"Institutional" is a word that is often heard in relation to economics. However, not everyone knows exactly what it means. But at the same time, it should be understood that this word, as well as the expressions and statements associated with it, play a very important role in modern life, and were also of great importance in the past, in the process of improving production and consumer relations. The concept of "institutional" is what started the development modern economy in the form in which it can be observed today. So what does it mean?

Meaning of the word

So, first of all, it is necessary to understand the meaning of this term. Institutional is an adjective that describes something that is directly related to and directly related to public institutions. This is the main meaning of the word, which underlies the well-known movement of the economy, which is better known as institutionalism. However, this will be discussed a little later, but now it is worth considering the second meaning of this word.

Institutional is one that is officially established and enshrined in its social status. That is, institutional relations are those relations that are actually fixed, perhaps even at the legal level.

As you can see, there are two main meanings of the mentioned word, but still the first one is used much more often and has received impressive publicity due to what was written above. Institutionalism is a direction in the economy, which will be discussed further.

institutionalism

What is institutional economics? This is an extensive theoretical school that focuses on considering the influence of social institutions, such as the state, law, morality, and so on, on the economic activity of society in general and on the adoption of specific economic decisions in particular.

It originated at the beginning of the twentieth century, and the term "institutional economics" was introduced in 1919. Until now, the named school has a serious impact and is one of the most recognized in the world.

institutional approach

The institutional approach is what lies at the very foundation of institutionalism. Strictly speaking, he considers two aspects - institutions and institutions. The first concept refers to the norms and customs of human behavior in modern society, and under the second - about the same, but only enshrined at the legislative level, that is, laws, official rights, as well as organizations and institutions.

To summarize, the difference between the institutional approach and other economic approaches lies in the fact that its supporters propose to consider not only themselves economic categories and processes, but also the social non-economic factors such as institutions and institutes.

Direction of thought

The social-institutional direction of thought has a number of its own distinctive characteristics. For example, supporters of this approach criticize the abstract and formal nature of neoclassical economic analysis, which was characteristic of this science before the advent of institutionalism.

Also, one of the main distinguishing features of this direction of thought was an interdisciplinary approach. As you can already understand, the institutionalists advocated that the economy should not be considered in itself, but integrated with the humanities. At the same time, they strove for empirical and factual research, for the analysis of topical pressing problems, rather than universal issues.

institutional changes

Institutional changes, which also have a different name - institutional development - is a process of transformations that have a quantitative and qualitative form. These processes are carried out in cooperation with a wide variety of institutions - political, economic, social, and so on. And the institutional environment is the one where these metamorphoses take place, but at the same time they are manifested not in changes in rules and laws, but at the level of various institutions.

Structure

Well, the last thing worth talking about is the institutional structure. What it is? According to the school of institutional economics, it is an ordered set of institutions that influence the economic behavior of people, communities, groups, businesses, and so on. At the same time, certain economic matrices are formed that create restrictions on the activities of a business entity. Naturally, all of the above takes place within the framework of a specific system for coordinating economic activity. Simply put, this is the one in which the changes described in the previous paragraph take place.

Naturally, this is far from all that the school of institutionalism consists of. It also has a huge number of concepts, methods, approaches, movements, and so on. However, it is these basic terms that will help you get a general idea of ​​the named type of economy as such, as well as directly about the word “institutional”, which has been one of the fundamental ones in the field of economics for almost a century.

This term is very important for every person who wants to have a good understanding of the totality of relations in the system of production, consumption, distribution and exchange, since many modern movements and concepts in this area are associated with it.

to institute (eng) - to establish, establish.

The concept of institution was borrowed by economists from the social sciences, in particular from sociology.

Institute is a set of roles and statuses designed to meet a specific need.

Definitions of institutions can also be found in writings on the political and social. For example, the category of institution is one of the central ones in the work of John Rawls "The Theory of Justice".

Under institutions I will understand the public system of rules that define office and position, with associated rights and duties, authority and immunity, and the like. These rules specify certain forms of action as permitted and others as forbidden, and they also punish some acts and protect others when violence occurs. As examples, or more general social practices, we can cite games, rituals, courts and parliaments, markets and property systems.

For the first time the concept of institution was included in the analysis by Thorstein Veblen.

Institutes- this is, in fact, a common way of thinking with regard to individual relations between society and the individual and the individual functions performed by them; and the system of life of a society, which is composed of a totality of those active at a certain time or at any moment in the development of any society, can be characterized from the psychological side in in general terms as a prevailing spiritual position or a widespread idea of ​​the way of life in society.

Veblen also understood institutions as:

• habitual ways of responding to stimuli;
• the structure of the production or economic mechanism;
• currently accepted system of social life.

Another founder of institutionalism, John Commons, defines an institution as follows:

Institute- collective action to control, release and expand individual action.

Another classic of institutionalism, Wesley Mitchell, has the following definition:

Institutes- dominant, and highly standardized, social habits.

Currently, within the framework of modern institutionalism, the most common interpretation of the institutions of Douglas North is:

Institutes are the rules, the mechanisms that enforce them, and the norms of behavior that structure the repetitive interactions between people.

The economic actions of an individual do not take place in an isolated space, but in a certain society. And therefore it is of great importance how society will react to them. Thus, transactions that are acceptable and profitable in one place may not necessarily be viable even under similar conditions in another. An example of this is the restrictions imposed on various religious cults.

In order to avoid coordinating many external factors that affect success and the very possibility of making one or another decision, schemes or algorithms of behavior are developed within the framework of the economic and social orders that are most effective under given conditions. These schemes and algorithms or matrices of individual behavior are nothing but institutions.

"Institutions are the basis of economic behavior"

Thorstein Veblen (1857-1929), author of The Theory of the Leisure Class (1899), is considered the founder of the institutional trend.

The main thesis of Veblen's work: "Institutions are the basis of economic behavior." Veblen spoke out against a one-sided interpretation of the motives of behavior " economic man”, which has been widespread since the time of the classics (A. Smith).

Veblen considers it wrong that economics does not consider human behavior, its patterns, and focuses on the instruments of the market mechanism, the monetary system.

Veblen has two main ideas. The economy is constantly developing and evolving. Economic changes occur under the influence of institutions, which are also constantly changing. But often institutional changes lag behind, and institutions hinder development. To debug the institutions, the countries of the West needed 400-300 years. This is a very complex and controversial process. Hence the conclusion: it is not the market mechanism itself that changes, but institutions, the institutional environment, customs, laws; each country has its own specific institutions; economists should study not ideal schemes, but real norms, traditions, structures.

Criticizing the classics, Veblen stated: a person should not be treated as a kind of mechanical ball or calculating machine, a kind of "calculator of pleasures and hardships." He is guided not only by the profit motive and not by strictly arithmetical calculation, commensurate the amount of costs with the size of the benefits.

The behavior of the individual as a consumer and participant in production is highly ambiguous. Its economic interests represent a complex and contradictory system, therefore, it is necessary to take into account more fully social conditions, psychological motives.

Institutes— habitual ways of carrying out the process of social life. The accepted way of life is based on the system of views held by social groups. The formation of institutions is conservative. The previously established forms and rules do not correspond to today's situation and must be constantly changed.

"Theme 1. general characteristics institutional economics Lecture No. 1 Theoretical features of institutional economics The term institutional economics refers mainly to ... "

Institutional economy

Topic 1. General characteristics

institutional economics

Lecture #1

Theoretical features

institutional economics

The term institutional economics refers mainly to the totality of those areas of modern economic theory, which

combines two common properties, namely:

1. expansion of the subject area of ​​economic theory; and correspondingly,

2. modification underlying assumptions forming the research method.

Domain extension is associated with two additional and closely related areas of analysis:

A. aspects of social life and human behavior that are not directly related to the operation of the market mechanism. So there were attempts to study human behavior in the field of politics, family, crimes and punishments, law, contract interaction, organizations, etc., based on the methods of neoclassical theory, and the corresponding approach was called economic imperialism.

b. institutions that are not customary to study within the framework of neoclassical theory.

As the most general definition of an institution, the following can be proposed: an institution is any mechanism that ensures the coordination and/or effective motivation of economic behavior. Thus, the meaning of the existence of institutions lies in the matching of plans (coordination) and/or the matching of incentives (motivation).

What is a mechanism for coordinating economic behavior and why is it needed? The mechanism of coordination is what guides economic behavior, that is, it helps to decide on fundamental economic issues such as what, how and for whom to produce.

The need for such a mechanism arises in any economy based on the social division of labor. The latter presupposes that each individual taken specializes in some narrow field of activity, for example, the profession of a locksmith or a teacher, which by itself, that is, in isolation from interaction with other participants in economic life, could not satisfy his needs. In such a system, everyone is focused on performing a narrow set of labor operations with the aim of subsequently exchanging the results of their work for the results of the work of other economic entities. Thus, the usefulness of any economic activity here it depends on the possibility of exchanging its results, i.e., whether they are needed by other people and, if needed, then to what extent. The last question is related to whether other economic entities will agree to provide in exchange for certain results of economic activity such a quantity of necessary goods that would make this activity expedient. In microeconomics, the implementation of decisions related to the answers to these fundamental questions is called resource allocation. This term embodies the idea of ​​the rarity of the resources needed to satisfy unlimited needs, and that the point of economic activity is for people to obtain the maximum possible satisfaction from the use of these resources.

Accordingly, institutions are what help answer fundamental economic questions or determine the allocation of resources.

If the need for a coordination mechanism is because people may not know what the right choice should be for resource allocation, then a mechanism to ensure the right motivation is needed because people may not want to make that right choice.

