a number of European capitals showed an inverse relationship between the birth rate and the level of well-being. That is, in poor families the birth rate was higher than in rich ones. Moreover, studies have shown that not only the actual, but also the planned number of children in poor families was greater. From this we can conclude that it was not the fall in income levels that caused the birth rate crisis in Russia.
Meanwhile, one should not discount the economic factor altogether, since it undoubtedly has a certain significance. It is known that through economic measures - increasing benefits, etc., it is possible to increase the birth rate, but, unfortunately, only to the level of the desired number of children in the family, which, for example, today in Russia is 1.9 children per family, that is, below the level of simple reproduction population. Therefore, the question is to raise precisely the level of the desired number of children in the family, and here economic measures are powerless.
Based on numerous studies of reproductive behavior in Russia and abroad, data have been obtained that allows us to believe with great confidence that it is cultural factors that play a decisive role in reducing the birth rate.
Types of population reproduction, or phases of demographic transition, strictly depend on the mode of production in society. Phases I and II correspond to the agricultural mode of production, phase III - industrial, and phase IV - post-industrial.
This is easy to explain - in an agrarian society, children were necessary for survival, as they were workers, helpers, and protectors. The well-being of a family directly depended on the number of children. Moreover, mortality in the agricultural era was very high, and where mortality is high, birth rates are usually high.
In the industrial era, the family ceases to be a production unit; children are no longer necessary for survival, but for procreation and satisfying the emotional needs of parents. Therefore, the desired number of children in the industrial era is 1-3 children per family, and this number gradually decreases, initially remaining sufficient for simple population reproduction, and even a small increase.
But then, as civilization develops, mass small families become increasingly common. This is primarily due to the fact that the entire way of life of a person in our era is associated with non-family activities, and the role of the family in the life of an individual is gradually decreasing, which will be discussed in the next section.
There are different forms of family. The family was originally represented by an expanded form, and this form was most common for thousands of years. An extended family consists of several nuclear families, and a nuclear family is a family consisting only of parents and their children.
But with the advent of industrialization and urbanization, there has been a shift from the “traditional” family to the “modern” family, from the extended family to the nuclear family. Such a transition has a negative impact on the birth rate, since the traditional family is characterized by large families, early and long marriages and childbearing periods, and a ban on abortion and divorce.
Initially, the institutions of education, health care, economics and others were intra-family, but with the process of industrialization, these institutions gradually began to leave the family and became extra-family.
A. Antonov and S. Sorokin in the book “The Fate of the Family in Russia in the 21st Century” name the following differences between an industrial family and an agricultural one:
1. Collapse family economy, separation of home and work, non-family employment of parents in the wage labor system with individual wages, the disappearance of joint activities of parents and children everywhere except for farming families, the transition to family-domestic self-service, family-centrism is replaced by egocentrism, the well-being of the family begins to consist of the successes of individual family members.
2. In urban families, who make up the majority, the connection with the land is disrupted, the essence of the family home is sharply transformed, the functions of consumption, hygiene and the implementation of physiological processes prevail, psychological unity with the microenvironment is replaced by disengagement, the emphasis is on separation from neighbors, ethnic alienation and T.
3. In the industrial family, kinship is separated from the economic affairs of the family, maximizing individual benefits and economic efficiency outweigh the value of family ties.
4. The replacement of a centralized family-kinship system of an extended type with decentralized nuclear families weakened intergenerational ties and the authority of elders, as well as the instructions of parents and kinship regarding the choice of a spouse, taking into account the property status (“open” system of marriage choice while maintaining material interests and the right of inheritance), transition from prohibiting divorces to allowing them, but within the framework of difficult procedures, mainly on the initiative of the husband.
5. Destruction of the system of high birth rate norms in connection with successes in controlling mortality and removing the taboo on preventing and terminating pregnancy, eliminating the need for full use of the reproductive period and hence, weakening the norms of lifelong and early marriage, lifelong childbearing and marriage, softening the norms of sexual behavior outside of marriage and before marriage.
The individualistic values of modern capitalism are at odds with the collectivist ones. family values, and the institution of family began to gradually die out.