Accordingly, the function of institutions is also to provide profitability right choice for economic agents.

The question arises: what institutions are usually studied in the framework of neoclassical theory? First of all, the market. It should be clarified in what sense the market is an institution, that is, a mechanism for coordinating and providing motivation. The market as a mechanism for coordination and stimulation is a system of relative prices. The latter contain information about the current proportions of exchange between various goods, which is necessary to answer fundamental economic questions and provide an incentive to realize these answers. It is relative prices, that is, exchange proportions, and not absolute price levels, that perform a coordinating and stimulating function, since only they indicate the comparative value of various resources and goods and, thus, what needs to be saved and what is available. greatest need.

From the point of view of neoclassical theory, the market is the only institution that is of serious importance, and therefore the action of other institutions in economic analysis can be abstracted. Institutional economics, on the other hand, is characterized by the belief that other institutions are also of great importance, and neglecting them hinders a correct understanding of economic behavior and the functioning of the institutional economics of the economy. Thus, the main difference between neoclassical and institutional theories lies in the scope of the institutions studied:

neoclassical theory is limited to the study of a single institution - the market, while institutional economics, in addition to the market, also studies other institutions (Fig. 1.1).

Rice. 1.1. Correlation between neoclassical and institutional theories in terms of coverage of the institutions under study These two additional areas of analysis that characterize the subject area of ​​institutional economics are closely related in two respects. First, the study of the rational behavior of individuals outside the market mechanism necessarily involves the study of other mechanisms of coordination and stimulation. Secondly, the study of the operation of non-market institutions makes it necessary to go beyond purely market activities, as, for example, in the analysis internal functioning firms. Therefore, it is no coincidence that representatives of economic imperialism (G. Becker, R. Posner, J. Buchanan, etc.) are often referred to as institutional paradigm, and representatives of the latter (R. Coase, D. North, O. Williamson, etc.) are often considered as having contributed to the expansion of the subject area of ​​economic theory, for example, through the analysis of contracts, organizations, etc.

As already mentioned, the expansion of the subject area within the framework of institutional economics also makes it necessary to modify the methodology of neoclassical theory. Accordingly, in order to understand the methodological features of institutional economics, it is necessary to have an idea of ​​the methodology of neoclassical theory.

The main assumptions of neoclassical theory According to the concept of the famous philosopher and historian of science I. Lakatos, the theoretical assumptions of any scientific school consist of a fixed core and a variable protective belt. The assumptions of the hard core form the main essence of the scientific school, and the rejection of them means a transition to another school. The protective belt consists of assumptions that are used in economic analysis depending on the development of scientific discussion and the course of economic history. According to this classification, one can represent the assumptions of neoclassical theory.

Assumptions of the Hard Core of Neoclassical Theory

1. The principle of methodological individualism. This principle refers to the relationship of the whole and the part. In particular, the whole is derived from its parts, that is, the whole owes all its properties and laws of behavior to its parts, and it does not have any independent properties. Applied to society, this means that all characteristics of society, such as institutions, can be derived from the behavior of individuals.

2. Optimization as the main way of describing economic behavior, i.e., economic behavior always comes down to maximizing benefits or minimizing costs.

3. Transitivity and stability of preferences. Transitivity of preferences means that if there are three alternatives A, B and C, so that A f B and B f C, then A f C. Transitivity of preferences is a necessary condition for the existence of the best alternative, without which optimization is impossible. Stability of preferences means that individuals do not tend to change their preferences frequently, so that their behavior would become unpredictable.

Essentially, preference transitivity and persistence are assumptions that further explain the meaning of optimization.

4. Equilibrium as the main way to describe economic dynamics.

In accordance with this principle, the functioning of the economic system is always reduced either to a stationary state in equilibrium, for example, equality of supply and demand, or to movement towards equilibrium (Fig. 2.1). The simplest example of the application of this principle is the market equilibrium model individual product. It contains two main types of economic dynamics, which are also present in more complex models. At the same time, it should be emphasized that the principle of equilibrium, in essence, includes the two previous assumptions, since the behavior of an individual can also be interpreted either as a state of equilibrium (optimization) or as a movement towards equilibrium (toward optimization), and the Institutional The economy of the third assumption, as already mentioned, is nothing more than the disclosure of the second.

Rice. 2.1. Equilibrium in the market of a particular product as an illustration of the equilibrium approach to the description of economic dynamics, so that the system is either at rest-equilibrium, or tends to equilibrium Assumptions of the protective belt of neoclassical theory

1. The principle of complete rationality. First, it is necessary to define rationality as such. The latter refers to the correspondence between the goals set and the means used. If a person's actions are contrary to his goals, then such behavior is beyond the scope of economic theory.

Accordingly, rationality is allowed in any school of economic theory, and the main difference between them is related to understanding the limitations of rationality. In this case, such restrictions are not provided and, in particular, it is assumed that there are no costs for obtaining and processing information. This means that the method of placement existing for the given purposes and restrictions

resources will certainly be used by the individual without any cost to find this way.

2. Assumption of the absence of opportunism. This assumption follows from the first. Since a necessary condition for the manifestation of opportunism is the asymmetry of information, which implies incompleteness of information, the first assumption necessarily leads to the absence of opportunism.

3. Assumption of the market mechanism as the only significant institution of the economic system. This assumption has already been mentioned in connection with the characterization of institutional economics as a result of expanding the subject area of ​​economic theory (Fig. 1.1).

4. Assumption of the free functioning of the market mechanism.

This assumption is similar to the premise accepted in the framework of Newtonian mechanics about the absence of friction in mechanical systems. The interaction of the parts of the system, which here is the market exchange, is carried out in the absence of friction, i.e., without transaction costs.

5. Assumption of full specification of property rights. Under this assumption, all ownership of rare resources is always clearly defined and protected, which is a necessary condition for the exchange. Since property rights are transferred in market exchange, these properties must be determined in order for the exchange to take place. You can't change what doesn't belong to anyone.

Note that just as the second assumption is an explanation of the first, so the fourth and fifth are the disclosure of the third. The market mechanism may be the only significant institution if its use does not generate additional costs and if property rights are clearly specified.

Institutional economy

Lecture №2 Classification of schools of institutional theory

As already mentioned, institutional economics is a collection of schools that differ from each other in their subject and methodological features.

One of the criteria for their classification can be their relationship with the assumptions of neoclassical theory. Accordingly, some schools confine themselves only to changing the assumptions of the protective belt of neoclassical theory and, thus, simply modify it in relation to current state scientific discussion. We will refer to these schools as neo- or new institutional theory. Others allow themselves to reject the assumptions of its hard core as well, which means they are trying to propose a fundamentally new economic theory (Fig. 3.1).

Rice. 3.1. Classification of schools of institutional economics according to the degree of departure from the assumption of neoclassical theory: some limit themselves to its modification, others propose a fundamentally new theory Neo- or new institutional economics First, it is necessary to clarify the terms neo-institutional and new institutional theory, since they are interpreted differently in various publications . For example, in Institutional Economics

A. N. Oleinik, the term “new institutional economics” practically coincides with the term “economy of agreements” (French institutionalism). T. Eggertsson in the book "Institutions and Economic Behavior"

proposes to make a distinction between G. Simon's concept of bounded rationality, which, in his opinion, has been fully embodied in O. Williamson's theory of transaction costs, and the theories of R. Coase and

General characteristics of institutional economics

D. Norta. Accordingly, he designates the first case as a new institutional economics, and the second - as a neo-institutional theory.

In this manual, however, it is proposed to accept these terms as equivalent, since they do not differ among the leading figures of neo- or new institutional theory, such as R. Coase, D. North, O. Williamson, etc.

As for the economics of agreements, here it is considered as a direction different from the new institutional economics.

Assumptions common to neoinstitutional theory

1. The principle of bounded rationality. According to this principle, obtaining and processing information are associated with costs. This means that optimization for an individual will consist in finding not the best of the existing, but the best of the alternatives possible under given informational constraints. This principle, which implies the incompleteness of information in individuals, reveals the possibility of information asymmetry, which implies the private nature of information. The latter means the constant reproduction of the situation when some of its participants know about the essential aspects of contractual interaction, while others do not.

2. Opportunism as a characteristic of economic behavior.

The asymmetry of information creates the possibility for a strong form of self-interest, i.e., opportunism.

The latter means that in order to achieve personal gain, individuals will be ready to violate existing rules and, accordingly, cause damage to their counterparties.

3. Assumption of incomplete specification and protection of property rights. This case highlights the fact that in the real world property rights are always only partially defined. For some rare resources, such as air, water, silence, etc., they are not defined at all. For other resources, they are defined only to some extent.

4. Emphasizing the importance of transaction costs. Transaction costs are the costs associated with moving or protecting property rights. In this case, it is emphasized that these costs are high enough to affect the results of the functioning of the economic system.

5. Deriving the role of non-market institutions from the incomplete specification and protection of property rights and from the existence of positive transaction costs. Since the functioning of a market-based institutional economy mechanism can be difficult due to the blurring of property rights, and is also not free, which follows from positive transaction costs, this raises the question of alternative mechanisms for coordination and incentives, the use of which, under certain conditions, could be cheaper than market.

Meanings of the term "institution" in neo-institutional theory In institutional theory, several meanings of the term institution can be distinguished, differing both in breadth of coverage economic phenomena, as well as in meaning.

1. Any mechanism for coordination and stimulation. This meaning has already been mentioned in connection with the characterization of institutional economics in comparison with neoclassical theory. This is the broadest meaning of the term, so that the concept of institution also includes the market as a system of relative prices.

2. Any non-market mechanism for coordination and stimulation. This narrower meaning is often encountered when institutional theorists emphasize the role of institutions (for example, the famous phrase “institutions matter”), referring to any mechanisms of coordination and incentives other than the market.

3. (Institutions-)rules or institutional environment. An even narrower meaning of the term institution, which includes only the rules that ensure order in the interactions between people.

4. (Institutions-)contracts or (institutions-)agreements. Under the contract in a broad institutional sense means an explicit or implicit agreement that organizes the implementation of transactions.

It should be noted that according to the classification of D. North, contracts are also a kind of rules, being at the lowest level of their hierarchy. At the same time, in the neo-institutional theory, rules (apart from contracts) and contracts act as two autonomous areas of study, on the basis of which rules and contracts are considered separately in this manual.

5. Organizations. An organization, such as a firm, is commonly thought of as a network of contracts.

6. Institutional arrangement. This term, proposed by O.

Williamson, has a broader meaning and refers to any way of consciously organizing transactions, whether they be contracts, organizations, or a market mechanism.

General characteristics of institutional economics

Main Subject Areas and Directions within the Neo-Institutional Theory Neo-institutional economics, like institutionalism in general, is not a homogeneous trend. It is possible to single out a whole set of schools that differ in subject areas and the analysis tools used. Depending on the latter, various neo-institutional schools also differ in the degree of proximity to neoclassical theory.

The first and most general criterion for classifying neo-institutional schools is the emphasis on the type of institutions studied, namely rules or contracts. Rules are the main focus of neo-institutionalism, such as the new economic history, public choice theory, constitutional economics, and the theory of property rights. The study of contracts is mainly occupied by representatives of such areas as the theory of contracts, or the theory of agency relations, and the theory of organizations, the main backbone of which is the theory of transaction costs, which, in turn, is subdivided into the theory of transaction management structures and the theory of measuring the profitability of transactions.

The new economic history is also a heterogeneous phenomenon and is divided into such currents as cliometrics, i.e., a quantitative analysis of the data of economic history (its leader is R. Vogel), and neo-institutional economic history proper. It is the latter school, headed by D. North, that is mainly meant by the new economic history when it comes to this current of neo-institutional economics1. The subject of research of this school is the influence of institutions-rules, both public and private, on economic growth in various countries. Much attention is paid here to cross-country comparisons of economic growth, the explanation of which is sought in differences in the institutional structure, that is, primarily in the institutions-rules.

Further, institutional theories of rules fall into those that study public rules and those that study private rules. The former include public choice theory and constitutional economics.

The subject of study of the theory of public choice is rational behavior in the sphere of political and public life, i.e. behavior For the sake of justice, it should be noted that along with R. Vogel, D. North is rightfully considered one of the founders of cliometrics as well, since he began with quantitative studies, such as price dynamics and wages in medieval England, the effectiveness of ocean shipping in the XVII-XIX centuries. etc. At the same time, he conducted quantitative studies, for example, on the dynamics of the transaction sector in the United States, which are of great importance both for the analysis of transaction costs and institutions, and in terms of the application of cliometric methods.

The institutional economics of politicians, officials, voters, etc., as well as the impact of this behavior on the economic results of the functioning of the state apparatus. The principle of methodological individualism is brought to its logical end in this theory, since the properties of the whole (state, society, etc.) are completely derived from the behavior of individual people. The main difference of constitutional economics - another variety of neo-institutionalism that studies rules - is to soften the extremes of methodological individualism at the expense of ideas taken from the theory of order.2 Neo-institutional theory, which studies private rules, is usually referred to as the theory of property rights. The focus here is on the property specification/erosion issue and its impact on resource allocation. With a broad understanding of property rights, when they are subdivided into a number of powers, that is, various freedoms and restrictions, they merge with the general concept of private rules, and the theory of property rights can be considered, more generally, as an economic analysis of law.

Neo-institutional theories (and not only neo-institutional ones) that focus on contracts are usually referred to as contract theory or organization theory, with the difference that in the first one the emphasis is on the analysis of the stage of preparation and conclusion of a contract, and in the second theory, first of all, the implementation process is already studied. concluded contract.

Accordingly, these two theories can be considered as two components of the general theory of contracts, where the first can be designated as the ex ante theory of the contract process, and the second as the ex post theory of the contract process.

The main assumption of the first of these theories is that the contract after its conclusion is fully implemented and, thus, the ex post contract process is not associated with any additional difficulties. The subject area of ​​this theory falls into two main problems, namely, the problem of pre- and post-contract opportunism. The first of the problems is often associated with adverse selection due to the asymmetry of information between the seller and the buyer. The second problem is usually associated with moral hazard, i.e., the likelihood of an adverse effect of the concluded contract on the incentive system of counterparties. Both problems in this theory are solved at the stage of concluding a contract, that is, the main question here is how in one or another specific situation there must be a contract to exclude pre- or post-contract opportunism.

The main premise of the second theory is that contracts always contain inaccuracies and other imperfections, due to which they are, i.e., an integral part of traditional institutionalism.

General characteristics of institutional economics implementation can only be partial. Hence the need to manage contractual relations after the conclusion of the contract.

The main conclusion of this theory is that the main function of contracts, or organizations, is to save on the amount of transaction and production costs. At the same time, within the framework of this theory, there are two views on the reason for this economy. In the theory of transaction management structures, it is assumed that this economy is achieved by differentially assigning transactions to different structures for managing them, i.e., for each transaction, the organization most suitable for it is selected, whether it be a market, a firm, or some intermediate form. The specificity of the theory of measuring the profitability of transactions lies in the fact that it focuses on the costs associated with the uncertainty of economic results and the characteristics of the exchanged goods. The main value of contracts, or organizations, is seen in the reduction of this kind of uncertainty.

–  –  –

Lecture No. 3 Directions of institutional economics that are not included in the mainstream of economic theory Traditional institutionalism This trend3 is the oldest in institutional theory, and to one degree or another it influenced all the institutional schools that arose subsequently. In particular, neo-institutional economics, in addition to neoclassical theory, has also experienced the influence of traditional institutionalism. The most famous representatives of this trend are T. Veblen, W. Mitchell and J. Commons. In addition to them, this current includes J. M. Clark and J. K. Galbraith, and in our time - J. S. Hodgson and W. J. Samuels. Of these, J. Commons had the greatest influence on neo-institutional theory.

The main methodological features of traditional institutionalism include the following:

1. The principle of methodological collectivism. This principle is also referred to as institutional determinism. Man is seen here as a product of the society in which he lives.

The most important characteristics of society are the stereotypes of thinking and rules of behavior adopted in it, which are of a supra-individual nature and form the individuals that form this society. The term institutional determinism encompasses the idea of ​​the total dependence of the behavior of individuals on existing institutions.

2. The assumption of stereotypes of thinking and habits as the main engine of economic behavior. Unlike neoclassical economics and the theories derived from it, in which individual behavior is interpreted on the basis of optimization principles, in traditional institutionalism, instead of optimization, the habits of economic behavior play the main role. For example, a certain consumption bundle is chosen simply out of habit, and not as a result of calculation in order to find the maximum utility.

3. The principle of cumulative causality. This principle applies to economic dynamics and, accordingly, displaces the equilibrium approach of the neoclassical school. The term cumulative causality denotes this type of dependence of any variables. Its other names are the old and American institutionalism.

A general characteristic of institutional economics in which their changes in a certain direction mutually reinforce each other. In such a situation, the economy will not only lack a tendency to return to an equilibrium state, but any change will create the preconditions for its continuation and strengthening.

Evolutionary theory Among modern schools of institutional theory, one of the closest to traditional institutionalism is evolutionary theory. In addition to traditional institutionalism, evolutionary theory, as its name implies, has also been influenced by the principles of evolutionism, espoused, in particular, by evolutionary biology. The founders of this direction are R. Nelson and S. Winter thanks to their joint book "Evolutionary Theory economic changes". In addition to them, it is also customary to include J. Schumpeter and J. Hodgson in this direction.

The main theoretical features of this school include the following.

1. Using the methods and concepts of evolutionary biology as tools for economic analysis. Here is the fundamental difference between evolutionary theory and neoclassical economics, which uses Newtonian (or classical) mechanics as its model.

In evolutionary theory, the concepts of evolution, mutations, natural selection, genes, organisms, etc. are used as the basic categories of economic analysis.

2. The principle of historical time with an emphasis on the irreversibility of the past. This principle boils down to three propositions: a) the past is irreversible; b) the future is uncertain; c) variability is the most important inherent property of all things, including economic agents and systems. Thus, this principle involves taking into account those ancient philosophical provisions that "everything changes"

and "you cannot step into the same water twice." As a prerequisite for economic analysis, this means the recognition of the fact that time, as a universal property of change, exists and influences the behavior of economic agents and systems. This influence is enhanced by its characteristics such as the irreversibility of what has been done in the past and the uncertainty about what will happen in the future. This principle implies the rejection of the main assumptions of neoclassical theory, namely, optimization and equilibrium as ideal types of behavior of individuals and systems. Both of these neoclassical assumptions imply a state of no movement, zero freedom, or the pursuit of it (Fig. 2.1), which is incompatible, first of all, with the position of universal volatility. In addition, optimization and the equilibrium principle closely related to it become impossible also due to uncertainty, which does not allow the implementation of calculations to find the optimal variant. As for the irreversibility of the past, it excludes the desire to return to the optimal or equilibrium state after leaving it. In short, the equilibrium principle presupposes the presence of a certain point of attraction that determines the dynamics of economic behavior, while the principle of historical time excludes the presence of such a point. Instead, he affirms economic reality as a kind of historical flow, unpredictable and irreversible.

Emphasis on the study of economic changes. One of the main 3.

questions of evolutionary theory is how and why economic organisms change, what are firms, markets, etc.

Combining the principles of methodological individualism and methodological collectivism. Unlike both neoclassical theory and old institutionalism, evolutionary theory recognizes the active role of both the part and the whole. In particular, the initiative of individual economic agents and the influence of external environment, i.e. institutions and economic behavior are in dynamic interaction.

Assumption of procedural rationality. Impossibility of optimization 5.

due to the uncertainty of the future, it implies a different type of rationality, which is commonly referred to as procedural. Procedural rationality consists in using the rules for performing repetitive operations, i.e., the bulk of actions are performed according to a certain pattern, without special calculation. The rationale for using these rules is to save effort associated with the collection and processing of information.

6. Emphasis on the analysis of routines in the study of economic organizations.

These rules or patterns are called routines in evolutionary theory. Each organization is characterized by its own set of routines, which some scientists identify with genes in evolutionary biology. In this sense, routines are the key to understanding the behavior of economic organizations, since they, like the genes of an organism, contain a certain code that predetermines

General characteristics of institutional economics

shy their behavior. These routines can refer to activities of different levels, ranging from primitive operations to strategic decision making. They can be formed consciously, with an eye to the effectiveness of their use in the past, and unconsciously. Survival in the market element of certain organizations is determined by the relative viability of their routine genes.

Thus, routines determine the survival or death of organizations in the market element. As a result, something like a natural selection of gene-routines takes place, and with them their corresponding organizations. At the same time, in response to changes in the external environment, mutation of genes-routins can also occur. It is in the mutation of routines that the key to understanding economic changes lies, i.e.

changes in economic organizations. Summarizing the above, we can say that the economy is a set of economic organisms fighting among themselves for survival. Each economic organism is characterized by its own genetic code, i.e., a set of routines. In the course of natural selection, organizations with more viable genes survive, while others perish. At the same time, the survivability of genes is determined, among other things, by the ability to efficiently mutate in response to environmental changes.

Post-Keynesianism Although this direction of modern economic thought is usually attributed to macroeconomics, it is also listed here in the list of institutional theories, since in many of its theoretical positions it is directly adjacent to the old institutionalism and evolutionary theory. The founding fathers of post-Keynesianism are J.

M. Keynes and M. Kalecki, and in the postwar period a great contribution to the development of this school was made by H. F. Minsky, P. Davidson, A. Eichner and others.

Let us list the theoretical features of this trend, bringing it closer to institutionalism.

1. The principle of historical time with an emphasis on the uncertainty of the future. The essence of this principle has already been said above, and here it is only necessary to say about its refraction in post-Keynesian theory.

The main problem that preoccupies the theorists of this school is the fundamental uncertainty of the future. The latter, unlike other types of uncertainty, comes down to two provisions: a. uncertainty is a property of the surrounding world, and not only the result of limited human cognitive abilities; b. uncertainty is not reduced to risk, ie, situations where institutional economics is aware of a set of possible future events and their corresponding probabilities.

2. Assumption of rationality. Rationality is behavior that is based on no rational calculation at all. This is due to the fundamental uncertainty of the future, when, due to the lack of necessary information there is no reliable basis for making a rational decision. At the same time, decisions have to be made. As a result, decisions are made without a rational basis, influenced by emotions and other irrelevant factors. This was expressed by J. M. Keynes when he spoke of the need to "take into account the nerves, the hysterical tendency, even the digestion and responses to changing weather in those on whose spontaneous activity ... investments depend to a large extent."4 includes the concept of animal spirits he introduced, which he defined as “the spontaneously arising determination to act.”5

3. The principle of holism. According to this principle, the whole is greater than the sum of its parts, that is, the whole has properties and patterns of behavior that cannot be derived from the properties and behavior of individual parts. The use of this principle unites post-Keynesianism with the old institutionalism, but it should be noted that post-Keynesianism applies this principle even more widely.

Here it is understood not only in the form of institutional determinism, i.e., the conditionality of people's behavior by existing norms, but also in the form of macroeconomic determinism, i.e.

properties of the economic system, measured by macroeconomic indicators, which cannot be found in individual individuals.

An example here is the paradox of thrift, according to which saving, while making individuals richer, causes economic damage to the entire system, since it leads to a reduction in aggregate demand and, accordingly, a decrease in GDP.

4. The study of institutions-rules in the form of conventional expectations.

An example of institutional determinism in post-Keynesianism is the emphasis on the role of conventional, i.e. generally accepted, expectations that determine investment both in financial markets and in real sector, and with them the course of the business cycle.

Keynes J. M. General theory employment, interest and money. M.: Anthology of economic classics, 1993, p. 262.

–  –  –

General characteristics of institutional economics In addition to rationality, i.e. the general mood, the decisions of individuals are also influenced by the prevailing mood of the crowd, which, in turn, is also rational, i.e. caused by some random factor, for example, some message in the media . Thus, the institutions-rules here act in the form of a dominant mood, which sets the mood for individual individuals as well.

5. Allocation as the main function of institutions-contracts to reduce the uncertainty of the future. In addition to rationality and conventional expectations as a response to fundamental uncertainty, contracts are also used. At the same time, it is forward, or long-term, contracts that stand out, because, by obliging individuals to act in a certain way for a long time, they reduce uncertainty and, thereby, facilitate calculations and help to make investments.

6. Allocation of the institutional function of money, consisting in protection from the uncertainty of the future. According to the post-Keynesian understanding of money, its function is not only to facilitate exchange, as suggested in neoclassical theory, but also to protect against uncertainty. They perform this function through their inherent property of the greatest liquidity, which provides individuals who keep their wealth in monetary form with freedom of maneuver.

The desire to protect against uncertainty takes the form of a preference for liquidity, i.e., the decision to store wealth in cash due to the lack of positive expectations of the future. At the same time, the precautionary motive of preferring liquidity is associated with the desire to fulfill contractual obligations, and the speculative motive is associated with bearish expectations of exchange players.

Economics of agreements This direction is also called French institutionalism, since its main representatives are French, and most of the works representing it are written in French. L. Thevenot, L. Boltanski, O. Favoro, F. Aimard-Duvernet and others are considered to be the most famous authors currently working within this school.

The most important theoretical features of this school are.

1. The position that society is a complex system consisting of several subsystems. At the same time, in this school, it is customary to distinguish seven subsystems: market, industrial, traditional, civil, public opinion, creative and environmental.

Institutional Economics Each subsystem is characterized by its own set of agreements, which include rules that ensure order in interactions between people, including contracts.

Table 1.1.

Seven subsystems of society, their characteristics and examples of their respective areas of activity

–  –  –

To characterize one or another subsystem, an approximately corresponding variety of each of the two main types of institutions that are found in economic theory is indicated, namely, rules and contracts, and information signals in the form of a system of relative prices or their substitutes. At the same time, in Table.

General characteristics of institutional economics

1.1 the type of contracts is selected based on the legal classification of J. McNeil.6

2. There are three types of correlation of subsystems, namely, expansion, touch and compromise.

Expansion refers to the case when the institutions, i.e. rules, contracts and information signals, of one subsystem are used in another subsystem. As examples of expansion, one can cite the political market, which involves the use of the institutions of the market subsystem in the civil subsystem, or, conversely, state regulation prices at which the institutions of the civil subsystem are used in the market subsystem.

Touching is a case where there is uncertainty about the institutions within which this or that interaction should take place. An example of touching is the situation of receiving guests, when the question arises about their participation in covering the costs of a feast. Hosts may either require appropriate monetary compensation for the feast organized by them (market subsystem), or to treat them for free (traditional subsystem). This can give rise to a high degree of uncertainty in the relationships of individuals regarding the distribution of expenses for a feast, which is illustrated in Table. 2.1.7 The Host may operate on the basis of a market or traditional subsystem, and the assessment of his actions by the Guest may also be evaluated in terms of both subsystems. Certainty in their interactions will take place when the actions of the Host and the assessments of the Guest are carried out within the same subsystem (favorable assessments of "sane" and "hospitable"). When they are in different subsystems, there will be uncertainty in their relationship (unfavorable assessments of "miser" and "sweat").

Williamson O. Economic institutions of capitalism. Firms, markets and relational contracting. St. Petersburg: Lenizdat, 1996, ss. 127-132. In this manual, this classification is discussed in Topic 9.

For a similar example of touching the market and civil subsystems, see: Oleinik A.N.

Institutional economy. M.: INFRA-M, 2000, p. 51.

Institutional Economics Table 2.1. An example of touching the market and traditional subsystems

–  –  –

Compromise takes place when complex institutions arise that combine the properties of several subsystems. Examples include stock trading, in which the desire to maximize utility by trading on the stock exchange is combined with taking into account the opinion of the crowd. Other examples include the conspicuous consumption and advertising described by T. Veblen.8

3. The principle of institutional determinism. Within the framework of this school, as well as in the old institutionalism, it is assumed that human behavior is entirely determined by existing rules, while these rules themselves do not depend on the will of an individual person.

4. Interpretation of following the rules as a condition for rational behavior.

This assumption softens the institutional determinism of the economics of agreements compared to the old institutionalism.

Within the framework of the latter, a person obeys the rules, regardless of whether it is beneficial or disadvantageous to him. It is also assumed here that although the rules of behavior are external to a person, it is always beneficial for him to obey them. Obedience to rules, whatever they may be, creates order in the interaction between people and, thereby, increases common benefit. This role of rules can be illustrated by the Prisoner's Dilemma, which, in its generalized form, for each of the players consists in choosing between cooperation ("deny guilt" in the classical prisoner's dilemma) and rivalry ("confess").

–  –  –

This matrix shows that it is more profitable for each individual individual to adhere to the rivalry strategy, since the latter provides him with greater expected utility compared to the cooperation strategy (for individual A and for individual B, if the players assume that the probability of choosing one strategy or another by another player is equal to 1/2 ). At the same time, the overall result, measured by the sum of payoffs at the Nash equilibrium point (3.3), does not provide the Pareto optimum (5.5). This leads to the conclusion that people's behavior aimed at maximizing individual utility may be incompatible with maximizing social utility, which, ultimately, will have a negative impact on the well-being of individual individuals (cf. payoff 3 when maximizing individual utility versus 5 when maximizing social utility). Since the individual desire to maximize utility is not enough to achieve the Pareto optimum, institutional economics needs some kind of supra-individual structures, which, in the framework of the economy of agreement, generally accepted rules of behavior are considered. So, the classic prisoner's dilemma is solved by introducing the rule "got caught - deny everything." The existence of such a rule would make the behavior of individuals for each other predictable and would ensure the achievement of the Pareto optimum.

Literature:

Rozmainsky I. V., Kholodilin K. A. The history of economic analysis in the West. Text of lectures. St. Petersburg, St. Petersburg FGU-HSE. 2000 (http://ie.boom.ru/History1.

htm), Skorobogatov A. S. Macroeconomic role of institutions: from ontological uncertainty to the concept of the business cycle // Economic Bulletin of the Rostov State University. Volume 3 (№2), 2005, ss.

83-95 (http://institutional.narod.ru/journal3.2.pdf).

Williamson O. Comparison of alternative approaches to the analysis of economic organization // Lessons of business organization. Ed. Demina A. A., Katkalo V. S. St. Petersburg: Lenizdat, 1994.

Williamson OI Economic institutions of capitalism. Firms, markets and relational contracting. St. Petersburg: Lenizdat, 1996, introduction and chapter 1.

Additional literature:

Lakatos I. Falsification and methodology of research programs. M.: Ermak, 2003, ss. 75-85.

Thevenot L. Rationality or social norms: overcome contradiction // Economic sociology. 2001, vol. 2, no. 1 (http://www.ecsoc.msses.

Eggertsson T. Economic behavior and institutions. M.: Delo, 2000, chapter 1.

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Man versus Homo economicus

At first glance, starting a conversation about institutional economics with a person is strange. Because in the economy there are firms, there are governments and sometimes, somewhere on the horizon, there are still people, and those are usually hidden under the pseudonym "household". But I immediately want to express a heretical view: there are no firms, states and households - there are different combinations of people. When we hear, “This is in the interests of the firm,” all we have to do is to scratch our finger a little and figure out whose interests are meant? These may be the interests of top managers, the interests of shareholders, the interests of certain groups of employees, the interests of the owner controlling stake shares or, conversely, minority shareholders. But in any case, there are no abstract interests of the company - there are interests of specific people. The same thing happens when we say, "The household has received income." Well, this is where things get interesting! Because the family has its own complex distribution process, very difficult tasks are solved, in which many different negotiating forces are involved - children, grandchildren, the older generation. Therefore, in economics, we will not get away from the question of a person. This is usually called the “proposition on methodological individualism”, but this name is extremely unfortunate, because it is not at all about whether a person is an individualist or not an individualist. The point is, is there anything in the social world that does not consist of the various interests of people? No, it doesn't exist. Then you need to understand: what is he, this person?

father of all political economy Adam Smith is considered the author of the human model that walks through all textbooks and is called Homo economicus. I want to speak in defense of the great progenitor. It must be remembered that Adam Smith could not teach at the Department of Political Economy, because in his time such a science simply did not exist. He taught at the Department of Philosophy. If in the course of political economy he talked about the egoistic person, then in the course of moral philosophy he had provisions about the altruistic person, and these are not two different people, but one and the same. However, Smith's students and followers were no longer teaching at the department of philosophy, and therefore a very strange flawed construction was formed in science - Homo economicus, which underlies all economic calculations of behavior. To a large extent, it was influenced by the French educational philosophy of the 18th century, which said that human consciousness is infinite, reason is omnipotent, man himself is beautiful, and if he is freed, then everything around him will flourish. And as a result of the adultery of the great philosopher and economist Smith, Homo economicus turned out - an omniscient selfish bastard who has supernatural abilities to rationalize and maximize his utility.

This design lives in very many economic works XX and XXI centuries. However, a person who pursues exclusively selfish goals and does this without any restrictions, because he is omniscient, like gods, and all-good, like angels, is an unreal being. The new institutional economic theory corrects these ideas by introducing two assumptions that are important for all other constructions and reasoning: the assumption about the limited rationality of a person and the assumption about his propensity for opportunistic behavior.

Man versus rationality

In fact, the notion that a person has unlimited rational abilities is refuted by the life experience of each of us. Although we clearly underestimate our own and others' limited rationality in our own lives. Economist and psychologist Herbert Simon Nobel Prize for solving the question of how exactly limited rationality manifests itself, how a person, not having endless abilities to obtain information and process it, solves many life issues. Let's imagine how a person, according to the standard textbook of economics, should spend the morning. He gets up and, before having breakfast, he must solve the following minimal optimization problem: put in all possible types of yogurt, cottage cheese, eggs, ham and everything else that is eaten for breakfast, taking into account the difference in production, geography, prices. After he calculates all this, he will be able to make the best decision: buy in Moscow - and not in Singapore, eggs - and not avocados, in such and such a store and at such and such a price. There is a suspicion that if a person does not involve a couple of institutions for such calculations, he will not have breakfast or even dinner that day. So how does he solve this problem?

Herbert Simon argued that the decision is made as follows: when a person chooses a spouse, he does not put billions of individuals of the opposite sex into the computer. He makes several random tests, sets a template, a level of claims, and the first person who meets this level of claims becomes his wife or spouse (and then, of course, marriage is made in heaven). Exactly the same way - by random testing and establishing the level of claims - the problem is solved, what to have breakfast or, for example, what suit to buy. Therefore, from the proposition about the limited rationality of people it does not at all follow that they are stupid. This means that they do not have the ability to process the entirety of information, but at the same time they have a simple algorithm to solve many different questions.

Man against good intentions

But people are not angels yet. They often try to circumvent the conditions and rules of life that are offered to them. The recent Nobel laureate Oliver Williamson (received the prize in 2009), the author of the idea that people tend to engage in opportunistic behavior, defined it as behavior using the means of cunning and deceit, or behavior that is not burdened by moral norms. Again, this hardly needs special proof. But the novelty of Williamson's idea is that, as in the case of bounded rationality, we can say, how do people get around certain restrictions? One of the clearest examples of how these mechanisms work is the lemon market model, for which economist George Akerlof won the Nobel Prize in 2002.

The lemons model describes so-called pre-contract opportunistic behavior and is built on a very real, burning problem - the used car trade in the United States. Here comes a man to buy a used car. All of them are in proper shape, they all shine, but how well these cars drive, whether they will drive 500 meters and get up or drive another hundred thousand kilometers, it is not known - they all look the same. What is the buyer's selection criteria? There is the look and there is the price. Who can lower the price more? The one who sells a good enough car, or the one who sells a not so good car? It turns out that as soon as a person begins to make a decision based on appearance and the price of the goods, the most unscrupulous participant wins the competition, the seller of the "lemon" - this is how a low-quality car is called in the jargon of American car dealers. And "plums", that is, decent enough cars, are beginning to be squeezed out of the market, they are not for sale.

It would seem that the “lemons” model describes a completely pure situation - normal competition, no interference from external forces, no monopolies. But because the buyer is boundedly rational and cannot know everything, and the seller withholds some of the information—behaving opportunistically—competition does not lead to economic prosperity. Moreover, it can simply collapse this market, because the quality of sellers will constantly fall. By the way, the solution to this issue are quite simple rules- for example, if you introduce a seller's guarantee: he gives a guarantee on his own behalf that any breakdowns during the year are repaired at his expense - and prices immediately equalize.

But this is already a solution to the problem by introducing certain rules - institutions. And without these rules, we get the so-called "worsening selection". Moreover, what Akerlof proved on the example of the used car market works, for example, in the Russian state apparatus. If you don't understand what public goods and for whom the Russian state produces, then the selection criteria are related to how the boss evaluates the performance of an employee. As a result, a career will not be made by the one who produces goods better - worsening selection works wherever the consumer is not able to assess the quality of the product.

Man against the contract

However, opportunistic behavior can be not only pre-contract, but also post-contract, and the situations in which it manifests itself are not very new for us either. I think that many of us, if not all of us, have had the misfortune of changing dentists. Almost always, the first phrase of a new dentist will be: “And who put the fillings for you?” I even had a case when, years later, I went to the same dentist who had already put fillings on me, but in a different clinic. And when he uttered the phrase he was looking for, I said: "You won't believe it, Anatoly Konstantinovich, but it was you." But one way or another, you always become dependent on the dentist. He hints that everything needs to be redone, and when the redo begins and the need for additional costs arises, you have neither the criteria nor the opportunity to say no. After all, having come to a new dentist, you will get the same problem.

Entrepreneurs know this situation well from the construction industry. When I first came to the US in 1991, I was struck by the contrast. In the USSR, construction was considered a very respectable activity, and trade was considered base. In America, however, I found that trading is considered a highly respected occupation, and construction is somehow dubious. In part, such ideas are justified by the fact that the mafia sticks to construction - much more strongly than to trade. Because if you steal a third of the turnover in trade, then the business will collapse, and if you steal a third of the materials in construction, then the building will still stand. But the main thing is different: in construction there are opportunities for blackmail. In management theory, the so-called “Cheops principle” is even formulated: “since the pyramid of Cheops, not a single building has been built in compliance with the deadlines and estimates.” Having entered this process, you are forced to continue it.

Another quite obvious type of post-contract opportunistic behavior is called shirking. It is well understood by both the employee and the employer: if the employee clearly complies with the contract, comes at 9 am, turns on the computer, sits and looks at the monitor, it is not at all obvious that he is not, for example, on the Odnoklassniki website or does not watch porn. At the same time, all the formal requirements of the contract can be met, but there is no result that the employer expected. And he has to look for some other ways to implement the contract, make deals with the employee, say: “I will let you go on Friday evening if you do what you have to do on time.” Why is there such a breakdown and completion of the contract? Because there is such a form of opportunistic behavior as shirking.

Man against his own interests

Why talk about a person in such not very embellishing things? If we want a realistic economic theory, then a person who at least somehow resembles a real person must act in it. But real people are very different, and this difference must also be somehow taken into account in theory. This is not to say that all the people around are scammers. This is quite common, but people can behave selfishly and at the same time quite within the rules, and even the rules of morality. Finally, they can behave in a non-egoistic way at all - this is called “weak behavior”, when a person identifies himself with some kind of community - with a village, with a clan.

True, usually "weak behavior" is found in patriarchal societies. And, by the way, that is why the ancient Greeks did not consider slaves to be people. In the Strugatsky novel “Monday Begins on Saturday” there is an image of an imaginary future: two people stand, play citharas and state in hexameter that they live in a beautiful society where everyone is free, everyone is equal and everyone has two slaves. From our point of view, this is a colossal contradiction, but from their point of view, it is not. A person torn out of the community is like a torn off hand, finger or ear. He lives only when he is included in a certain community, and if he is torn out of his community and transferred to someone else's, he is already an instrument, a "talking tool", as the Romans said. That is why, for example, Socrates refused to leave his community and chose to accept death.

At the same time, sometimes the bonds that a traditional society gives are very effectively used today, in international competition. For example, South Korea built on the basis of kinship loyalty chaebols - huge business conglomerates, consisting of separate, formally independent firms. As a result, the Koreans got extremely low costs of running a concern, because they used "weak behavior", the recognition that you are part of something larger.

In Russia, this is impossible, because we have long lost traditional communities and, accordingly, people have nothing to identify themselves with. Take, for example, the peasantry, which began to be squeezed from the time of Peter I and finished off during the Bolshevik modernization. Having lost their habitual communities of identification, people, on the one hand, almost without resistance gave their neighbors to the terror, and on the other hand, they began to identify themselves with non-existent communities: with the European proletariat, with the starving Negroes of Africa. The peasant stereotype of identification worked, but not on the scale of a village or community, which no longer exists, but on the scale of a “people” or even “the whole world.” It is for the sake of this “people” or this “new universality” that one must sacrifice oneself or someone else.

Man against the system

It must be remembered that the concepts of bounded rationality and opportunism extend not only to the relationship of people with each other, but also, for example, to their relationship with the state. This essence itself is quite illusory - like the essence of the "people", it is an object of manipulation of the human individual or at least groups of human beings. And that's why institutional economists don't talk about the state - they talk about rulers and their agents. Here it would be appropriate to recall the famous and bondage-derived formula “do not be afraid, do not hope, do not ask,” which absorbed the rather tragically received understanding of bounded rationality and opportunistic behavior.

Why don't be afraid? Because people tend to exaggerate certain dangers. For example, we may think that we are continuously recorded by special services that control our lives. Have you ever tried to calculate how much money this kind of tracking will cost? About ten years ago I was in the German department where the archives of the Stasi, the East German political police, are kept. There was a full hall, strewn with undeciphered magnetic tapes - wiretapping from the 1970s. Over the 40 years of its existence, the Stasi conducted about a million observation cases, which, at the same time, did not always end in arrest or, moreover, conviction. Seven million people were engaged in their conduct, that is, there were seven people for only one case-observation. So don't think too highly of your own worth. If it seems to you that special services are strongly interested in you, understand that they have to spend quite a lot of resources on this operation. The same goes for organized crime, by the way: the idea that the mafia is waiting for you around every corner is caused by your limited rationality. Any potential for violence is limited; it is a resource that has to be counted and saved. Therefore, don't be afraid. Calculate how much it costs to fight personally with you, and you will see that many fears are exaggerated.

But do not hope. The amazing thing is that in the 1970s, wonderful Soviet economists, based on the work of one of our two Nobel laureates in economics, academician Kantorovich, made a system for the optimal functioning of the economy. But to whom were they addressed? After all, they, in general, understood that the country was ruled by the Politburo, with all its internal interests, with internal competition, with not always complete secondary education ... But the people who created the system for the optimal functioning of the Soviet economy had the idea that there was a certain subject, reasonable and all-good, a state that will take their proposals and implement them. And these ideas are still alive today. The problem is that power is not infinitely rational. Its rationality, that is, the rationality of the people who make it up, is rather severely limited. The assumption that power can do anything is based on the unrealistic notion that the gods are in power, which is not the case.

But power is not all-good, and therefore the well-known thesis “do not ask” is also justified in its own way. It is clear that opportunistic behavior is possible outside of power, but also within power. And if it is also formed taking into account the effect of worsening selection, then it is very likely that in power you will encounter people who are not limited by moral considerations.

Is it possible to live in this world with such a gloomy picture? Can. You just need to understand one thing: our hopes for something powerful and all-good can hardly serve as a normal fulcrum. It is necessary to rely rather on the rules that we can use in communicating with each other. We need to rely on institutions.

Alexander Auzan will talk about how institutions help people with limited rationality and opportunistic behavior in the next part.

Institutional Economics arose and developed as an oppositional doctrine - opposition, first of all, to neoclassical "economics".

Representatives of institutionalism tried to put forward an alternative concept to the main teaching, they sought to reflect in not only formal models and strict logical schemes, but also living life in all its diversity. In order to understand the causes and patterns of development of institutionalism, as well as the main directions of its criticism of the mainstream of economic thought, we briefly characterize the methodological basis -.

Old institutionalism

Formed on American soil, institutionalism absorbed many of the ideas of the German historical school, the English Fabians, and the French sociological tradition. The influence of Marxism on institutionalism cannot be denied either. The old institutionalism arose at the end of the 19th century. and took shape as a trend in 1920-1930. He tried to occupy the "middle line" between neoclassical "economics" and Marxism.

In 1898 Thorstein Veblen (1857-1929) criticized G. Schmoller, the leading representative of the German historical school, for excessive empiricism. Trying to answer the question "Why economics is not an evolutionary science", instead of a narrowly economic one, he proposes an interdisciplinary approach that would include social philosophy, anthropology and psychology. This was an attempt to turn economic theory towards social problems.

In 1918, the concept of "institutionalism" appeared. He is introduced by Wilton Hamilton. He defines an institution as "a common way of thinking or acting, imprinted in the habits of groups and the customs of a people." From his point of view, institutions fix established procedures, reflect the general agreement, the agreement that has developed in society. He understood institutions as customs, corporations, trade unions, the state, etc. This approach to understanding institutions is typical of traditional ("old") institutionalists, which include such well-known economists as Thorstein Veblen, Wesley Clare Mitchell, John Richard Commons, Karl -August Wittfogel, Gunnar Myrdal, John Kenneth Galbraith, Robert Heilbroner. Let's get acquainted with the concepts of some of them a little closer.

In The Theory of Business Enterprise (1904), T. Veblen analyzes the dichotomy of industry and business, rationality and irrationality. He contrasts behavior conditioned by real knowledge with behavior conditioned by habits of thought, considering the former as the source of change in progress, and the latter as a factor that counteracts it.

In the works written during the First World War and after it - "The instinct of skill and the state of industrial skills" (1914), "The place of science in modern civilization"(1919), "Engineers and the price system" (1921) - Veblen considered important problems scientific and technological progress, focusing on the role of "technocrats" (engineers, scientists, managers) in creating a rational industrial system. It was with them that he linked the future of capitalism.

Wesley Claire Mitchell (1874-1948) studied at Chicago, trained at Vienna and worked at Columbia University (1913 - 1948) Since 1920, he headed the National Bureau economic research. His focus was on business cycles and economic research. W.K. Mitchell turned out to be the first institutionalist to analyze real processes "with numbers in hand." In his work "Business Cycles" (1927), he explores the gap between the dynamics of industrial production and the dynamics of prices.

In Art Backwardness Spending Money (1937), Mitchell criticized neoclassical "economics" based on the behavior of the rational individual. He sharply opposed the "blissful calculator" I. Bentham, showing various forms human irrationality. He sought to statistically prove the difference between real behavior in the economy and the hedonic normotype. For Mitchell valid economic entity is the average person. Analyzing the irrationality of spending money in family budgets, he clearly showed that in America the art of "making money" was far ahead of the ability to spend it rationally.

A great contribution to the development of the old institutionalism was made by John Richard Commons (1862-1945). His focus in The Distribution of Wealth (1893) was the search for instruments of compromise between organized labor and big capital. These include the eight-hour work day and higher wages, which increase the purchasing power of the population. He also noted the beneficial effect of the concentration of industry to improve the efficiency of the economy.

In the books "Industrial Goodwill" (1919), "Industrial Management" (1923), "The Legal Foundations of Capitalism" (1924), the idea of ​​a social agreement between workers and entrepreneurs through mutual concessions is consistently promoted, it is shown how the diffusion of capitalist property contributes to a more even distribution of wealth.

In 1934, his book "Institutional Economic Theory" was published, in which the concept of a transaction (deal) was introduced. In its structure, Commons distinguishes three main elements - negotiations, acceptance of obligations and its implementation - and also characterizes various types of transactions (trade, management and rationing). From his point of view, the transactional process is the process of determining "reasonable value", which ends with a contract that implements "guarantees of expectations". IN last years J. Commons focused on the legal framework for collective action and, above all, the courts. This was reflected in the work published after his death - "The Economics of Collective Action" (1951).

Attention to civilization as a complex social system played a methodological role in post-war institutional concepts. In particular, this was reflected in the works of the American institutionalist historian, professor at Columbia and Washington Universities. Karl-August Wittfogel (1896-1988)- first of all, in his monograph "Oriental Despotism. A Comparative Study of Total Power". The structure-forming element in the concept of K.A. Wittfogel is despotism, which is characterized by the leading role of the state. The state relies on the bureaucratic apparatus and suppresses the development of private ownership tendencies. The wealth of the ruling class in this society is determined not by ownership of the means of production, but by a place in the hierarchical system of the state. Wittfogel believes that natural conditions and external influences determine the form of the state, and this in turn determines the type of social stratification.

A very important role in the development of the methodology of modern institutionalism was played by the works Carla Polanyi (1886-1964) and above all his "Great Transformation" (1944). In his work "The Economy as an Institutionalized Process", he singled out three types of exchange relations: reciprocity or mutual exchange on a natural basis, redistribution as a developed system of redistribution, and commodity exchange, which underlies the market economy.

Although each of the institutional theories is vulnerable to criticism, nevertheless, the very enumeration of the reasons for dissatisfaction with modernization shows how the views of scientists are changing. The focus is not weak purchasing power and inefficient consumer demand, nor low level savings and investment, and the value of the value system, the problem of alienation, tradition and culture. Even if resources and technology are considered, it is in connection with the social role of knowledge and the problems of environmental protection.

The focus of the modern American institutionalist John Kenneth Galbraith (b. 1908) there are questions of technostructure. Already in "American Capitalism. The Theory of the Balancing Force" (1952), he writes about managers as the bearers of progress and considers trade unions as a balancing force along with big business and the government.

However, the theme of scientific and technological progress and post-industrial society is most developed in the works "New industrial society"(1967) and" Economic Theory and the Goals of Society "(1973). In modern society," writes Galbraith, "there are two systems: planning and market. In the first, the leading role is played by the technostructure, which is based on the monopolization of knowledge. major decisions other than the owners of capital.Such technostructures exist under both capitalism and socialism.It is their growth that brings the development of these systems together, predetermining tendencies of convergence.

The Development of the Classical Tradition: Neoclassicism and Neoinstitutionalism

The concept of rationality and its development in the course of the formation of neo-institutionalism

Public choice and its main stages

constitutional choice. Back in the 1954 article “Individual Voting Choice and the Market,” James Buchanan identified two levels of public choice: 1) initial, constitutional choice (which takes place even before a constitution is adopted) and 2) post-constitutional. At the initial stage, the rights of individuals are determined, the rules for the relationship between them are established. At the post-constitutional stage, a strategy for the behavior of individuals is formed within the framework of established rules.

J. Buchanan draws a clear analogy with the game: first, the rules of the game are determined, and then, within the framework of these rules, the game itself is carried out. The constitution, from the point of view of James Buchanan, is such a set of rules for conducting a political game. The current policy is the result of playing within the constitutional rules. Therefore, the effectiveness and efficiency of policy depends to a large extent on how deep and comprehensive the original constitution was drafted; after all, according to Buchanan, the constitution is, first of all, the fundamental law not of the state, but of civil society.

However, the problem of “bad infinity” arises here: in order to adopt a constitution, it is necessary to develop pre-constitutional rules according to which it is adopted, and so on. To get out of this "hopeless methodological dilemma", Buchanan and Tulloch propose a seemingly self-evident rule of unanimity in a democratic society for the adoption of an initial constitution. Of course, this does not solve the problem, since the substantive question is replaced by a procedural one. However, there is such an example in history - the United States in 1787 showed a classic (and in many ways unique) example of a conscious choice of the rules of the political game. In the absence of universal suffrage, the US Constitution was adopted at a constitutional convention.

post-constitutional choice. Post-constitutional choice means the choice, first of all, of the "rules of the game" - legal doctrines and "working rules" (working rules), on the basis of which specific directions are determined economic policy, aimed at production and distribution .

Solving the problem of market failures, the state apparatus at the same time sought to solve two interrelated tasks: to ensure the normal operation of the market and to solve (or at least mitigate) acute socio-economic problems. This is what antitrust policy is for. social insurance, limiting production with negative and expanding production with positive externalities, the production of public goods.

Comparative characteristics of "old" and "new" institutionalism

Although institutionalism as a special trend was formed at the beginning of the 20th century, for a long time it was on the periphery of economic thought. Motion Explanation economic benefits only institutional factors did not find a large number of supporters. This was partly due to the uncertainty of the very concept of "institution", by which some researchers understood mainly customs, others - trade unions, still others - the state, fourth corporations - etc., etc. Partly - with the fact that institutionalists tried to use the methods of other social sciences in economics: law, sociology, political science, etc. As a result, they lost the opportunity to speak the common language of economic science, which was considered the language of graphs and formulas. There were, of course, other objective reasons why this movement was not in demand by contemporaries.

The situation, however, changed radically in the 1960s and 1970s. To understand why, it suffices to make at least a cursory comparison of "old" and "new" institutionalism. Between the "old" institutionalists (like T. Veblen, J. Commons, J. K. Galbraith) and neo-institutionalists (like R. Coase, D. North or J. Buchanan) there are at least three fundamental differences.

Firstly, the "old" institutionalists (for example, J. Commons in "The Legal Foundations of Capitalism") went to the economy from law and politics, trying to study the problems of modern economic theory using the methods of other social sciences; neo-institutionalists go the exact opposite way - they study political science and legal problems using the methods of neoclassical economic theory, and above all, using the apparatus of modern microeconomics and game theory.

Secondly, traditional institutionalism was based mainly on the inductive method, strove to go from particular cases to generalizations, as a result of which a general institutional theory did not take shape; neo-institutionalism follows a deductive path - from general principles neoclassical economic theory to explain the specific phenomena of social life.

Fundamental differences between "old" institutionalism and neo-institutionalism

signs	Old institutionalism	Non-institutionalism
Movement	From law and politics to the economy	From economics to politics and law
Methodology	Other humanities (law, political science, sociology, etc.)	Economic neoclassical (methods of microeconomics and game theory)
Method	Inductive	Deductive
Focus of attention	collective action	Independent individual
Analysis background		Methodological individualism

Thirdly, the "old" institutionalism, as a current of radical economic thought, paid primary attention to the actions of collectives (mainly trade unions and the government) to protect the interests of the individual; Neo-institutionalism, on the other hand, puts at the forefront an independent individual who, by his own will and in accordance with his interests, decides which collectives it is more profitable for him to be a member of (see Tables 1-2).

In recent decades, there has been a growing interest in institutional studies. This is partly due to an attempt to overcome the limitations of a number of prerequisites characteristic of economics (the axioms of complete rationality, absolute awareness, perfect competition, establishing equilibrium only through the price mechanism, etc.) and consider modern economic, social and political processes more comprehensively and comprehensively; partly with an attempt to analyze the phenomena that arose in the era of scientific and technological revolution, the application to which traditional methods research has not yet yielded the desired results. Therefore, we will first show how the development of the premises of neoclassical theory took place within it.

Neoclassicism and neoinstitutionalism: unity and differences

What all neo-institutionalists have in common is, first, that social institutions matter, and second, that they are amenable to analysis using standard microeconomic tools. In the 1960s-1970s. a phenomenon called G. Becker "economic imperialism" began. It was during this period economic concepts: maximization, balance, efficiency, etc. - have become actively used in such areas related to the economy as education, family relations, health care, crime, politics, etc. This has led to the fact that the basic economic categories of neoclassicism have received a deeper interpretation and a wider application.

Each theory consists of a core and a protective layer. Neo-institutionalism is no exception. Among the main prerequisites, he, like neoclassicism as a whole, primarily refers to:

• methodological individualism;
• concept of economic man;
• activity as an exchange.

However, unlike neoclassicism, these principles began to be carried out more consistently.

methodological individualism. In conditions of limited resources, each of us is faced with the choice of one of the available alternatives. Methods for analyzing the market behavior of an individual are universal. They can be successfully applied to any of the areas where a person must make a choice.

The basic premise of neo-institutional theory is that people act in any area in pursuit of their own interests, and that there is no insurmountable line between business and social sphere or politics.

The concept of economic man. The second premise of neo-institutional choice theory is the concept of "economic man" (homo oeconomicus). According to this concept, a person market economy identifies his preferences with the product. He seeks to make decisions that maximize the value of his utility function. His behavior is rational.

The rationality of the individual has a universal meaning in this theory. This means that all people are guided in their activities in the first place economic principle, i.e. compare marginal benefits and marginal costs (and, above all, the benefits and costs associated with decision-making):

where MB is the marginal benefit;

MC - marginal cost.

However, unlike neoclassical theory, which considers mainly physical (rare resources) and technological limitations (lack of knowledge, practical skills, etc.), neoinstitutional theory also considers transaction costs, i.e. costs associated with the exchange of property rights. This happened because any activity is seen as an exchange.

Activity as an exchange. Proponents of neo-institutional theory consider any area by analogy with the commodity market. The state, for example, with this approach, is an arena of people's competition for influence on decision-making, for access to the distribution of resources, for places in the hierarchical ladder. However, the state is a special kind of market. Its participants have unusual property rights: voters can choose representatives to the highest bodies of the state, deputies can pass laws, officials can monitor their implementation. Voters and politicians are treated as individuals exchanging votes and campaign promises.

It is important to emphasize that neo-institutionalists are more realistic about the features of this exchange, given that people are inherently bounded rationality, and decision-making is associated with risk and uncertainty. In addition, it is not always necessary to make the best decisions. Therefore, institutionalists compare the costs of decision-making not with a situation that is considered exemplary in microeconomics (perfect competition), but with those real alternatives that exist in practice.

Such an approach can be supplemented by an analysis of collective action, which involves considering phenomena and processes from the point of view of the interaction not of one individual, but of a whole group of persons. People can be united into groups on social or property grounds, religious or party affiliation.

At the same time, institutionalists can even somewhat deviate from the principle of methodological individualism, assuming that the group can be considered as the final indivisible object of analysis, with its own utility function, limitations, etc. However, a more rational approach seems to be to consider a group as an association of several individuals with own functions usefulness and interests.

The differences listed above are characterized by some institutionalists (R. Coase, O. Williamson, and others) as a genuine revolution in economic theory. Without downplaying their contribution to the development of economic theory, other economists (R. Posner and others) consider their work rather further development mainstream of economic thought. Indeed, it is now more and more difficult to imagine the main stream without the work of neo-institutionalists. They are more and more fully included in modern textbooks on Economics. However, not all directions are equally capable of entering the neoclassical "economics". To see this, let's take a closer look at the structure of modern institutional theory.

The main directions of neo-institutional theory

Structure of institutional theory

A unified classification of institutional theories has not yet developed. First of all, the dualism of the "old" institutionalism and neo-institutional theories is still preserved. Both directions of modern institutionalism were formed either on the basis of neoclassical theory, or under its significant influence (Fig. 1-2). Thus, neo-institutionalism developed, expanding and supplementing the main direction of "economics". Invading the sphere of other social sciences (law, sociology, psychology, politics, etc.), this school used traditional microeconomic methods of analysis, trying to explore all social relations from the position of a rationally thinking "economic man" (homo oeconomicus). Therefore, any relationship between people is viewed through the prism of mutually beneficial exchange. Since the time of J. Commons, this approach has been called the contract (contractual) paradigm.

If, within the framework of the first direction (neo-institutional economics), the institutional approach only expanded and modified the traditional neoclassic, remaining within its limits and removing only some of the most unrealistic prerequisites (the axioms of complete rationality, absolute awareness, perfect competition, establishing equilibrium only through the price mechanism, etc.) , then the second direction (institutional economics) relied to a much greater extent on the "old" institutionalism (often of a very "left" persuasion).

If the first direction ultimately strengthens and expands the neoclassical paradigm, subordinating to it more and more new areas of research (family relations, ethics, political life, interracial relations, crime, the historical development of society, etc.), then the second direction comes to a complete rejection of neoclassicism. , giving rise to an institutional economy that is in opposition to the neoclassical "mainstream". This modern institutional economics rejects the methods of marginal and equilibrium analysis, adopting evolutionary sociological methods. (We are talking about such areas as the concepts of convergence, post-industrial, post-economic society, economics global problems). Therefore, representatives of these schools choose areas of analysis that go beyond the market economy (problems of creative labor, overcoming private property, eliminating exploitation, etc.). Relatively apart within the framework of this direction is only the French economy of agreements, which is trying to lay a new foundation for the neo-institutional economy and, above all, for its contractual paradigm. This basis, from the point of view of representatives of the economy of agreements, are norms.

Rice. 1-2. Classification of institutional concepts

The contract paradigm of the first direction arose thanks to the research of J. Commons. However, in its modern form, it received a slightly different interpretation, different from the original interpretation. The contract paradigm can be implemented both from the outside, i.e. through the institutional environment (the choice of social, legal and political "rules of the game"), and from within, that is, through the relationships underlying organizations. In the first case, constitutional law can act as the rules of the game, property right, administrative law, various legislative acts etc., in the second - the internal regulations of the organizations themselves. Within this direction, the theory of property rights (R. Coase, A. Alchian, G. Demsets, R. Posner, etc.) studies the institutional environment of economic organizations in the private sector of the economy, and the theory of public choice (J. Buchanan, G. Tulloch , M. Olson, R. Tollison, etc.) - the institutional environment for the activities of individuals and organizations in the public sector. If the first direction focuses on the welfare gain that can be obtained due to a clear specification of property rights, then the second one focuses on the losses associated with the activities of the state (the economy of bureaucracy, the search for political rent, etc.).

It is important to emphasize that property rights are understood primarily as a system of rules governing access to scarce or limited resources. With this approach, property rights acquire important behavioral significance, since they can be likened to the original rules of the game that regulate relations between individual economic agents.

The theory of agents (relationships "principal-agent" - J. Stiglitz) focuses on the preliminary premises (incentives) of contracts (ex ante), and the theory of transaction costs (O. Williamson) - on already implemented agreements (ex post), generating various management structures. The theory of agents considers various mechanisms for stimulating the activities of subordinates, as well as organizational schemes that ensure the optimal distribution of risk between the principal and the agent. These problems arise in connection with the separation of capital-property from capital-function, i.e. separation of ownership and control - problems posed in the works of W. Berl and G. Minz in the 1930s. Modern researchers (W. Meckling, M. Jenson, Y. Fama, and others) are studying the measures necessary to ensure that the behavior of agents deviates to the least extent from the interests of the principals. Moreover, if they try to foresee these problems in advance, even when concluding contracts (ex ante), then the theory of transaction costs (S. Chen, Y Barzel, etc.) focuses on the behavior of economic agents after the contract is concluded (ex post) . A special direction within this theory is represented by the works of O. Williamson, whose focus is on the problem of governance structure.

Of course, the differences between theories are quite relative, and one can often observe how the same scholar works in different areas of neo-institutionalism. This is especially true for such specific areas as "law and economics" (economics of law), economics of organizations, new economic history, etc.

There are quite profound differences between American and Western European institutionalism. The American tradition of economics as a whole is far ahead of the European level, however, in the field of institutional studies, the Europeans turned out to be strong competitors of their overseas counterparts. These differences can be explained by the difference in national and cultural traditions. America is a country "without history", and therefore the approach from the standpoint of an abstract rational individual is typical for an American researcher. On the contrary, Western Europe, the cradle modern culture, fundamentally rejects the extreme opposition of the individual and society, the reduction of interpersonal relations only to market transactions. Therefore, Americans are often stronger in the use of mathematics, but weaker in understanding the role of traditions, cultural norms, mental stereotypes, etc. - all that is precisely forte new institutionalism. If representatives of American neo-institutionalism consider norms primarily as a result of choice, then French neo-institutionalists consider norms as a prerequisite for rational behavior. Rationality is therefore also revealed as a norm of behavior.

New institutionalism

Institutions in modern theory are understood as the "rules of the game" in society, or "man-made" restrictive framework that organizes relationships between people, as well as a system of measures that ensures their implementation (enforcement). They create a structure of incentives for human interaction, reduce uncertainty by organizing everyday life.

Institutions are divided into formal (for example, the US Constitution) and informal (for example, the Soviet "telephone law").

Under informal institutions usually understand generally accepted conventions and ethical codes of human behavior. These are customs, "laws", habits or regulatory rules which is the result of the close coexistence of people. Thanks to them, people easily find out what others want from them, and understand each other well. These codes of conduct are shaped by culture.

Under formal institutions refers to the rules created and maintained by specially authorized people (government officials).

The process of formalizing restrictions is associated with increasing their impact and reducing costs through the introduction of uniform standards. The costs of protecting the rules are, in turn, associated with establishing the fact of violation, measuring the degree of violation and punishing the violator, provided that the marginal benefits exceed the marginal costs, or at least not higher than them (MB ≥ MC). Property rights are realized through a system of incentives (anti-incentives) in a set of alternatives facing economic agents. The choice of a certain course of action ends with the conclusion of a contract.

Control over compliance with contracts can be both personalized and non-personalized. The first is based on family ties, personal loyalty, shared beliefs or ideological convictions. The second is on the provision of information, the application of sanctions, the formal control exercised by a third party, and ultimately leads to the need for organizations.

The range of domestic works that touch upon issues of neo-institutional theory is already quite wide, although, as a rule, these monographs are not very accessible to most teachers and students, since they come out in a limited edition, rarely exceeding a thousand copies, which, of course, for such a large country as Russia very little. Among Russian scientists who actively apply neo-institutional concepts in the analysis of modern Russian economy, it is necessary to single out S. Avdashev, V. Avtonomov, O. Ananyin, A. Auzan, S. Afontsev, R. Kapelyushnikov, Ya. Kuzminov, Yu. Latov, V. Mayevsky, S. Malakhov, V. Mau, V. Naishul , A. Nesterenko, R. Nureyev, A. Oleinik, V. Polterovich, V. Radaev, V. Tambovtsev, L. Timofeeva, A. Shastitko, M. Yudkevich, A. Yakovlev and others. But a very serious barrier to the approval of this paradigm in Russia is the lack of organizational unity and specialized periodicals, where the foundations of the institutional approach would be systematized.